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This book germinated in a chance encounter with Egyptian theater while 
I was studying Arabic at the American University in Cairo in the summer 
of 1999. I had read a review of director Mohamed Sobhi’s Carmen in the 
English- language weekly Cairo Times, and decided to test my fledgling Egyp-
tian colloquial Arabic by going to watch the play at a downtown theater. I 
understood very few lines. The satire of Hosni Mubarak’s pseudodemocratic 
regime felt powerful nonetheless, and it inspired me to think critically about 
the aesthetic, affective, and political dimensions of theater. In the years that 
followed, several mentors have helped me understand theater as a cultural 
phenomenon under dictatorship.
At Amherst College, Deborah Gewertz and Jamal Elias nurtured my inter-
est in Egypt and anthropology with the kind of advising I only aspire to 
emulate. Amherst’s dean of the faculty and Religion Department together 
funded my first trip to Cairo, where I researched my senior honors thesis on 
youth culture. Tayeb el- Hibri was a patient Arabic teacher, particularly when 
Egyptian youth slang deformed my classical Arabic. My gratitude also goes 
to my Egyptian sisters Rula and Rania Zaki, who took in a naive college stu-
dent and did much to help her settle into Cairo. Their friendship over the 
years has made them the nicest kind of extended family.
Later, at Columbia University, Brinkley Messick and Lila Abu- Lughod 
were staunchly supportive advisers to a project they understandably found 
quixotic. Outside the Department of Anthropology, courses with Gayatri Spi-
vak and Peggy Phelan were key to refining my ideas. The late Pierre Cachia 
also shared his wisdom about performance in the Cairo of his childhood. Elli-
ott Colla, Deborah Kapchan, and Rosalind Morris offered further feedback 
and stimulating critique. The loyal friendship of Sofian Merabet and Ruchi 
Chaturvedi amplified New York’s charms. Sofian has continued to read drafts 
and encourage me through the project’s twists and turns, for which I am ever 
grateful. I owe a further debt to Nadia Latif and Ben Sampson for their sup-
port during a spell of writing when I navigated four flights of stairs with a 
broken foot.
An International Predissertation Fellowship from the Social Science Research 
Council (2001– 2) was transformative in allowing me to spend a year in Cairo 
under the tutelage of Dr. Nehad Selaiha, dean of the Arts Criticism Institute 
at the Academy of Arts. When the Theater Institute’s administrators would 
not let me enroll, Dr. Nehad took me under her wing and introduced me to 
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everyone in the independent theater movement. She was the most forma-
tive influence on this book, and I regret that she is no longer alive to see it. 
Her friends and protégés have remained my guides through Cairo’s theater 
world ever since: Nora Amin, Sameh Ezzat, Hassan el- Geretly, Hany El- 
Metennawy, Rasha Abdel Moneim, Hamada Shousha, Reham Zein, and 
others. Moreover, Abeer Ali, Ahmed el- Attar, Hazem Azmy, Mirette Mikhail, 
Khaled el- Sawy, and Effat Yehia have been enormously helpful and insight-
ful colleagues. Their patient answers to my questions (sometimes by email 
from New York) shed much light on my path to understanding their work. 
Their theater world as I describe it is now past, but I hope my analysis does 
justice to it.
I was lucky to learn at the start of my anthropological career that rela-
tionships made in “the field” keep a research program alive with the allure 
of going back to meet old friends. Sameh and Reham were my compan-
ions at many plays and introduced me to many corners of downtown Cairo. 
Elisabetta Ciuccarelli, Jakob Lindfors, Lucia Sorbera, and Matteo Vivian-
etti were youthful coconspirators in various urban adventures. Later, Yasser 
Abdellatif, Iman Mersal, Sara Sedrak, and Randa Shaath enlivened evenings 
at the Greek Club and Estoril with their company. Nadia Naqib’s welcom-
ing home and warm friendship still make it a pleasure to go back to Cairo.
It is my biased belief that Middle East studies scholars are second to none 
in their collegiality. For their intellectual insight and encouragement, I am 
indebted to Margaret Litvin, Kamran Rastegar, and Jessica Winegar in par-
ticular. The Middle East Studies Association meeting has been a welcome 
refuge from the misconceptions about the region in the larger academic 
world. It was always nice not to have to explain here that the Arab world 
did have theater. The supportive feedback of Arabist colleagues was crucial 
in helping me move from a defensive stance about studying Egyptian theater 
to a more nuanced scholarly argument.
My shift from cultural anthropology to theater studies would not have 
been possible without the interdisciplinary community of the University 
of California, Los Angeles, program Cultures in Transnational Perspective, 
where I was lucky to hold a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellowship. Program leaders 
Françoise Lionnet and Shu- mei Shih were role models of intellectual openness 
and human generosity with sharp rigor. Theirs was the most diverse academic 
group I have ever been part of. Sue- Ellen Case welcomed me to the theater 
department and taught me a great deal about performance studies. As an 
affiliate of UCLA’s Department of Anthropology, I also learned much at its 
linguistic anthropology colloquium. And my fellow Mellons were the most 
amazing scholars and individuals. Alessandra Di Maio, Kris Manjapra, Sarah 
Valentine, Sze Wei Ang, and especially Marcela Fuentes made Los Angeles a 
formative place and epicenter of academic cool. I am grateful to Françoise and 
Shu- mei for organizing reunion conferences that allowed us to meet there later 
in our careers.
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Youth, Performance, and Identity in the Late Mubarak Era
The arcades linking downtown Cairo’s boulevards were dotted with sidewalk 
cafés serving tea, coffee, and shisha, as well as air- conditioned bars where 
muthaqqafin (the cultured class) met to gossip about art and politics. The 
Grillon bar was a social institution among state television journalists and 
employees of the public arts sector, its bow- tie- clad bartenders dressed by 
the rules of an era when downtown was the center of Cairo’s nightlife. Over 
rounds of local Stella beer and Merit cigarettes, these members of a wan-
ing intellectual elite dissected the nation’s drift away from their leftist ideals. 
President Hosni Mubarak’s economic reforms had ushered global corpora-
tions into the Egyptian economy and streamlined the state sector since the 
1990s. The public cultural institutions on which an older generation had 
thrived no longer existed for young college graduates with artistic or liter-
ary ambitions. Now that satellite television dishes had sprouted on Cairo’s 
buildings, reshaping the cultural landscape and throwing Egypt’s prominence 
in the Arab world into question, these literati debated the future of national 
culture with particular urgency.
On an August evening in 2005, a friend and I visited the Grillon to meet 
playwright and director Lenin el- Ramli. The rumpled, bespectacled intel-
lectual in his sixties shared enduring friendships and socialist ideals with 
state- sector peers, despite having launched a private theater company. He 
was currently preparing a play for the upcoming edition of the Cairo Interna-
tional Festival for Experimental Theatre (CIFET), Masks Off!, a satire on the 
sudden fashion for wearing masks. This allegory of the spread of face veil-
ing (niqab) in urban Egypt drove home El- Ramli’s secularist cultural politics 
with raucous comedy. While his collaborations with Mohamed Sobhi in the 
1980s and 1990s satirized feckless presidents and the decline of Arab solidar-
ity, he now turned his critical eye to Egypt’s alliance with the United States 
and the rise of Islamist movements.1 Theater was his intellectual generation’s 
means of staging debates on national identity at a time of cultural polariza-
tion. And Cairo audiences of various ages flocked to his plays.
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In the alleyway off the Grillon, younger downtown muthaqqafin dug 
into bowls of fava beans at the sidewalk restaurant of Saad al- Harami. Sev-
eral worked part time as freelance journalists or acting teachers; others were 
unemployed. Amateur theater was the topic of many of their conversations, 
a cherished means of sustaining student- day debates and gaining an audi-
ence for intellectual voices of a new generation. Instead of staging the plays 
of canonical Egyptian playwrights, these dramatists used news articles and 
translated texts to generate scripts for contemporary theater. One friend who 
had dropped out of the prestigious Theater Institute (Ma’had al- Masrah) 
because he found its curriculum old- fashioned spoke of devising a play based 
on a Paulo Coelho book, with Indian music to accompany the spiritual 
theme. Cairo dramatists in their twenties and thirties shared with El- Ramli’s 
generation an enthusiasm for theater as a stage for national identity poli-
tics and a means of self- representation. But they played the role of public 
intellectuals through adaptation, hybridization, and improvisation more than 
authorship. Their version of avant- garde culture traversed genre and national 
boundaries.
This book analyzes the evolving use of urban theater as a stage for citi-
zenship during the decline and fall of the Mubarak regime. When the former 
president’s minister of culture trimmed the budgets of state theaters, divert-
ing millions toward an annual international theater festival, young Egyptian 
dramatists took to seeking space outside state institutions to make critical 
theater. These university graduates from urban families found in the ven-
erable art a public forum in which to represent their generational concerns 
intellectually and aesthetically, if not politically. Wherever theater was per-
formed, it created a platform for modern identity politics that echoed that 
of the storied theaters of Egypt’s heritage. Middle- class creatives who strug-
gled to find work in an increasingly globalized private cultural sector that 
favored a tiny, bilingual elite found in amateur theater a place to pursue 
many ambitions. Throughout the shifting economic tides produced by glo-
balization policies in the early 2000s, and waves of political repression, they 
invested their time and resources in building a milieu for youth culture to call 
their own. Independent theater became a lively stage of citizenship, gathering 
waves of generational representation of Egyptian identity.
Among the policies of neoliberal globalization in what I call the late 
Mubarak era (2001– 11), one that affected youth sharply was the reduction 
of state subsidies for public universities and cultural centers. As with the 
structural adjustment programs that had handed economic power to foreign 
corporations in Egypt, the shrinking of state cultural institutions proved most 
detrimental to the middle class.2 The state sector had traditionally employed 
journalists, television producers, and artists, making culture a respectable 
career for college graduates. However, my friends ensconced in downtown 
Cairo’s cafés lacked such avenues for employment and social influence. Their 
generation experienced a growing cultural and economic distance from the 
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aging ranks of established, state- employed intellectuals. Most dramatists 
under forty thus affiliated themselves with the independent arts movements 
that some of their seniors dismissed as amateur. The new generation styled 
its distance from state institutions as a mode of freedom, however, claim-
ing its underground as a space of independent thought, like the informal 
spaces Stefano Harney and Fred Moten call “the undercommons of enlight-
enment.”3 They capitalized on a fashion for transnational theater in an era 
of globalization to claim the mantle of Egyptian avant- gardists of the future. 
These “youth of the theater” (shabab al- masrah) used the double sense of the 
word “youth” (in Arabic as in English) to signal the rejuvenation of Egyp-
tian theater. Their relative optimism about the future of national culture in 
the era of globalization reasserted the role of theater as a stage not just for 
intellectual debate but also for the reconceptualization of the avant- garde as 
a popular, inclusive cultural space.
The idealistic cultural workers who launched independent theater in 
Egypt, through activist campaigns in 1990 and 2005, were part of a wider 
movement of underground organizing that generated the 2011 revolution. As 
Egyptians who came of age in the Mubarak era demanded cultural and polit-
ical rights from state institutions, they demonstrated the force of alternative 
representational practices when formal politics was stifled by dictatorship. 
Thus, the performances and activism developed in independent theater of the 
late Mubarak era built repertoires of citizenship. As independent dramatists 
developed contemporary, critical narratives of middle- class identity, they also 
practiced collaborating, debating, and organizing cultural production. Their 
collaborations evolved into repertoires that sustained concepts of citizenship 
in the undercommons of a neoliberal oligarchy. Cultural production had a 
relatively wide margin of freedom under Mubarak, as was the case with his 
predecessors in Egypt who protected artists and dramatists from excesses 
of state violence. The policy of cultural democracy, launched in the 1990s, 
specifically designated the arts as a site of liberal secular expression.4 Tele-
vision dramas and literary novels were consequently critical sites of debate 
on national culture and social class in Egypt’s era of globalization.5 Inde-
pendent arts movements in the decade before the revolution further opened 
up the space of cultural debate, turning a closed intellectual landscape into 
a proliferating web of venues for cultural democracy. They generated new 
platforms for expression that allowed institutionalized modernist ideology to 
branch out into diverse politics of citizenship. Analyzing the cultural politics 
of independent performance repertoires offers insights into the ways in which 
participatory citizenship was rehearsed on the eve of Egypt’s revolution, and 
enacted in its aftermath.
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Egyptian Theater and Identity Politics in the Twentieth Century
Egypt was unchallenged as the leading Arab producer of film, television, and 
music throughout the twentieth century. Its official national dialect spread 
through the Arab world via broadcast, in radio concerts by Umm Kulthum, 
the cinema of Youssef Chahine, and television versions of stage plays like the 
1970s Madrasat al- mushaghghabin (School for Troublemakers), still on reruns 
in the 1990s.6 For many contemporary Cairenes, the golden age of Egyptian 
theater was that in which movie stars Adel Imam and Ahmad Zaki had got-
ten their breaks. “Do you know that Adel Imam is in a play on Haram Street 
right now?” many a helpful Cairo taxi driver asked when I mentioned I was 
researching theater in 2004. As proud as many Cairenes were of their televi-
sion and cinema, theater elicited a special nostalgia. Whether my interlocutors 
had acted in university festivals or watched stage comedies on television, they 
spoke of theater as an art of uncensored satire and youthful irreverence. It was 
a place where director Mohamed Sobhi could satirize President Mubarak’s fake 
referendum with two different words for “yes” in his 1999 musical Carmen, 
and youth could make fun of teachers in School for Troublemakers. The his-
torical shifts within Egyptian theater made it both a school for national 
identity and a space in which to critique its authoritative conception.
After 1919, when Egypt rose in revolution against British occupation 
and Ottoman rule, cosmopolitan intellectuals began promoting theater as a 
means of fostering modern thought. Pioneering playwright Muhammad Tay-
mur advocated for national theater with the argument that this cultural form 
was a mark of a modern, European- style society.7 Until this time, theater in 
Egypt had mainly been the province of traveling Syrian troupes who adapted 
French and Italian stories, with exceptions such as Egyptian Jewish play-
wright Yaqub Sanu’, whose satires at Cairo’s Comédie Française theater 
ran afoul of the Ottoman khedive.8 Egyptian playwrights before the Second 
World War largely continued this tradition of comedy and farce, despite the 
efforts of Taymur and French- educated Tawfiq al- Hakim to lift theater above 
light entertainment. Songs were a key attraction in plays, and actors were 
renowned primarily as singers and dancers.9 After the war, the liberal Waf-
dist government promoted theater for education more systematically. It was 
taught in the national network of amateur cultural centers called the People’s 
University (established in 1945), where classes in art, theater, and literary 
writing supplemented school curricula with aesthetic repertoires of cosmo-
politan identity. The years after the 1952 revolution marked a high point 
of state support for theater, as President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime fun-
neled public money into building new theaters in Cairo, including the Tali’a 
(Avant- Garde), near the National Theater (formerly the Comédie Française), 
and Al- Salam Theater for the new Comedy and Modern Theater troupes.
Leading playwrights of the Nasser era, such as Yusuf Idris and Al- Hakim, 
published widely read polemics that questioned the politics of staging 
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European- style theater in a postcolonial nation. Their arguments for theater 
that suited Egypt’s “theatrical mold” and drew on folk characters were influ-
ential in evolving definitions of modern national culture that extended beyond 
the cosmopolitan urban class that older liberals addressed.10 Meanwhile, 
the regime sponsored budding playwrights and directors on study- abroad 
programs in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.11 The combination of vig-
orous debates about and major state funding for theater led to a vibrant and 
critical “theater of the sixties” (masrah al- sittiniyat) that intellectuals like El- 
Ramli continued to lionize. When private theaters were legalized again in the 
1970s, that golden age was used to stand for a project of national unity, pan- 
Arabism, and socialism, across its varied genres and forms. However, it had 
been a crucial means of contesting state policy as well as supporting its left-
ist principles.
Fans of irreverent comedy and literary drama alike valued theater as a 
venue for sociopolitical critique. Like their Syrian counterparts, Egyptian play-
wrights of the late twentieth century capitalized on the protection afforded to 
the arts to hold the state and its leaders to account. The language of theater 
was often high Arabic (fusha), and the double valence of al- adab as “liter-
ature” and “politesse” in Arabic granted critical drama a courtly stature.12 
Literary writers across the Arab world channeled its cultural respectability 
to criticize authorities. Lisa Wedeen writes of a rich visual and verbal reper-
toire in Syria under Hafez al- Assad that framed the ruling family as a corrupt 
patriarchy. It included jokes, literature, and particularly theater.13 The com-
parable use of political allegory in Nasser’s Egypt staged the revered president 
as a misguided protagonist who needed guidance from ethical intellectuals, 
represented often by a Hamlet figure.14 If theater was a space of cultural 
exception to the sustained emergency of democracy in Syria, it served a com-
parable function under successive Egyptian dictators.15 When more comic 
styles of drama blossomed with the reemergence of private theaters in the 
1970s, playwrights continued to invoke literary tradition to authorize their 
political critiques. For instance, Ali Salem’s 1970 Comedy of Oedipus: You 
Killed the Beast turned the Greek drama into a satire of Nasser’s policies, set-
ting the stage for Salem’s earthier School for Troublemakers.
Critical drama on Egypt’s main stages fell into decline in the Mubarak 
era, when state support for playwriting diminished. Moreover, the regime’s 
expanding economic power proved difficult to represent in traditional drama. 
When Cairo’s National Theater staged King Lear in 2001 and Hamlet in 
2003, it produced costume dramas in ornate Arabic that left all the major 
critics unimpressed. They denounced the use of big budgets to stage classic 
plays that failed to resonate with current social or political concerns.16 After 
all, charismatic Arab presidents who were once represented as kings had been 
replaced by technocrats. Thus, Syria’s Bashar al- Assad was represented as 
a sadistic puppet in the show Top Goon and his violence played for dark 
laughs.17 Egypt’s Mubarak did not even appear as a dramatic character; his 
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regime’s power was visible instead in capillary intrusions into citizens’ lives. 
My theater friends in the early 2000s consequently found the Egyptian canon 
of political drama unsatisfying for their purposes. “How did the political 
theater of the sixties change anything?” one actor- director asked rhetorically. 
These new- generation dramatists recognized that Egyptian theater’s status 
as a stage for national debate had diminished in the age of television. One 
advantage of theater’s lower new profile, however, was that it was minimally 
censored by state authorities.18 Independent theater, in particular, could stage 
more daring narratives than television dramas.
Independent theater in the late Mubarak era was critical rather than directly 
political, addressing a mode of neoliberal state power that “manifested in 
multiple, often contradictory strategies that encounter diverse claims and con-
testations, and produce diverse and contingent outcomes.”19 The Ministry 
of Culture invited troupes to participate in its theater festivals and offered 
opportunities at state theaters on an ad hoc basis. Meanwhile, state secu-
rity regularly shut down independent plays about which informers had 
complained. Theater makers began self- regulating their work, developing 
strategies in response to the uneven exercise of power. Their strategies exem-
plified what Gilles Deleuze calls the society of control, in which subjects 
modulate their relationships to power.20 Adjusting the nationalist tone of 
political theater in earlier decades, contemporary dramatists now spoke back 
to state pedagogy in alternative performances of citizenship that centered on 
gender and generational identity. Not only did they largely reject the literary 
respectability of the older generation, then, but they also turned aesthetic dis-
sent into new avant- garde style. Neoliberal state policies combined with a 
history of intellectual critique in theater to shape an independent theater that 
set new cultural standards. It spoke of individual citizens and their desires 
rather than of masses awaiting enlightenment. While claiming the mantle of 
critical intellectuals, then, independents were also proud outcasts of cultural 
institutions and their approved narratives of identity.21
The iconoclastic politics of identity in independent theater scrambled the 
cultural genres of state theaters, each assigned to produce plays for a segment 
of the citizenry. As “the theater of established authors” (masrah al- rasikhin), 
the National Theater addressed educated audiences with high- toned drama. 
Tragedy was a signature of its program, which typically consisted of one 
translated play in literary Arabic and one in Egyptian Arabic each year. Col-
loquial musical comedies and romantic melodramas formed the mainstay of 
Cairo’s Al- Salam Theater, by contrast. In 2004, veteran playwright Alfred 
Farag’s Gawaz ‘ala waraqit al- talaq (Marriage on a Divorce Paper) revived 
Nasserist nostalgia with its staging of a doomed love affair between a young 
aristocrat and the daughter of his chauffeur. There were few such national 
heroes in independent theater, with its marginalized young men (see chapter 
3). Their performance of the role of ethical citizen was more tenuous, as they 
struggled to reconcile national ideals with oppressive realities. Independent 
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dramatists challenged the progressive symbolism of middle- class protago-
nists in mainstream theater by showing how that social class had been eroded 
morally and materially.
Even intellectuals of an older generation recognized that the old avant- garde 
dramatic genres no longer worked in a new era. They applauded Minister of Cul-
ture Farouk Hosni for taking the initiative to reimagine Egyptian theater when 
he founded CIFET in 1988. Aimed at bringing Egyptian theater into conversa-
tion with global trends, the festival also relieved avant- gardists of a tradition of 
representing the nation positively. New experimental theater would focus on 
diverse stories and attend to form as well as content. The influence of CIFET 
enriched Egyptian repertoires of proscenium naturalism with dance theater, 
storytelling, and other styles fashionable at transnational festivals. The fes-
tival certainly raised debate on how such transnational exchange might 
threaten the cultural specificity of Egyptian theater, at academic seminars and 
in the pages of literary journals.22 Given the nationalist commitments of state 
theaters, it was unsurprising that new styles and genres seen at CIFET had 
the most visible impact on independent theater. Younger dramatists seized the 
opportunity to mediate their stories through texts and techniques outside the 
Egyptian literary canon. Their embrace of new performance styles gave their 
repertoires a cosmopolitan cachet, echoing the authoritative language that 
literary predecessors had claimed for their own critical theater.
New embodiments of the citizen in independent theater resembled the Euro-
peanized liberal aesthetics of Egypt’s historical avant- garde. In many ways, 
independent theater was an extension of the twentieth- century state cultural 
project of fashioning modern identity through artistic self- representation. 
However, staging neoliberal politics of personhood engendered subtle dif-
ferences from the performance repertoires of classical modernism.23 A key 
difference of theater in the neoliberal context was that it relied on more varied 
arbiters of value than just the state cultural establishment. As such, its reper-
toires aligned with different institutional values. If the Ministry of Culture or 
Cultural Development Fund was unable to help a troupe, the troupe could 
appeal to a foreign cultural center (see chapter 2) or private teaching insti-
tution (see chapter 5). Since building cultural alliances was a multipronged 
endeavor for an independent troupe, these troupes assembled flexible rep-
ertoires of genre and character. These evolved as the troupes’ performance 
venues changed, and the sprawling independent movement itself evolved 
considerably during the decade of my study. The exuberant cosmopolitanism 
that led some critics to question independent theater as a new national avant- 
garde indexed shifting politics of citizenship during these turbulent years in 
Egypt. While the aesthetics of citizenship in golden- age theater centered on 
iconic national figures, independent theater staged the gender and class poli-
tics of neoliberal identity.
It is in this sense that independent theater of the late Mubarak era was a 
theater of neoliberal citizenship, responding to the erasure of popular voice 
10 Chapter 1
in economic and political institutions with self- styled representational prac-
tices. In an era of international arts festivals, satellite television, economic 
globalization, and military dictatorship, the nation and the stage were no 
longer metonymic spaces. State theaters could not claim to represent the 
iconic citizen. Yet avant- garde performance repertoires did enrich the means 
of narrating contemporary crises of citizenship. In particular, the shift in 
independent theater away from text- based dramatic literature opened up sce-
narios of alienation and narratives of stasis rather than progress. New theater 
staged gender and class anxiety through experimental repertoires for embod-
ying fractured selves. In the plays, theater workshops, and activist campaigns 
of independent theater, young characters embodied living critiques of a 
nation that left them without a future.
Narrating Youth and the National Future
The hero of many a classic Egyptian drama was a young student, son, or 
lover whose story was also that of the modernizing nation. In the theater 
of the early 2000s, these protagonists were often alienated youth. Dancer- 
choreographer Muhammad Shafiq’s 2004 dance theater show Aqulu lakum 
(I Say to You) had ten performers onstage, nine of them men, occupying sepa-
rate spaces to voice fragments of poetry, play a guitar, or eat watermelon. The 
visually striking performance devised for CIFET staged what Shafiq consid-
ered a key truth about his generation: “99% of Egyptian youth don’t know 
what to do. They are torn apart [mushattatin].”24 The circular narrative of the 
performance marked the repetitive experience of time for many unemployed 
graduates who participated in independent theater. There was no grand, mod-
ernist coming- of- age; narratives were built instead through smaller movements 
of bodies and shifts in their relations. Performance repertoires in independent 
theater evolved in tandem with generational conceptions of identity to stage 
the experience of being young in a time without hope.
Youth had been icons of a progressive Egyptian modernity since the inter-
war period, when they represented cosmopolitan middle- class (effendi) 
culture in sports media and photography.25 In the post- 1990s wave of glo-
balization, they were hailed as cosmopolitan consumers of new media and 
consumer goods.26 The young men who swaggered through downtown Cairo 
on Friday evenings, with trendy hair and tight jeans, consciously played the 
role of modern youth inherited from Egypt’s cinematic and musical herit-
age. In the late Mubarak era, however, being young and urban, even college 
educated, held little promise of attaining full citizenship. The academic and 
bureaucratic institutions that had channeled upward mobility were eroded 
by structural adjustment reforms, and only exclusive private schools could 
now guarantee their graduates economic independence. Young models seen 
in Egyptian advertisements for glitzy holidays and television talent contests 
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were visibly upper class. For the Mubarak regime, a bright national future was 
represented by the president’s son and heir- apparent, Gamal, whose smiling 
face began appearing on television and giant billboards in Cairo. The gaping 
difference between iconographies of youth for members of the business elite, 
on the one hand, and the reality of struggle for most urban youth, on the 
other, fueled an underground youth culture. Independent theater became one 
creative space for middle- class Egyptians in search of an aesthetic vocabulary 
to replace a lost iconography of youthful hope and desire.
In the early twenty- first century, when the median Egyptian population 
was under thirty- five years old,27 youth moved at different speeds through 
life and urban space. A middle- class Cairo man in his twenties, like my friend 
Khaled, typically lived with his parents in a modest suburb like Al- Haram or 
Helwan. Khaled had a public university degree and worked several freelance 
jobs, saving a little money in the hope of marrying and renting his own apart-
ment. The world of theater offered a space of community and cultural capital 
while his search for permanent employment dragged on. Between appoint-
ments in central Cairo, he caught up with university friends at downtown 
cafés, where they discussed creative projects and kept youthful dreams alive. 
Their plays about the temporality of everyday despair paradoxically helped 
these young artists think of a future in which they could lead more respect-
able lives. Most of the youth who talked theater at such cafés were men. 
The few young women free to socialize here were children of artists and 
intellectuals, journalists on the beat, or foreign residents of downtown like 
me. We inhabited a bohemian world in which youth stretched beyond stu-
dent years and slow journeys to adulthood were the norm. A daring few 
even conducted love affairs in downtown pieds- à- terre. Their unconventional 
lifestyles attracted criticism from many elders who worried about unemploy-
ment among educated youth. Senior dramatist Saleh Saad, whose teenage 
daughter was part of this crowd, once organized a play because he was con-
cerned about youth wasting their time at cafés. Theater work gave structure 
and narrative to slow lives.
In performance, young creatives were able to situate their unconven-
tional lives within a history of avant- garde youth culture. Like José Esteban 
Muñoz’s queer performers, alienated from mainstream theater, these artists 
constructed minor narratives that “offer[ed] the minoritarian subject a space 
to situate itself in history and thus seize social agency.”28 Muñoz’s concept 
of disidentification, an alternative to the binary of good and bad subjects, 
resonates with the work of young Egyptian theater makers who turned the 
negative associations of unemployed leisure into time for art. Rather than 
being sexual rebels or drug users, they used theater to enact an alternative 
respectability. They played the role of new- generation intellectuals by debat-
ing at downtown cafés, where they sometimes joined the weekly gatherings 
(nadwas) of senior intellectuals. At the same time, they questioned the very 
institutions of Cairo’s intellectual life, as they formed a fugitive community 
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seeking to remake the system rather than reproduce its concepts of profes-
sionalism.29 The combination of utopian idealism and nihilistic anger that 
fueled the independent theater scene permeated its narratives of youth who 
made visible the failures of their society.
Across the stages of youth theater festivals, the alienated young man was a 
familiar dramatic character. At the Sakia cultural center’s 2004 theater festi-
val, the Panorama troupe staged an allegorical chess game between an older 
and a younger man, the latter condemned to defeat by unfair rules. Young 
dramatists mined Egyptian dramatic literature for texts about shell- shocked 
soldiers and disgruntled youth, or constructed collages of translated texts 
to tell a contemporary story. In the language and aesthetics of drama, their 
generational predicament could be represented with intellectual refinement. 
Whether independent dramatists devised their own scripts or borrowed from 
foreign literatures, they performed a gesture of rejecting the classic texts of Egyp-
tian drama. The canonical repertoire offered few scenarios that represented 
life in this generation. Independent dramatists’ disidentificatory practice of 
“rethinking and recycling encoded meaning” by adapting cultural texts gave 
middle- class youth a larger repertoire of scenarios for self- representation.30 
They won considerable critical recognition for their new styles of theater, in 
an era when mass media claimed more representational authority than live 
performance. Their minoritarian representational practices fit the predica-
ment of theater itself, as it was pushed to the margins of cultural life. At the 
same time, these practices— which Muñoz terms utopian gestures— staged 
the social future as if it could be transformed through youthful interventions. 
Independent theater was itself such an intervention, one that contested rep-
resentations of youth in mass media by showing what more representative 
narratives looked like.
Turning youth from a stage in the life cycle to the stage of theater, where 
it built cultural repertoires, transposed a temporary identity into one with its 
own space.31 As a cherished part of youth culture, amateur theater was meant 
to be just a stage in the lives of educated Egyptians. University students who 
wrote satirical dramas had once graduated, gone on to work in media, and 
looked back fondly on their days in theater. Now, graduates who dwelt longer 
in the time between college and employment brought collaborative student- 
day practices to independent troupes, fostering more inclusive and equitable 
spaces of theatrical production. Youth who restricted their unconventional 
personal lives to the corners of downtown Cairo and Alexandria could go 
to independent performances and see these represented as legitimate culture 
onstage. Independent theater repurposed generational alienation and cultural 
conflict into positive identities, building narratives of the national future out 
of youthful frustration, hope, and desire.
Independent theater troupes built an extensive network of youth culture 
in the late Mubarak era. As youth was reconceptualized within independent 
theater, its dramatic scenarios came to legitimize what had been underground 
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cultural politics. In Diana Taylor’s seminal theory of repertoire, reenacted 
performance scenarios carry cultural memory forward in time. Through tech-
niques of “cultural masquerading and strategic repositioning,” contemporary 
performances invoke historical scenarios to claim a link to authoritative 
sources.32 Independent Egyptian dramatists mobilized the authenticating 
relationship between contemporary theatrical scenes and historical scenarios 
of youth in both directions. They used the historical respectability of theater 
as a space of youthful critique to win recognition for their stories, and their 
experiences to infuse scenarios of youth culture with contemporary detail. 
By recycling dramatic repertoires from home and abroad, they showed how 
far Egyptian youth culture had diverged from its representation in canon-
ical modernist theater. The scenes of cosmopolitan youth represented in 
this theater countered globalization from above through undercommons 
repertoires that showed new- generation intellectuals to be adept at pro-
ducing modern culture despite their exclusion from cultural institutions. 
Their repertoires carried not just representations of modern youth, but also 
alternative narratives and symbols of citizenship that resonated with many 
Egyptians.
Intellectual Labor and Cultural Movements in the Neoliberal Era
Underground political and cultural movements made their activist potential 
felt during a time of heightened popular discontent in the late Mubarak era. 
In April 2008, a protest wave against ongoing economic reforms brought dis-
sident movements briefly into the national spotlight. The April 6 movement, 
organized by striking textile factory workers in Al- Mahalla Al- Kubra and 
aided by Cairo- based youth activists, drew swift repression by the regime’s 
Central Security Forces. It was nevertheless a sign that the Mubarak regime 
was losing credibility. The protest against disinvestment in a flagship public- 
sector factory made spectacularly visible the discontents of privatization across 
class lines. Meanwhile, Egypt’s political leadership ignored emerging net-
works of grassroots organizing. It worked to win ideological support instead, 
through policies that included investing in cultural production. After the inter-
national arts festivals launched in the 1990s, it was the turn of the General 
Organization of Cultural Palaces (Al- Hay’ah al- ‘Amma li Qusur al- Thaqafa) 
to get a boost in state funding, aimed at rejuvenating youthful interest in the 
arts in Egypt’s provinces. Jessica Winegar describes this as an enlightenment 
program to cultivate faith in the secular- oriented nationalism of the regime.33 
By investing in culture rather than industry, the Mubarak regime sought loy-
alty from an educated middle class that was assumed to embrace its secular 
liberal values. Egypt’s culture wars of the 1990s, in which the Ministry of 
Culture claimed to defend literati against their Islamist critics, urged state 
intellectuals to focus on ideological rather than economic concerns.34
14 Chapter 1
Using the cultural field to claim legitimacy was a risky project in an era 
when the state offered little funding to cultural producers.35 Annual theater 
festivals and national culture conferences in the late Mubarak era framed 
intellectual life mainly as a life of the mind. Thus, the new head of the Gen-
eral Organization of Cultural Palaces could announce his mission in 2007 as 
simply “return[ing] our attention to the intellectual” as a means of “spread-
ing human knowledge [ma’rifa insaniyya], and absorbing what is new in 
culture and in life.”36 The organization that had built brick- and- mortar cul-
tural centers in all of Egypt’s towns and cities now hosted conferences in 
Cairo and circulated “human knowledge” in an immaterial, informational 
mode. According to the editor of the new General Organization of Cultural 
Palaces newspaper Masrahuna, the idea was to build arts culture as a coun-
terpoint “to religious groups and that sort of thing.” Inevitably, this civilizing 
mission faltered when it relied on ideology rather than material support to 
persuade literati that the regime was their patron. In 2003, novelist Sonallah 
Ibrahim famously rejected a state literary prize by saying the regime lacked 
the legitimacy to award it. “We have no theater, no cinema, no research, no 
education. We only have festivals and conferences and a boxful of lies,” he 
declared at the award ceremony.37
The emphasis on ideology over production in regime cultural policy also 
frustrated young artists and writers. Nevertheless, they made the best of it by 
incorporating knowledge gleaned from festivals and seminars into their own 
cultural practice. The transposition of official knowledge into alternative cul-
tural production was a signature of intellectual networks in the late Mubarak 
era. While the regime celebrated intellectual life in the abstract, independ-
ent dramatists used the cultural prestige of theater to win credit for their 
critical productions. Their self- styled repertoires for organizing troupes and 
mounting performances generated what philosopher Maurizio Lazzarato 
calls immaterial labor. “Immaterial labor produces first and foremost a ‘social 
relationship’ (a relationship of innovation, production, and consumption),” 
Lazzarato argues, showing that the information society has extended a style 
of intellectual labor once associated with cultural elites to ordinary culture 
workers.38 Independent Egyptian dramatists occupied a space between cul-
tural elites and participating subjects of the information economy. They 
absorbed cultural knowledge and used it to play the role of savvy cosmopol-
itan intellectuals at transnational and Egyptian theater festivals alike. This 
role had political potential in a nation that historically placed intellectuals at 
the forefront of projects of building national identity.
Repertoires of cultural citizenship formed in the heyday of socialist 
nationalism, and developed over the following decades, showed the double- 
edged nature of intellectual support for state ideology. It could be used as an 
antagonistic weapon, as Ibrahim demonstrated, or an arsenal of alternative 
cultural authority. New- generation dramatists often used their intellectual 
stature for the latter purpose, deploying the iconic figure of youth toward 
Theaters of Citizenship 15
a new narrative of cultural citizenship.39 The contemporary national cul-
tural economy, shaped by liberalization, strategically absorbed the labor of 
independent dramatists into grand state spectacles like CIFET. Independent 
dramatists also parlayed the recognition they gained here, however, to win 
material rewards and build their own cultural capital. Those who learned 
to pitch their plays to and win production money from state officials used 
the same skills to negotiate with private cultural centers. And they bran-
dished credentials built at CIFET and elsewhere to demand legal rights from 
the Ministry of Culture. The place of theater within the neoliberal state cul-
ture project was more flexible than the regime had outlined with its abstract 
model of globalizing culture through dissemination from state institutions to 
the masses. Young dramatists with cosmopolitan cultural capital used their 
immaterial labor in ways that did not always fit within official definitions 
of cultural production. In fact, they demonstrated that they could take their 
cultural skills elsewhere— even to private corporations or nongovernmental 
organizations that were challenging state control over the meaning of national 
culture.
The uneven and ideologically complex landscape of cultural production 
in the late Mubarak era resonated with the Black American intellectual cul-
ture that Harney and Moten situate on the cusp of official recognition and 
countercultural fugitivity. Fugitive intellectuals who redirected their labor 
outside institutions that excluded them developed alternative repertoires that 
governments sought to co- opt with only partial success.40 Their Egyptian 
counterparts spent long years building such repertoires, as we will see in the 
chapters that follow. However, the politics of their practice were not always 
radical. The various performance repertoires that emerged in independent 
theater networks— from politically critical theater to self- help programs— 
borrowed conceptions of culture from the institutions from which they 
had escaped. Their respective reconstructions of cultural citizenship in the 
undercommons exemplified the flexible paths of intellectual labor under a 
neoliberal regime that invested in individuals more than institutions. Inde-
pendent dramatists were intellectually radical, then, in using state ideology 
about enlightenment against the state, as they showed how differently one 
could enact enlightened citizenship.
The role of the cultured citizen became a reservoir for the hopes of middle- 
class Cairo youth, while their economic future was uncertain. The chapters 
that follow show that their performance practice generated a cultural under-
commons that spilled beyond a single political orientation. It would thus be 
a mistake to frame independent theater in unified terms, as the extension of a 
state secularist tradition or logical precursor to the 2011 revolution. However, 
these dramatists did share utopian visions of changing the future through cul-
tural practice in the present. A faith in intellectual agency echoed across the 
cultural repertoires of performers who acted, negotiated, and wrote against 
the constraints of life in an oligarchic dictatorship. They continued to make 
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pragmatic compromises, such as taking on dull teaching jobs and negoti-
ating with corrupt state officials. Their undercommons culture nevertheless 
kept alive their intellectual idealism. Where state ideology framed theater as a 
site for rehearsing limited modes of cultural citizenship, independent theater 
extended it to broader imaginations of worldmaking. Its aesthetic and politi-
cal values were part of an undercommons of Egyptian neoliberalism that lent 
its utopian spirit to the revolutionary project.
Performing Revolutionary Citizenship
During the mass uprising that ended the Mubarak era, and the protest waves 
that followed, various repertoires of citizenship were on public display. Pray-
ing Muslims and Christians, guitarists belting protest songs, and middle- class 
youth forming security details in Tahrir Square performed ethical citizenship 
according to each of their conceptualizations of a revolutionary society. In 
2013, protests by secularist literati against the Muslim Brotherhood’s minis-
ter of culture similarly staged citizenship by cultural means. A sit- in at Cairo’s 
Ministry of Culture headquarters featured the highbrow genres of ballet and 
opera, from which the new regime threatened to withdraw funding. In Alex-
andria, it was independent dramatists who organized the parallel protest, 
inviting a female poet, a male lute player, and local indie band Massar Egbari 
to perform in their Festival of Dissent (Mahragan al- Rafd), while campaigners 
for the Tamarod movement gathered signatures. Urban Egypt’s mainstream 
and underground cultural producers intersected in the festive protests, where 
they performed confident, postrevolutionary claims to public voice.
A generational difference between performances of cultural citizenship was 
clear in the contrast between Cairo’s and Alexandria’s protests. The senior 
state functionaries’ call to safeguard a hierarchy of arts overlapped minimally 
with independent dramatists’ performance against “all forms of dictator-
ship,” as Massar Egbari’s lead singer put it. The culture that the younger 
independents sought to protect from political repression encompassed life-
styles, political critique, and repertoires of self- representation, which could 
not be contained in an elite institution like the opera. Claiming recognition 
for cultural diversity in the anthropological sense was a key concern for new- 
generation dramatists. Their use of theater to link their pre- and postrevolution 
visions of cultural citizenship showed an enduring refusal to be incorporated 
within official political projects. Instead of reconciling with the Ministry of 
Culture after the revolution, then, independent dramatists organized with 
other independent artists to form a coalition that reimagined the future of 
cultural production. Revolutionary cultural practice did not end after the polit-
ical revolution.
The persistence of hope after the political failure of the Egyptian revolution 
has been the subject of much debate. Samuli Schielke’s sensitive ethnography 
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of the different hopes that sustained middle- class young Egyptians before 
and after this epoch offers a nuanced picture of what it meant to have an 
“aspirational sense of existence, a life in the future tense.”41 To analyze the 
aspirations of independent dramatists across countercultural and avowedly 
neoliberal repertoires, I build on his insight that utopian thinking in this gen-
eration spanned ideological divides. Since dramatists’ utopian practices were 
in the here and now, however, I frame their hopes in everyday terms rather 
than grand narratives of life building. Muñoz’s concept of “doing utopia” as 
a practice of unlinking life from the pragmatism of the present in order to see 
a future is a useful frame for aspirational narratives in independent theater.42 
The new- generation dramatists who were my friends were not rehearsing for 
roles waiting for them on reaching adulthood. They were rather using perfor-
mance to embody new futures in concrete utopias. Their cultural practice 
held in reserve alternative narratives of the future, structurally separated as 
it was from the political world, where disappointment soon grew as revolu-
tionary hopes were quashed.
The hopeful projects of the plays, activist manifestos, and self- help work-
shops that I analyze in this book carried more modest dreams of social change 
than the spectacular protests of the revolution. They enacted a new imagi-
nation of the future through concrete and conscious shifts in performances 
of citizenship. The dialogue between avant- garde performance and imagina-
tions of new citizenship in the late Mubarak era played out in embodiments 
of time, personhood, and social relation in performance repertoires. Since 
theater was a key site of social experiment and intellectual practice among 
educated Egyptians in their twenties and thirties, it generated many such rep-
ertoires, with socially radical as well as economically liberal narratives of 
the future. Examining the respective paths of these projects reveals ways in 
which utopian experiments gained recognition as part of the new national 
culture. They also offer historical context in which to situate the limited pro-
gress of the grand revolutionary narrative beyond the eighteen- day uprising.
Youth culture is frequently a suggestive vector of social and political 
change. In Egypt, notes sociologist Asef Bayat, its political implications were 
subtle but significant. Formal youth movements were intermittent in the late 
Mubarak era, since organized dissent was heavily policed. He argues instead 
for attending to youth cultural nonmovements: “the collective actions of non-
collective actors; they embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary 
people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change, 
even though these practices are rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable 
leaderships and organizations.”43 These passive social networks turned into 
dynamic collectives at moments of crisis. The story of independent theater is 
one example of a nonmovement that united occasionally to form an activ-
ist front, with the aim of gaining cultural or political rights. In time, the 
avant- garde of the 1990 manifesto devolved into a sprawling and sometimes 
contradictory cultural phenomenon. While its institutional alliances shifted, 
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independent theater remained part of a broader cultural space for youth 
to experiment with social and intellectual roles. Using the concept of per-
formance repertoire to link onstage and offstage activities, I extend Bayat’s 
analysis of explicitly activist and everyday movements by studying their coev-
olution in independent theater as an undercommons of official culture and 
politics.
The theatrical repertoires that I analyze include performances of citizenship 
in an avant- garde manifesto movement (chapter 2) and dramatic narratives 
about gender and generational identity (chapters 3 and 4). Independent theater 
accommodated self- representations in which such aspirational performances 
of citizenship could be enacted in halls of power. As theater offered a space 
for those excluded from institutions to act as legitimate intellectuals, inde-
pendent dramatists gained cultural if not legal recognition from the highest 
authorities. They capitalized on the historical status of theater as a national 
avant- garde to invoke recognition for more minor narratives of citizenship. 
The use of theater to publicize youth cultural knowledge was a tactic used 
also in explicitly neoliberal institutions. Self- help programs in the new cul-
tural centers of the late Mubarak era employed actors’ skills to channel 
embodied knowledge from the neoliberal workplace into educational set-
tings (see chapter 5). As the immaterial labor of avant- garde performers was 
transposed and repurposed in new repertoires of citizenship, theater culture 
generated circuits for distributing cultural capital across class lines. Such 
attempts to extend cultural production and its means of self- representation 
outside a middle- class urban milieu proliferated in street festivals and perfor-
mances after 2011 (see chapter 6).
The repertoires of citizenship that Egyptian theater makers developed before 
and after the revolution used the regime of cultural rights under Mubarak to 
gesture at expanding the sphere of democracy further. Independent drama-
tists were privileged subalterns, able to use culture to call for transformation 
and be heard. Their aesthetic and organizational practices formed a concrete 
template for democratic representation, cutting across inherited class- and 
gender- based norms of political leadership. The rights- bearing citizen deline-
ated in liberal Egyptian political culture throughout the twentieth century had 
long been represented dramatically, in television, cinema, and theater. Inde-
pendent intellectuals opened up space to imagine a future in which a wider 
range of Egyptians had access to aesthetic and political self- representation. 
Their use of cultural practice toward constructive worldmaking resonated 





The Intertwined Rise of Cultural  
and Political Avant- Gardes
Autumn brought a harvest of new plays to theaters across Cairo. Each Sep-
tember, the Cairo International Festival for Experimental Theatre (CIFET) 
saw state- owned theaters spruced up to welcome about forty foreign troupes, 
as well as critics and academics from across the world. For ten days, the 
gated Cairo Opera House campus buzzed with crowds of theatergoers in 
their twenties. They chatted and flirted in cafés before the show, spilling onto 
manicured strips of lawn or the spacious parking lot. These middle- class audi-
ences had arrived by metro or bus and were easily distinguished from elite 
operagoers by their curly ponytails or the chic Muslim headscarves popular 
among young women. Foreign artists who came as guests of Egypt’s Minis-
try of Culture were impressed by the large audiences for experimental theater 
in Cairo. The festival was a carefully curated window onto cosmopolitan 
theater culture, part of the Mubarak regime’s efforts to showcase cultural lib-
eralism in Egypt. Without allowing political democracy, the regime claimed 
instead to preserve a diversity of cultural voices against Islamist hegemony. 
CIFET was a key showcase for its policy of cultural democracy. A range of 
Egyptian troupes were welcomed to perform, regardless of institutional affil-
iation, and the nation’s most diverse panoply of theater was represented to 
international festival audiences.
Minister of Culture Farouk Hosni’s mission statement in the brochure 
for the inaugural CIFET, in 1988, proclaimed his goal of liberalizing cul-
tural production in Egypt. “The idea of the Cairo International Festival for 
Experimental Theatre emerged from my faith that creative expression in all 
its forms finds a surprising vibrancy in the moment of crossing from one soci-
ety to another.”1 Hosni was careful to emphasize that this initiative would 
also serve national audiences, enriching Egyptian culture and creativity. The 
festival’s committee included a translation wing that rendered foreign schol-
arly works and plays into Arabic, and the committee responded to charges 
of cultural imperialism from nationalist intellectuals by ensuring a strong 
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representation of Arab troupes. “The festival management hopes that the 
national identity of art will not be substituted by continuous dialogue with 
experimental currents in world arts,” the inaugural program stated.2 After 
much careful framing, and due deference to members of the state cultural 
establishment, CIFET gained legitimacy as a beloved annual institution for 
Cairo dramatists.
Most Egyptian theater makers I encountered at the festival ignored the 
painstaking brochures and seminars and went straight to the performances. 
Even the sleepiest state theaters saw long lines at ticket windows during the 
festival, when they hosted plays by foreign troupes. Hungry audiences packed 
in to British Kuwaiti Sulayman al- Bassam’s Al- Hamlet Summit, an Italian 
Biancaneve with a mix of puppets and humans, and a Korean shaman- style 
performance. These formally inventive shows were unlike the typically slow- 
paced literary dramas at Cairo’s state theaters, which hewed to Egyptian 
realism and historical European repertoires. CIFET revived interest in theater 
as a space of contemporary creative possibility among different generations 
of Egyptian aficionados who had mourned its stagnation in recent years. 
They wrote long columns that debated the festival’s merits in the magazine 
Al- Masrah (Theater) and in special issues of literary journals.3 Some asked 
skeptically whether the festival was an appropriate use of state funds, noting 
that five- star hotel accommodations for visiting troupes came at the cost of 
funding cash- strapped theaters nationally. For the independent dramatists I 
knew, however, the festival was a priceless opportunity to learn about theater 
beyond the limited vista offered by Egyptian state institutions. Retired play-
wright Alfred Farag’s prediction that CIFET would appeal most to a young 
generation of theater makers was proved right.4
Young theater makers embraced the minister’s vision that the festival 
would enrich national theater. The experimental styles seen at CIFET were 
folded into the repertoires of independent dramatists in their twenties and 
thirties who eventually came to represent Egypt in the festival competition. 
In 2003, the dance- drama Aqni’a, aqmisha, w masa’ir (Masks, Fabrics, and 
Destinies) by the independent troupe Al- Shadhya w al- Iqtirab (Shrapnel) 
not only won the committee’s sponsorship as Egypt’s official entry to the 
festival but also took the prize for best ensemble performance. The show 
was a pioneering collaboration between independent dramatists and a new 
state theater, the Hanager, which invited Iraqi director Qasim Muhammad 
to script the play. Directed by the Shrapnel troupe’s Hany El- Metennawy, 
the experimental show combined fragments of Greek myths and ritualized 
dance to stage an elegy for Iraq, which had been crushed by war. This prize 
fruit of the international festival garnered attention from local and interna-
tional television crews in Egypt. Masks, Fabrics, and Destinies was invited 
to theater festivals in Indonesia and Italy. Hosni held a celebratory reception 
for the large ensemble cast of dancers and actors and promised to support 
their travel abroad. But once the festival lights had dimmed, the minister 
After the Festival 21
summarily abandoned his promises to these independent dramatists. The lim-
its of CIFET as a means of liberalizing Egyptian theater had emerged over the 
years, and they became most poignant now.
This chapter analyzes the project of experimental theater as a vehicle of 
liberal reform in the last decade of the Mubarak era, against the backdrop of 
that regime’s turn to cultural globalization in the 1990s. The lavish arts festi-
vals of this decade, writes Jessica Winegar, imagined a cultural democracy in 
which young artists represented a version of cosmopolitan Egyptian citizen-
ship that could travel around the world.5 Where prior Egyptian regimes had 
used state art schools to develop national cultural repertoires, Hosni’s turn 
to festivals and competitions echoed new economic policies in which imports 
and exports were used to diversify the nation’s commodity market. In the 
theater world, the policy of internationalization made room for genres that 
straddled the dichotomy of Western and Arab drama that was maintained 
at state theaters through the demarcation of separate repertoires. However, 
cultural democracy generated more than new styles of performance onstage. 
The networking practices of independent troupes developed the theater of 
cultural democracy into a generational phenomenon. In an archipelago of ven-
ues extending across and beyond state cultural institutions, new- generation 
Statue of Egyptian diva Umm Kulthum in front of the Cairo Opera House.  
Photograph by Sonali Pahwa.
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dramatists made space to represent their gender and generational identity 
politics to mixed urban audiences. CIFET evolved from a temporary venue 
for consuming experimental theater into a site for launching Egypt’s free 
theater movement (in 1990) and protests against the Ministry of Culture (in 
2005). It revealed the permeable boundaries between cultural and political 
democracy in this era. The evolving roles of independent dramatists as liberal 
citizens are a central theme of this story. While the ministry intended the festi-
val as a site of transnational artistic exchange, it became a venue for Egyptian 
dramatists to claim self- representation in more than an aesthetic sense.
Egypt’s theatrical avant- gardes had been privileged standard- bearers of lib-
eral citizenship since the early twentieth century, when upper- class members 
of the liberal Wafd Party promoted theater as a means of building modern 
character, in its doubled sense as pedagogical and performative.6 In 1922, 
pioneering cultural critic and playwright Muhammad Taymur argued for the 
need for university theater in a modern nation, claiming that “a competent 
actor, in the European view, is like a competent minister.”7 The theme of 
social value in theater continued to echo in state cultural policy throughout 
Banners advertising the Cairo International Festival of Experimental Theatre dress 
the walls of downtown’s Avant- Garde Theater. Photograph by Sonali Pahwa.
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the century. President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s minister of culture Tharwat 
Okasha declared before Parliament in 1969, “The message of the theater 
is not merely ease and relaxation; its importance lies, rather, in making the 
people know itself and realize its existence, and in presenting its problems. 
The theater is engaged in a role of acculturation which aims at establishing 
humanist and progressive values and creating new relations between the indi-
vidual and society.”8
Following the 1952 Free Officers revolution, when state investment in 
the arts burgeoned, Egypt’s literary, visual, and theatrical arts became well- 
supported wings of the state project of social modernism through cultural 
production. As in postcolonial West Africa, Egyptian avant- gardists built on 
the “contestation of the dominant notion of national culture seen as inauthen-
tic because of its cultural imitativeness, and the struggle for a new conception 
of the nation and its identity that is rooted in, and does not merely gesture at, 
the practices of the ‘people.’”9 Theater proved particularly well suited to rep-
resenting the nation’s people as a diverse modern citizenry, accommodating 
popular comedy and literary drama within cultural repertoires aimed at the 
expansively imagined middle classes.
Throughout the twentieth century, generational waves of Egyptian theater 
were associated less with aesthetic genres (such as absurdism or realism) than 
with epochs of intellectual debate about national identity. Thus novelist and 
playwright Tawfiq al- Hakim argued in diametrically opposed terms, in the 
1930s and 1960s, for European- style and folksy Egyptian drama.10 In each 
decade, his vision for a cultural avant- garde was linked to different polit-
ical programs. Since the 1990s, however, it had been dramatists working 
outside state institutions who claimed the mantle of a national avant- garde, 
framing their vision as structurally independent from politics. The drama-
tists I examine in this chapter formed an independent theater movement in 
which avant- gardism included theatrical and activist repertoires in a range 
of aesthetic styles. Using the historical approach to avant- garde performance 
outlined by James Harding and John Rouse, I analyze their performances 
as counterhegemonic gestures in cultural and historical context.11 These 
dramatists used theater as a site of modernist imagination in counterpoint 
to state- sponsored visions of the national cultural future. Their avant- 
gardism from below borrowed experimental techniques from official venues, 
such as CIFET, to develop unofficial versions of the state project of cultural 
globalization.
The avant- gardism of Egypt’s state theaters echoed what Richard Schech-
ner has called the conservative avant- garde in the United States, which 
borrows from a historically validated repertoire of radical styles and restages 
these reverentially, a practice that Schechner criticizes as “circulating sta-
sis.”12 Egypt’s avant- garde “theater of the sixties” was similarly restaged in 
state theaters in the early twenty- first century. However, CIFET helped to 
open up institutional definitions of avant- garde theater. Like the Lusophone 
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theater festivals analyzed by Christina McMahon, it opened up national 
debates about theater’s geographies of identity and affinity. These were sus-
tained beyond the time of the festival, and I follow McMahon’s lead in 
exploring the festival’s aftermath as a space of productive cultural tension.13 
The national circulation of experimental theater styles, at CIFET and smaller 
festivals in its aftermath, raised newly urgent questions, in festival newsletters 
and seminars, on the contemporary relevance of avant- garde performance in 
Egypt. The circulation of stasis was interrupted by livelier democratic debates 
on the relationship between theater and modern citizenship.
Foreign drama had long offered Egyptian avant- gardists a medium for 
staging political critique in artfully oblique ways. The myriad adaptations of 
Hamlet as an Arab intellectual speaking truth to power point to this history 
of creating openings in political debate through literary translation. Such 
adaptations were incorporated into repertoires of political theater, in Egypt 
as in Syria, where dramas of corrupt kings and rulers spoke back to official 
spectacles in which subjects performed loyalty to leaders.14 After their high 
point in the late twentieth century, such allegorical styles of political theater 
grew less central to Arab avant- gardes. Leading playwrights, such as Syria’s 
Saadallah Wannus, became disillusioned with theater about the nation and 
developed more psychological genres for staging identity.15 Independent 
Egyptian dramatists of the early twenty- first century went further in using 
translated drama to stage personal narratives of alienation, claiming a new 
cachet for this form of social critique because it was part of an illustrious for-
eign repertoire. In the cultural economy of the early twenty- first century, the 
brand name of a European author lent particular prestige to a theater pro-
duction. It was often used by independent dramatists to claim the privilege of 
critiquing both political leaders and state- affiliated avant- gardists.
Within a cultural landscape where theater was used to debate modern cit-
izenship, CIFET opened a space for staging cultural responses to new forms 
of state power. The Ministry of Culture, through its gestures toward a com-
petitive free market in the arts, coupled with budget cuts for standing staff 
in state theaters, framed itself as an arbiter of artistic value rather than an 
art producer in the late Mubarak era. However, it did not liberalize laws 
governing national theater, such as the requirement of membership in the 
Actors’ Union in order to work at state theaters and in television, or the 
expensive registration needed to open a ticket window for an independent 
show. Egyptian theater remained very much defined by state institutional 
frameworks, then, even when the Ministry of Culture called for internation-
alism. Independent dramatists seeking to democratize theater thus styled 
themselves as a new national avant- garde, in the same way that the nation 
remained a vital “category of practice” for visual artists of this time.16 Ris-
ing literary writers of the 1990s who wrote highly personal narratives also 
maintained nationalist political commitments, despite departing from clas-
sic genres of committed literature.17 As the Mubarak regime announced its 
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policy of cultural globalization at the close of the twentieth century, young 
avant- gardists fashioned repertoires that combined cosmopolitan style and 
national narrative to claim cultural democracy on their own terms. In their 
repertoires of liberal citizenship, avant- garde art was a means of claiming 
recognition for the cultural and political rights of citizens. They used theater 
as a medium of cultural continuity between liberalism in the nation’s past 
and present.
Debating Cultural Democracy at the Festival
Founded in 1988, CIFET rapidly became a focal point for generational 
debates about the future of theater in Egypt. It attracted Egyptian dramatists 
of all generations, but my impressions from attending four editions of CIFET 
from 2002 to 2007 squared with the finding of a survey at the opening fes-
tival that the majority of those who attended were under thirty years old.18 
There was a striking demographic difference from the audiences I usually saw 
at the National, Avant- Garde, and Salam state theaters in Cairo. When lead-
ers of Cairo’s university theater scene were interviewed at the first edition, 
they claimed experimental theater as the special domain of youth. Actor- 
director Khaled el- Sawy called it the style of a generation “on the cusp of two 
eras” (al- mawqif bayn al- ‘asrayn). University dramatists like him had long 
adapted translations as a way of representing their cultural hybridity, and 
they embraced the eclectic repertoires of experimental theater at CIFET. “We 
must absorb the past and sift it for new art, with a new ideology opposed to 
that which is hegemonic,” El- Sawy argued.19 His colleague Mansur Muham-
mad defined experimental theater by its rebellion against a generation that 
insisted on “playing the teacher” with new dramatists. “I refuse obedience to 
past icons that have not proven their worth,” he declared.20 Whereas the min-
ister of culture performed a benevolent gesture of granting young dramatists 
access to foreign trends, they used the festival to claim legitimacy for genera-
tional repertoires and disavow the authority of older avant- gardists.
The festival was a window onto cultural democracy that opened in both 
directions. Egyptian dramatists debated the vista of Egyptian theater at 
CIFET even more than the foreign visitors for whom the regime curated a 
showcase of liberal, cosmopolitan Egyptian culture. Much reportage at the 
early editions of the festival focused on the new troupes that responded to the 
festival’s invitation to fill the stages commissioned for the festival. Their sud-
den visibility revealed that Cairo’s underground theater scene was larger than 
journalists had anticipated. Samia Habib of Theater magazine wrote a report 
on the unfamiliar new category of “amateurs” (al- huw’a). Once seen as a 
motley collection of troupes with tiny audiences, they were now analyzed 
as a cultural category: “Who are the amateurs? This question has arisen for 
those interested in theater in recent years, which have seen evident activity 
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not in the public and private sectors alone, but in the young leadership of uni-
versities, the Mass Culture organization, and workers’ groups . . . which raises 
the question of who these youth are.”21
Habib’s slippage between “youth” and “amateurs” points to the similar 
structural positions of the two in state cultural discourse. Both were hailed 
as temporary participants in a theater economy where a professional career 
was reserved for state employees (or successful film and television actors). To 
be an amateur was to perform in educational theater at cooperatives within 
the Supreme Council for Youth and Sports, university troupes, clubs of the 
General Organization of Cultural Palaces (GOCP), and certain trade unions 
with theaters, such as the Lawyers’ and Journalists’ Syndicates. Amateur sta-
tus precluded dramatists from a legitimate stake in determining the future of 
national theater. However, the troupes that attracted so much comment at 
CIFET initiated theatrical and intellectual debate about that future. And the 
festival was an exceptional space in which their views on cultural democracy 
could be heard.
In 1990, the minister of culture abruptly took away this forum. Hosni can-
celed CIFET after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, deciding to forgo festivities 
as a mark of respect for Egypt’s Arab neighbor. Cairo’s independent drama-
tists went up in arms against this high- handed gesture of solidarity by which 
their opportunity to perform on a national stage was sacrificed. A core group 
of university troupes called a meeting with supportive theater critics Nehad 
Selaiha and Menha el- Batraoui to plan an alternative youth festival. The gath-
ering snowballed into a convention, including troupes the critics had never 
heard of. Selaiha’s incredulous description of the meeting on August 23, 1990, 
points to the gap between their knowledge of Cairo’s university theater and 
the diverse reality of dramatists who performed outside mainstream cultural 
and educational institutions: “What Menha [el- Batraoui] hadn’t bargained 
for was the existence of a strong and militant, if politically and artistically 
immature, underground theater movement: young and ardent self- supporting 
offshoots of the university and state regional theaters, manned by talented 
former students and amateurs, and lacking any legal status. They came in 
droves, flaunting fanciful names and clamoring for recognition and the right 
to participate.”22
Selaiha and El- Batraoui were bilingual, upper- class women, educated 
respectively in Britain and France, who came of age in the 1970s. Taking stock 
of the so- called golden age of state theater, they recognized the advantages of 
liberalizing laws and granting rights to independent troupes. Selaiha taught at 
the Academy of Arts, and El- Batraoui was a critic at the French- language Al- 
Ahram Hebdo newspaper. Their outsider status as women in the leadership 
of those institutions led them to cheer on young dramatists who embraced 
experimental theater. Selaiha’s use of the English terms “fringe” and “under-
ground” framed independent dramatists not as amateurs, then, but rather as 
members of an alternative arts community she wished to help grow. In the 
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manifesto that the two critics compiled, and that twenty- one troupe leaders 
signed, they described the dramatists further as proponents of “free theater” 
(al- masrah al- hurr): “a group of free theater troupes that have worked for 
many years in the field of theater with self- funding, in crushing material and 
personal circumstances, as well as aspersions on the creative powers of these 
troupes, and discrimination between them and troupes affiliated with the 
state, on the one hand, and the impossibility of existing on the stage of com-
mercial theater, with its values and resources, on the other.”23 The critics’ 
bold new vision of the future of Egyptian theater was evident in the language 
of their manifesto, a genre historically used by senior state intellectuals to call 
for new cultural programs.24 The rousing call for change in the free theater 
manifesto of 1990 marked a new kind of avant- garde voice, young, collec-
tive, and situated outside state institutions. As Martin Puchner writes of the 
manifesto genre, it “project[ed] a scenario for which it must then seek to be 
the first realization.”25 The manifesto outlined a bill of rights and a template 
for a new production model for theater. It argued that all citizens deserved 
the right to perform legally onstage in Egypt, with financial support. And it 
called on “all domestic bodies and institutions to bear their historic respon-
sibility and act to support cultural and theatrical activities.”26 The manifesto 
was published in the very next issue of Theater magazine, edited by Selaiha’s 
spouse.
By claiming recognition for independent dramatists as rights- bearing citi-
zens, and the government as their protector, the manifesto proposed a scenario 
of cultural democracy that extended beyond a single annual festival. Yet it did 
not call on senior officials in state theaters to step down and make room for a 
new generation, or demand reforms at those famously stagnant institutions. 
The troupes signing the manifesto simply asked for legal recognition as they 
worked with modest means. Selaiha conveyed this manifesto to CIFET presi-
dent Dr. Fawzi Fahmi, state theater sector head Dr. Karam Mutawi’, and head 
of the General Egyptian Book Organization Dr. Samir Sarhan. These officials 
agreed to lend their venues, and a little funding, to hold the Free Theater Fes-
tival from October 1 to October 10, 1990. It was a democratic gesture that 
pleased everyone and cost the state sector little besides the effort of repurpos-
ing available performance spaces. The festival gathered troupes “dispersed in 
obscure corners of the theatrical map” to center stage in Cairo.27 Under the 
label of free theater, their work was recognized, both artistically and struc-
turally, as a new avant- garde.
For pioneering members of the movement still active in 2004, the manifesto 
had generated exciting new scenarios of artistic freedom. Cairo- based Saleh 
Saad, who taught at Minya University and specialized in carnivalesque (ihti-
fali) folk- style theater, had once directed plays for the GOCP. He launched an 
independent troupe after running into difficulties with state institutions. “It 
was to be expected that the [carnivalesque] alternative to established theater 
would be irreverent,” he wrote, “but provocative statements always caused 
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anxiety in the official theater.”28 When the free theater manifesto was created, 
he signed it, seizing the hope for a legal framework that would allow him 
to take his plays to different audiences.29 Another dramatist who had been 
thriving on the margins of GOCP theater, Abeer Ali, also signed it. She had 
felt marginalized as a feminist in the male- dominated state organization and 
was glad to join a community in which she could use repertoires of folk per-
formance to compose her own feminist dramas (see chapter 4).
Most members of the free theater movement came from Cairo- based uni-
versity troupes, seeking recognition and opportunities to perform beyond their 
student years. The Shrapnel troupe, which represented Egypt in CIFET 2003, 
was founded by Cairo University students in English literature and philoso-
phy. Director Mohamed Aboul Seoud adapted British drama and Saadallah 
Wannus with equal ease, actor Nora Amin was a translator of French, and 
Hany El- Metennawy was pursuing a Ph.D. in sports education. The well- read 
troupe held its own in university contests and sought the opportunity to com-
pete on an equal footing with state troupes at CIFET. “We are the illegitimate 
children of Egyptian theater,” El- Metennawy explained sardonically when I 
asked why this had proved a struggle. “All we want is a bridge to the govern-
ment system, so that they don’t dismiss us as terrorists.”30 In previous decades, 
members of a gifted university troupe would readily have found work at state 
theaters; now they sought the same right as an independent collective.
A key right that free theater dramatists sought from the Ministry of Culture 
was protection from harassment by Islamist student groups that emerged on 
university campuses in the 1990s. Muhammad ‘Abd al- Khaliq’s independent 
Atelier troupe was one that had thrived at the College of Fine Arts, winning 
prizes in university competitions, until Islamist students called for the theater 
to close.31 Such intermittent threats reminded Egyptian dramatists that some 
audiences deemed their art irredeemably Western, no matter how local its 
content. The origins of national theater in secularist urban circles defined its 
aesthetics of freedom for outsiders in terms that were sometimes controver-
sial. As graduates of university drama went on to independent theater, then, 
they relied on the Ministry of Culture to protect their rights to free expres-
sion under the umbrella of cultural democracy. Like ‘Abd al- Khaliq, many 
dramatists called themselves secular and embodied a distinctive cosmopoli-
tan style. The younger men wore their hair long and smoked cigarettes, the 
women frequently did not cover their hair, and they socialized freely across 
genders. The university style of the free theater movement was bolstered by 
its absorption of many university graduates who remained unemployed, for 
months or years, and took refuge in theater spaces as an extension of the col-
lege campus.32
As free theater grew into a cultural phenomenon, centered on the down-
towns of Cairo and Alexandria, the Ministry of Culture sought to corral it in 
controlled environments. The free theater manifesto had gained an exceptional 
concession of rights through an unusual set of circumstances. The ministry 
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curated a more strategically liberal theater culture in the 1990s, launching 
annual events at cultural palaces nationwide and monitoring university festi-
vals carefully. In Cairo, it cultivated a small showcase of experimental theater 
within the confines of the opera house campus by assigning an unused build-
ing for use by independent troupes. The circles of free theater continued to 
proliferate, but the Ministry of Culture invited select members of the original 
manifesto movement to work within a zone of artistic freedom, gaining state 
support with political limits. This gesture of recognition built a provisional 
wall around free theater. The ministry assumed that if the movement could be 
contained within monitored art spaces, claims of cultural democracy could 
be limited as well.
Curating Freedom: The Hanager Theater as Liberal Showcase
When the buzz of experimental theater dissipated after each edition of CIFET, 
it lingered in a special building on the Cairo Opera House grounds. The Han-
ager Arts Center (Al- Markaz al- Hanagir li- l- Funun) consisted of a 350- seat 
theater and a spacious art gallery, linked by a long cafeteria. The theater 
opened in 1992 and was allocated soon after as a venue for experimental 
theater on the island campus, which had been inaugurated with a Japanese- 
built opera house in 1985.33 In the same way that Cairo’s old opera house 
in ‘Ataba Square formed part of an entertainment quarter, including the 
National Theater (formerly the Comédie Française), the new opera campus 
built on Gezira Island came to include a modern art museum, a music library, 
a theater, and the Supreme Council for Culture building. Unlike ‘Ataba’s old 
arts district, however, the walled and gated new opera grounds welcomed a 
carefully screened set of audiences for European- style arts.
Young visitors found a more welcoming space at the concrete Hanager 
than at the stately marble buildings of the opera. Passing through a perfunc-
tory, primitive metal detector, they entered a red- painted cafeteria staffed by 
friendly waiters who bantered with regulars, kept actors’ tabs, and knew the 
critics to whom special deference was due. Many Cairenes flocked to enjoy 
the atmosphere of the cafeteria, whether or not they were actors themselves. 
It was an inexpensive place to meet friends or hash out plans for a new show. 
When I came to the cafeteria for my biweekly meetings with Selaiha or lin-
gered there after attending a rehearsal, the front tables were inevitably filled 
with actors discussing photocopied playscripts over tea while demurely head-
scarved young women met their dates in discreet corners. The respectably 
liberal atmosphere of the Hanager, like a college cafeteria, made it a haven 
for youthful conversation of different kinds.
The presiding deity of the Hanager was its director, Dr. Hoda Wasfi. A 
professor of French literature at ‘Ain Shams University, she arrived in a 
chauffeured car to her office next to the theater. A single secretary outside 
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scheduled her appointments, and the theater had a tiny scene design crew. 
The Hanager’s budget was evidently far more modest than that of other state 
theaters. However, it did offer production budgets to twelve shows by unaf-
filiated directors each year. Independent troupe leaders thus made regular 
pilgrimages to Wasfi’s office with play pitches, steeling themselves for blunt 
but helpful feedback. “There is not much cooperation between older crit-
ics and the younger generation— they don’t adopt the young folks,” Wasfi 
observed in explaining her desire to mentor youth. Her professorial back-
ground, which included heading a student club (usra) for theater and music 
at ‘Ain Shams, encouraged her to guide rising dramatists with lessons from 
her own training. She passed on to favored protégés her taste for translated 
European drama and proudly claimed credit for “raising the new generation 
of dramatists.” However, she espoused an inclusive concept of experimental 
theater as essentially a “culture of questioning.”34
Wasfi’s commitment to training led her to spend a large portion of the 
Hanager’s budget on acting workshops given by eminent directors such as 
Roger Assaf and Nidal Abu Murad, from Lebanon, and Qasim Muhammad, 
from Iraq. Although new waves of dramatists applied to work at the Hanager 
after its first decade, Wasfi referred to them all as a single generation, which 
needed nurturing so it could mature. “This generation is new in every respect. 
It is always searching, experimenting, trying new paths,” she declared. Using 
a handpicked group of free theater pioneers to represent the leadership of 
Hanager theater, December 2010. Photograph by Sonali Pahwa.
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this generation, Wasfi created a model for a new avant- garde consisting of 
university theater graduates from a cosmopolitan, middle- class background. 
A friend whose troupe was not part of this roster referred to it ironically 
as “the favored ten” (al- ‘ashara al- tayyiba). Since the theater hosted ten to 
twelve productions each year, and regularly featured favorites, the Hanager’s 
repertoire expand more slowly than the free theater troupes over the years. 
Moreover, the success of the Hanager’s model gave the core troupes of the 
free theater movement enough opportunities in the 1990s to make organiz-
ing their annual festival unnecessary. Wasfi’s parallel role as head of CIFET at 
this time boosted their opportunities to perform and gain recognition before 
international critics. Thus the plan to contain the manifesto movement to a 
small group of troupes worked well until 2002.
During this time of spatial containment, the free theater troupes never-
theless produced strikingly critical art. The first of their plays that I saw, at 
CIFET 2001, was a topical adaptation of the Greek tragedy Phaedra. The 
Shrapnel troupe’s Mohamed Aboul Seoud decided to rewrite the incestuous 
plot as the story of an unemployed Cairo man. Director Hany El- Metennawy 
played the young Hippolytus as a lonely youth smoking in his room, resisting 
his stepmother’s seduction, while his tyrant father went on voyages of war 
and plunder. Meta- Phaedra was a controversial choice for the CIFET selec-
tion committee, but Wasfi persuaded them that it would not cause offense 
since the festival was “for foreigners.” The daringly sexual play about youth-
ful frustration won success at CIFET and a ten- day run at the Hanager. While 
such decisions bolstered the Hanager’s permissive reputation, they attracted 
attacks in the press. A vituperative review in the popular weekly journal Ruz 
al- Yusuf compared the play to anthrax.35 Meanwhile, a pair of reviews in the 
highbrow Theater magazine applauded the play for its imaginative and tech-
nical brilliance.36 Using a translated play to tell a shocking Egyptian story 
became a signature strategy of the Shrapnel troupe and other independent 
troupes.
Not all free theater troupes resorted to foreign texts, however, as the price 
of free expression. They feared this tactic would make their avant- garde 
appear alienated from the Egyptian middle classes they sought to address. It 
was telling that the favored Shrapnel troupe’s leader spearheaded a departure 
from the Hanager and its curated repertoire by reviving the Free Theater Fes-
tival after a hiatus of seven years. El- Metennawy and his fellow free theater 
pioneers decided to pool their resources to book the theater of the Russian 
Cultural Center in Al- Doqqi for a five- day festival in March 2002. Now 
in their thirties, these dramatists had the financial and cultural capital to 
strike out on their own. And they hoped that by leaving behind the opera 
house grounds, they could attract broader audiences. The new Free Theater 
Festival emphasized its popular orientation with the theme “light comedy” 
(al- kumidiya al- khafifa). It was even more accessible because entry to the 
plays was free, since independent dramatists could not legally sell tickets. The 
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diligent advertising and well- chosen comedies from the troupes’ repertoires 
made the festival a hit, with full houses at most shows. Since only ten troupes 
could be accommodated, it was necessarily a small festival. Yet the gesture 
of taking free theater out of the Hanager, and showing that it attracted large 
audiences, won these troupes a reputation as an avant- garde at large.
It was at this point that members of the original manifesto movement 
decided to form a cooperative and change their identification from free 
theater to independent theater. Paradoxically, the latter term signified artistic 
independence with state support. The bold gesture of 2002 had proved too 
expensive to sustain. “We have no wings with which to soar above state insti-
tutions,” wrote movement critic Rasha Abdel Moneim, “nor an earthmover to 
shake the foundation of the establishment.”37 Ten troupes began legal pro-
ceedings to form the Independent Theater Troupes’ Training and Studies 
Cooperative (Jama’iyat Dirasat wa Tadrib al- Firaq al- Masrahiyya al- Hurra). 
This was a less expensive option than registering as a corporation, and it 
accorded with their preference for noncapitalist models of organizing. The coop-
erative launched in 2004 and applied successfully to revive its annual festival 
with funding from the Hanager. Its new title of Independent Theater Festi-
val attracted much debate, which the troupes encouraged in the daily newsletter 
printed throughout the festival. Elder playwright Saad Ardash and veteran 
critic Luis Gris dismissed the troupes’ claims to independence when interviewed 
for the festival newsletter. Younger critics like Hazem Shehata defended the 
arrangement as one of taxpaying citizens, for whom “state support [al- da’m] 
is our right.”38 El- Metennawy underscored the national contribution of inde-
pendent theater by noting that it was “distinctive in penetrating problems 
that arise in society, like poverty, ignorance and power.”39 The discourse of 
cultural democracy that emerged in the 2004 and 2005 editions of the Inde-
pendent Theater Festival allowed young dramatists to speak not as Hanager 
protégés but rather as citizen artists.
The opening- night show of the 2004 festival thematized artistic inde-
pendence provocatively. An adaptation of Slawomir Mrozek’s Polish play 
Striptease (rendered in Arabic as Al- ta’arri qita’ qita’) staged the story of an 
intellectual and an activist who had been jailed for obscure reasons and now 
voiced absurd statements to justify their freedom despite their abject circum-
stances. The two men were Egyptianized, the intellectual as upper class and 
the activist as working class, with the former speaking earnestly about his 
dignity as he was forced to strip by the mysterious figure called “the hand.” 
Festival audiences applauded the depiction of a police state and laughed at 
the intellectual (played by El- Metennawy), who believed that cooperation 
would protect him. Such bold gestures of defiance against the hand that fed 
independent theater belied the fact that directors did rely on the Hanager 
to protect them from state censors and conservative social critics. Inde-
pendent dramatists faced a conundrum. Avant- garde theater had the most 
cultural prestige at the Hanager, where it was perceived as legitimate critique 
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by educated audiences, critics, and intellectuals. However, the limits of free 
expression here shifted unexpectedly as the neoliberal state calibrated its force 
to produce manageable versions of freedom. These dramatists began work-
ing, then, to build protocols of independence that could carry over to other 
institutions. They used their experience in negotiating with Wasfi and CIFET 
authorities to apply for funding from the Cultural Development Fund and 
other theater venues. As independent theater gained wide recognition, cultural 
centers across Cairo and Alexandria joined the movement and launched their 
own theater festivals.
Detaching the avant- garde gesture of performing freedom from its orig-
inal location allowed for independent theater repertoires to circulate and 
evolve more broadly. Within Mike Sell’s concept of avant- garde performance 
as a vector of radical thought, the movement’s separation from the Hanager 
produced new directions of avant- garde practice.40 How did its repertoires 
of cultural democracy and liberal citizenship travel and evolve? Could they 
work in spaces outside the protected realms of state- sponsored liberalism? 
The festival mode of organization and avant- garde performance proved 
adaptable, and even thrived outside state institutions. And the avant- garde 
that expanded once the free theater movement broke the bounds of the 
Hanager traced a more broadly democratic path for theater as a stage for rep-
resentational practice.
Fugitive Repertoires and Traveling Avant- Gardes
The years 2002– 5 saw much growth in free theater as new troupes formed 
by recent college graduates joined the movement. As the pioneering 1990s 
generation rose to leadership, its members recognized that the younger dram-
atists they mentored needed opportunities of their own. They sympathized 
with the growing discontent at the ways in which curators at the Hanager 
and the Bibliotheca Alexandrina defined experimental performance. Spe-
cialists in folk- style theater were displeased that translated drama was so 
prominent, and modern dancers wished their work could gain a theater audi-
ence. Moreover, the demand of deference to state officials rankled performers 
who wished to chart their own path. Critic Rasha Abdel Moneim wrote in 
her retrospective of the movement that its academic patrons had “promoted 
free theater as an alternative theater, an artistic form that does not suffer 
from the weight of bureaucracy,” but regretted that they had “anointed [inde-
pendent dramatists] as revolutionaries and gave them dimensions of political 
struggle that did not originate with them.”41 After they formed the cooper-
ative, cultural rights claims took precedence over the political statements of 
the original manifesto. For instance, the protocol of the independent troupes’ 
cooperative simply outlined how to apply for funds and negotiate contracts 
with sponsors. The dry legal terms in which independents were now trying 
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to define their movement separated the idea of a cultural avant- garde from 
a political one. Framing their claims in terms of cultural rights appropriated 
the promise of cultural democracy in relatively uncontroversial liberal terms.
Independent troupes that took their work outside the Hanager found for-
eign cultural centers to be their most reliable partners. The festival model 
continued to serve them well here. In the early 2000s, downtown Cairo’s Cen-
tre Français de Culture et de Coopération (CFCC) launched its own theater 
festival, which embraced a wide range of performance styles. The center, 
headed by French- educated cultural programmer Latifa Fahmy, had a reputa-
tion as both a language study institute and a cultural destination. The French 
language had long provided a cultural repertoire of cosmopolitanism without 
colonial power dynamics for Egyptian intellectuals, and French lycées offered 
more affordable bilingual education than English schools.42 The CFCC, in 
the heart of Cairo and close to public transportation, was thus well loved by 
downtown arts aficionados. The center had a theater that played uncensored 
Egyptian and French films. A small festival of French theater by language 
students proved so popular that, in 2003, Fahmy launched an annual theater 
festival, without any requirement that performances have a connection with 
French. Each January, Jeunes Créateurs (Young Directors) hosted fifteen to 
twenty shows. With a younger audience than the Independent Theater Fes-
tival, this festival became a key venue for experimental theater that was 
explicitly dissociated from a national avant- garde.
Fahmy was a relative outsider to the world of theater, but she used her 
connections in the art world to assemble festival juries of critics across gen-
res. In 2004, the Young Directors curators included ballet dancer Laila Sha’ir, 
modern dancer Walid Aouni, playwright and professor Sameh Mahran, and 
film actor Vanya Exerjian. The jury featured theater critics Nehad Selaiha and 
Nabil Badran and film critic Rafiq al- Sabban. They devised a festival program 
that mixed genres more fluidly than did state venues for theater or dance. The 
seventeen performances chosen for the festival included adaptations of plays 
by Bertolt Brecht and Salah ‘Abd al- Sabbur, self- scripted performances, and 
four dance theater shows. Playing outside the lines of propriety enforced at 
the Hanager, Young Directors hosted several unconventional performances 
of generational and gender identity. The protection from censorship offered 
by a foreign cultural center made the use of translated texts less necessary.
The prizewinning performance of 2004, Intersections of an Everyday 
Disorder, and the most controversial show, Solo Player, were both self- scripted 
shows about young masculinity. The latter was a one- person dance theater 
piece by a young man from Minya. He moved between motions of Islamic 
prayer, traditional stick dancing, and club dance, silently embodying the 
dancer’s struggles with identity. Intersections was also a movement- based 
performance, featuring three young men who crossed through a space while 
avoiding collisions. The simple acting school exercise staged a near- clash 
of men “who carry three different ideologies,” according to the program 
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blurb.43 Ahmad Rubi, in a black leather jacket, and Sameh Ezzat, with a 
short beard and scarf, portrayed a version of their real- life relationship as 
college friends with secular and religious beliefs, respectively. A third male 
actor was dressed in a business suit. Their movements accelerated with a 
drumbeat and the voice- over of readings from an article by Egyptian psychia-
trist Yahya al- Rakhawy titled “The Revolt of Madness.” These performances 
of ideological confusion staged contemporary struggles of youth identity that 
went unrepresented in literary drama. The scandalized whispers— or festival 
prizes— that these performances received affirmed that they made an impact 
as social commentaries without explicit political statements.
Performing at the CFCC festival offered independent dramatists creative 
distance from the norms and forms of a national avant- garde. Juries instead 
discussed performances at Young Directors as youth culture, commenting 
approvingly on the use of experimental styles (such as modern dance) to extend 
the formal possibilities of Egyptian theater. The free theater movement trave-
led here as a cultural avant- garde, in which original narratives and technical 
innovation won performers cultural capital. Self- representation could be more 
creative, outside the norms of citizenship assigned to “youth of the theater” 
in the state theater establishment. They performed as social critics more than 
as political dissidents, and their experimental aesthetics appeared less politically 
charged than at CIFET or the Free Theater Festival.
The festival model became a proliferating framework for independent 
theater, building a fugitive avant- garde that echoed the “general antagonism 
to politics looming outside every attempt to politicize” in what Stefano Har-
ney and Fred Moten call the undercommons.44 By taking the festival model 
to underground venues, independent dramatists refused to allow their crea-
tive work to be appropriated toward the identity politics of state institutions. 
They were not dissidents to be co- opted but rather independents to be reck-
oned with. They gained less visibility for other festival performances than 
they did at the Hanager, where theater critics from all major newspapers 
reviewed plays. Yet the recognition they received from critics on the CFCC 
jury did boost the reputations of successful performances at Young Direc-
tors. Prizewinners also went on trips to the Avignon theater festival in France, 
funded by the French embassy in Cairo. The alternative forms of cultural 
currency they acquired through circulation at festivals contested the author-
ity of the Ministry of Culture as the sole arbiter of transnational exchange 
in theater. It also allowed performers to test their repertoires before a wider 
range of audiences.
In the early 2000s, the theater festival revealed its flexibility as a medium 
of avant- garde culture when it allowed independent dramatists to use 
experimental theater as currency outside the state cultural economy. The 
combination of dance, folk- style theater, and self- scripted performances at 
these festivals extended the frame of European- style avant- gardism to win 
audiences for various Egyptian youth repertoires as well. Participating in 
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the CFCC festival granted performers an automatic legitimacy as part of a 
cosmopolitan avant- garde. As I discuss in chapter 4, adapting translations 
remained a privileged means for young directors to claim cosmopolitan cre-
dentials. It was remarkable, however, that the prize for best performance 
regularly went to self- scripted shows about contemporary Egyptian life, such 
as Intersections. The translation of foreign experimental theater into Egyptian 
genres seemed more complete at independent festivals. Dramatic characters 
here looked different from the “soldiers of the cultural battleground” that 
Farouk Hosni had called on to internationalize the Egyptian avant- garde.45 
They used their avant- garde status to valorize their refusal of the role of 
exemplary citizens, as outlined by the Ministry of Culture.
By trading on the value of transnational experimental theater promoted at 
CIFET, these dramatists were able to gain growing recognition for an avant- 
garde that represented their generation. The label “independent troupe” (firqa 
mustaqilla), which Hanager- sponsored troupes added to clarify their affilia-
tion on posters, came to be used widely by newer troupes. Identifying with the 
independent theater movement added cachet to university and other amateur 
troupes. Their borrowing of cultural capital through affiliation had its limits, 
however. The new avant- garde reflected some of the cultural hierarchies of 
Rawabet Theater, opened by the independent troupes’ collective in 2005.  
Photograph by Sonali Pahwa.
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the old, as performers trained in European literature, drama, or dance gained 
more opportunities at festivals. Traveling outside the protected bounds of 
state theaters did nonetheless evolve transnational styles, as independent dram-
atists grew their avant- garde through new modes of community building. The 
horizontal connections that characterized the avant- garde at large showed 
that cultural democracy did not need state institutions to thrive. Urban troupes 
capitalized instead on informal connections and the relative freedom of big 
cities to make communal spaces of independent performance.
As Cairo- based troupes sought to build connections with their coun-
terparts across the nation, they had to travel through the more monitored 
infrastructure of the GOCP. This network of state- owned cultural centers 
offered both a physical and a cultural framework for youth theater, to which 
members of the Cairo avant- garde wished to connect. Some were graduates of 
GOCP troupes themselves. When the GOCP launched a nationwide program 
of festivals and workshops, its independent- minded allies experimented with 
reinterpreting the organization’s traditional civilizing mission in the terms of 
a new avant- garde.
Avant- Gardism in the Provinces
The oasis town of Al- Fayum was less than a hundred miles from Cairo, but a 
world away for visitors from the capital. In July 2009, the little van in which I 
traveled to the GOCP festival for professional troupes was packed with staff-
ers eager to escape Cairo’s steamy summer. Several were journalists visiting 
to write about the festival, including my new friend Magdi, a critic from the 
town of Al- Mahalla. They were part of the GOCP, a national institution for 
grassroots cultural production that had originated with the name of the 
People’s University in 1945 and expanded into the Mass Culture Organiza-
tion in 1965 before acquiring its present name in 1989. In each incarnation, the 
GOCP was an instrument of the ideology of “cultural cultivation” (tathqif) 
espoused by Egyptian regimes through their shifts from constitutional mon-
archy to state socialism to neoliberalism.46 As its original name indicated, it 
had an educational as well as cultural mandate aimed at young amateur art-
ists. The current festival was part of the latest cultural policy for fulfilling 
that mandate.
Recent GOCP publications wrote of art as a means of “enlightened thought” 
(al- fikr al- mustanir), teaching modern citizenship with a specifically secularist 
ethic. In his editorial to the program of the Scientific Conference on Egyp-
tian Theater in the Provinces in 2007, dramatist Abd al- Rahman al- Shafi’i 
expounded on Islamism as an “internal challenge” on par with the “external 
challenge” of cultural globalization and the “hegemony of a market cul-
ture.”47 His vision of theater as a cultural defense portrayed the avant- garde 
in instrumentalized terms similar to those of Hosni, though his tone was more 
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nationalist. Surprisingly, it was an ideology with which several independ-
ent dramatists from Cairo agreed. Abeer Ali, a leading figure in Cairo’s free 
theater, regularly worked with the organization, where she got her start as 
an amateur from Suez. “I’m a daughter of the Theater Clubs [Nawadi al- 
Masrah],” she asserted in response to my surprise at finding her at Cairo’s 
Manf Cultural Palace in 2009.48 “I started my career here in 1989, as an 
assistant director and then a director.” There had been a key change in the 
organization’s mission since Ali found her path to Cairo through the GOCP. 
Now, it mainly produced festivals, as a means of cultivating “theater cul-
ture” (al- thaqafa al- masrahiya) in the provinces. The vans of Cairo critics who 
traveled to these festivals came to converse with small- town dramatists as 
part of a new economy in which the vector of enlightenment moved from the 
capital to smaller towns.
I went with Magdi to a streetside café where other visiting dramatists and 
bureaucrats were also lingering before the play, conspicuous by their urban 
clothing in a place where men of the town wore traditional robes (galabiya). 
Eventually, we headed to the cultural palace itself, where we were told GOCP 
theater head Essam el- Sayed was expecting us. The wiry veteran director, 
now in his sixties, seemed imposing when I interviewed him in Cairo. Here in 
Al- Fayum, he wore a casual polo shirt and joked with junior critics, reading 
out their conflicting reviews of the same play and saying they should fight it 
out. In Al- Fayum, they were all part of an urban cultural elite. Coming out 
to festivals on bumpy roads and driving back the same night was a ritual by 
which they affirmed the enduring value of the institution that helped to make 
Egyptian theater truly national.
When El- Sayed took over the Theater Sector in 2009, he was tasked with 
bringing it up to speed with a theater economy that valued professional stand-
ards. “Mass Culture theater had become a theater without an audience,” he 
told me, using the old term for the GOCP. “I was asked for a strategy to 
improve the quality rather than quantity of productions. So I framed some 
rules, including a limit on the number of times the same text could be per-
formed. Troupes are now evaluated and assigned points, which they gain 
by performing new texts.” El- Sayed applied an ideology of productivity that 
characterized cultural policy under Hosni, framing theater as a means not 
just of enlightenment but also of capacity building. “In the third world, art 
must develop human capabilities [al- qadarat al- bashariya],” he told me. 
“You expand someone’s horizons so that he becomes an effective person and 
engaged citizen.”49 His new program included both educational workshops 
and festivals, which circulated existing resources in the GOCP to nurture 
talent across the nation. The cultural dissemination that he envisioned was 
founded on an economic model aimed at measurable progress. As a result, 
provincial festivals often took on the air of a bureaucratic exercise.
When night fell in Al- Fayum, the GOCP professional troupe’s production 
of a 1970s drama by Alfred Farag marked an anticlimactic end to the festival 
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journey. Folksy songs and labored dialogue in classical Arabic transposed 
the historical drama clumsily into contemporary times. My colleagues from 
Cairo gave it a perfunctory round of applause and headed out for a cigarette. 
Young local actors came over to introduce themselves and chat about theat-
rical trends. They were eager to avail themselves of the presence of cultural 
authorities from Cairo, and my colleagues were happy to answer their ques-
tions. The ritual of the GOCP festival offered an opportunity to play the part 
of public intellectuals. As my fellow travelers salvaged from an otherwise disap-
pointing festival the pleasure of friendly debate, they found unofficial avenues 
for cultural exchange with colleagues in the provinces who were interested in 
the arts. Those youth embodied the Cairo intellectuals’ idea of the “cultured 
individual” (muthaqqaf) in other ways as well, as they smoked cigarettes and 
wore Western clothes. The festival saw such connections flicker so briefly that 
I questioned the investment of time and effort in it. But my fellow travel-
ers in the van back to Cairo that night shrugged off my concerns. They were 
glad to make the trip and connect with young dramatists in the provinces. In 
some instances, casual connections resulted in dramatists producing the work 
of playwrights from other towns, as I saw in a festival production of Rasha 
Abdel Moneim’s feminist one- woman drama later that summer. GOCP fes-
tivals produced occasional collaborations that challenged the organization’s 
Cairocentric vision of cultural outreach.
The festivals offered brief, utopian glimpses of a national avant- garde, 
despite all their entrenched hierarchies. The Mubarak regime’s renewed 
investment in GOCP theater since the 1990s was aimed at fostering liberal 
cosmopolitanism in “cultural counterpoint to economic liberalism.”50 Its 
equal desire to monitor youth culture and prevent young Egyptians from 
turning Islamist gave the GOCP’s cultural enlightenment project a limited 
focus. Yet idealistic participants at the festivals realized their latent potential, 
using them to have conversations and make connections outside formal dis-
cussions. Particularly committed GOCP workers lamented that they could 
not engage in more enduring forms of cultural exchange. “If only we could 
hold workshops all over Egypt, in places like Sinai and the desert oases,” 
Ali lamented. “They don’t have enough cultural production there.”51 She 
believed in cultivating theatrical talent across the nation. Other friends in 
Cairo’s independent theater community disparaged the GOCP’s national 
project as an old- fashioned civilizing mission. However, younger actors hop-
ing for a chance to break into theater and media saw a rare avenue for access 
to a national avant- garde here. The socialist dream of the arts as a vector of 
upward mobility was one that they wanted to uphold in times of capitalist 
neoliberalism.
In 2008, a group of art journalists working for state television and news-
papers tried to animate a national avant- garde through a grassroots initiative. 
They collaborated with students in art criticism and theater to launch a 
tabloid- style cultural newspaper intended specifically for young dramatists. 
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The editorial office of Masrahuna (Our Theater) was housed in the Giza 
Cultural Palace, across from the Academy of Arts campus in Cairo, where 
several contributing writers studied. Editor in chief Masoud Shuman was 
a poet writing in colloquial Arabic, and he brought an inclusive approach 
to what he considered an unnecessarily “priestly” (kahnuti) view of theater 
in the academy. He sent reporters out to cover theater of all kinds. “At first, 
we thought we’d last a few months at most,” he told me. “But the reality we 
found was that theatrical life in Egypt is plentiful, despite all the pressures on 
it. All the provinces practice theater, as do public- sector companies and cul-
tural palaces. All universities and colleges have theater troupes, too.”52 The 
newspaper channeled this vitality into an inclusive representation of national 
avant- garde theater. Our Theater grew so successful that senior GOCP bureau-
crats began writing columns for it. And when the editors persuaded academy 
professors to give a summer lecture series at the office, in 2008 and 2009, 
these “workshops” drew theater enthusiasts from across Egypt. I met attend-
ees from Port Said, Al- Fayum, Minya, and Aswan among crowds of GOCP 
amateurs from Cairo. They were glad for the chance to study with professors 
at an otherwise very exclusive academy. “I have a full notebook from the lec-
tures that I can share with my friends in Aswan,” one attendee, Hany, told me. 
Another regional dramatist, Tariq, recorded the lectures on a handheld video 
camera. The imagined community of Our Theater’s readership had come 
together, and its idealism was palpable.
The enthusiasm that the cultural palaces inspired in veteran Cairo dram-
atists like Essam el- Sayed attested to their enduring nostalgia for the idea of 
national theater. In Cairo, El- Sayed worked mainly for commercial produc-
tions. But like his contemporary director Galal al- Sharqawi, who owned a 
private theater, he retained a job in the state sector. These men in their sixties 
and seventies were of a generation in which memories of Nasserist socialism 
coexisted with hardnosed entrepreneurial practices. Al- Sharqawi’s Al- Gala’ 
Theater was known for glitzy musicals. But at a lecture series organized by 
Our Theater in 2008, he brought out his academic training (and a vintage 
tweed jacket) to discuss ancient and modern concepts of European politi-
cal drama in impeccable formal Arabic. “Theater affects society,” he said, 
repeating a motto of his generation in conclusion. “It is not just an art— it 
is a jihad.”53 Like leftist Cuban dramatists, these Egyptians evinced a nos-
talgia for a golden age of amateur theater that was part of a longing for the 
era when social revolution seemed possible.54 Yet young Egyptians had lit-
tle hope of making professional careers in theater today. When students at 
Al- Sharqawi’s lecture asked the great man how they could make theater that 
benefited society and won them jobs, he offered no answers. The idea of 
a progressive national theater continued to bring generations of Egyptian 
dramatists together in projects like Our Theater nonetheless.
At the summer workshop, the abstract concept of “youth of the theater” in 
state publications materialized in utopian form. It was necessarily short- lived, 
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as there were not resources to extend the project beyond two summers. Yet 
the newspaper’s gesture of educational support for young dramatists legit-
imized a larger project of representing Egyptian theater in its regional and 
generational breadth. Young culture journalists wrote about their friends’ 
plays and showed they were well versed in national and international dra-
matic literature. Unlike GOCP festivals, where well- meaning juries lectured 
young dramatists, moreover, the newspaper gave provincial artists the chance 
to represent themselves as cultured and capable. Meanwhile, bureaucrats 
could perform here as benevolent older statesmen. GOCP head Ahmed Meg-
ahid wrote in Our Theater that its “cultural and artistic activities herald the 
consciousness of beauty, belonging, and love,” while editor Yusri Hassaan’s 
paean to “the enthusiasm, commitment, and love” of workshop participants 
underscored the affective dimensions of the initiative he had founded.55 These 
did not fit within the rules of productivity that El- Sayed set forth for evaluat-
ing GOCP productions. But they seemed paradoxically to fulfill the mission 
of the GOCP festivals: the exchange of theatrical knowledge across genera-
tions and regions. The ideal of state support for theater was staged in such 
brief rituals. A catastrophic failure of the ritual process had recently revealed 
that the Ministry of Culture was neglecting its mission, and it brought Cairo 
dramatists and peers in the provinces together in a demonstration of avant- 
garde solidarity.
The September 5 Movement and a New Manifesto  
for Cultural Democracy
On September 5, 2005, a performance at the annual amateur Nawadi al- 
Masrah (Theater Clubs) festival ended in tragedy. A group of Cairo theater 
critics and directors had traveled to the southern town of Beni Suef to serve 
on the festival jury and sat in the front row. A nightmarish accident at the 
start of a play— a lighted candle knocked over onstage— created a blaze that 
spread through the hall. The theater doors were locked according to state 
security rules, and forty- six people died, including the entire jury. As shock 
waves reverberated through the Cairo theater community, leaders of the 
independent theater movement demanded the resignation of the minister of 
culture. When he refused, they called for a boycott of CIFET, due to begin a 
few days later. Once again, CIFET saw the inception of a manifesto move-
ment. This time, the manifesto claimed political as well as cultural rights. 
It was published on a blog and addressed to a broader audience than state 
authorities, describing the movement as “a group that was born on this day 
of shock, amid the smell of deadly smoke, when more than 35 actors and crit-
ics and spectators died in the burning of the Beni Suef Cultural Palace. We 
decided to form a fact- finding committee in order to hold to account those 
responsible for what happened, those whose neglect turned a mistake into 
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a terrible tragedy.”56 An early blog post on September 29 simply listed lawyers 
who had volunteered to help families of the deceased. Next appeared four 
eyewitness accounts, gathered by Alexandria director Ibrahim al- Furn. They 
noted that the fifty- seat theater had been filled well over capacity, with 
about 150 people attending, and that fire extinguishers were locked away in 
another room. Finally, a founding statement (bayan ta’sisi) listed the aims of 
the movement succinctly:
Bringing to account those responsible.
Establishing measures to prevent the recurrence of what happened, to 
which end we seek to establish a council of independent arts monitors.
Protecting the safety of theater workers as well as their material and 
artistic rights.57
While members of the Egyptian theater community attempted to investigate 
what had happened and come to terms with the death of so many colleagues, 
the Ministry of Culture decided simply to proceed with CIFET. The inde-
pendent troupes were outraged and called for a boycott. A blog post featured 
a “statement issued by the Independent Theater Troupes’ Training and Studies 
Cooperative and the cream of Egyptian intellectuals,” calling for the resig-
nation of the ministers of culture, health, and interior.58 It had first been 
issued at a press conference held to coincide with a hasty Ministry of Culture 
event honoring the “martyrs” of Beni Suef. The petition garnered 407 signa-
tures, including those of eminent Egyptian poets Ahmad Fuad Nigm and 
Sayed Higab, novelists Sonallah Ibrahim and Radwa Ashour, and movie star 
Mahmoud Hemeida.59 Arab newspapers such as Al- Safir and Al- Hayaat, 
alongside Egyptian independent journals like Akhbar al- Adab, wrote articles 
in support of the boycott that the blog reposted. An article from Jerusalem- 
based Al- Quds Al- Arabi even noted that the minister conscripted employees 
to fill empty seats at CIFET after the boycott and stationed plainclothes police 
to prevent September 5 activists from entering.60 Lebanese journalist Pierre 
Abi Saab declared that “starring roles [at CIFET] this year went to the heroes 
of that tragedy which extended beyond the stage to expose the truth, with 
its scandals and tragedies.”61 The international recognition that CIFET had 
gained for the free theater movement now attracted foreign visitors to their 
cause. Troupes from Italy, Jordan, Serbia, Montenegro, and Senegal quickly 
withdrew from the festival.
The tragedy at the national Theater Clubs festival, so soon before the 
transnational spectacle of CIFET, laid bare the contradictions of theater pol-
icy under Farouk Hosni. While handpicked Cairo dramatists had gained 
support from the ministry, their colleagues in the provinces suffered terrible 
neglect. The leaders of the September 5 movement, including Khaled el- Sawy 
and Muhammad ‘Abd al- Khaliq, used their status as anointed avant- gardists 
to dramatize this nationwide crisis of rights. Their blog gathered signatories 
at home and abroad, including Egyptian human rights organizations that 
After the Festival 43
were forming at the time, such as Markaz al- Janub. The September 20 protest 
outside the opening ceremony of CIFET was joined by different wings of 
the new Egyptian Movement for Change (Al- Haraka al- Masriyya min Ajl 
 al- Taghyir), known by its brief moniker Kefaya (Enough!). Formed ahead of 
the 2005 presidential elections, this umbrella group included Artists for Change, 
Doctors for Change, Youth for Change, and Journalists for Change, all of 
whom participated in the festival boycott. The demands of cultural democracy 
set the stage for a more political rights movement.
The September 5 manifesto was a different kind of political statement 
from that of the free theater movement: it was explicitly opposed to and crit-
ical of the Mubarak regime. Its claims rested, however, on the ground laid 
by the earlier cultural rights movement. That founding scenario of youthful 
anger and activism in the face of state neglect, which extracted concessions 
from sympathetic state officials, was replayed in a more strident voice in 
2005. It eventually achieved results: Minister Farouk Hosni resigned, though 
President Hosni Mubarak refused to accept his resignation. And theaters 
nationwide were slated for renovation in 2006, among them the Hanager, 
which stayed closed for the next two years. The September 5 movement dis-
sipated almost as quickly as it had emerged, and by January, the blog was 
no longer updated. However, the betrayal that independent dramatists felt at 
this juncture cemented their break from state theaters. The drama of cultural 
citizenship had been exposed as a farce, and several avant- gardists joined 
antiregime movements like Kefaya.
The September 5 movement was the first in a series of Egyptian political 
initiatives named after a protest event (such as those of April 6, 2008, and 
January 25, 2011). In it, the rights claims of middle- class, university- educated 
artists coincided with those of many more Egyptians whose lives were at 
everyday risk from the malfunction of the state. As passenger ferries sank and 
trains collided, the Mubarak regime’s neglect of citizens became spectacularly 
visible in its last years. Independent Cairo dramatists put a sympathetic face 
on that neglect for interlocutors within the state establishment, and deployed 
their role as standard- bearers of cultural democracy to call for political 
change. It was symbolically significant that the independent dramatists now 
boycotted CIFET, when they had once fought against its cancellation. They 
were ready to seek other theaters for their performances of citizenship.
Though CIFET had been founded to generate “symbols for the nation,” 
independent theater makers used it to develop flexible repertoires of rights 
claims as citizens of a new generation. The leaders of the independent theater 
movement enacted cultural democracy within the privileged habitus that they 
shared with state- employed intellectuals. Their liberal rights claims began to 
move across and beyond cultural institutions after Beni Suef, even as the GOCP 
and Ministry of Culture worked to contain them within arts festivals. The path 
from state- sponsored cultural democracy to democratic rights movements was 
far from a straight line, as it might appear if we saw the former as a rehearsal 
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for revolution. Rather, the combination of theatrical and organizational rep-
ertoires developed in independent theater helped to fashion scenarios of 
rights claims that found a platform at moments of political ferment.
Avant- Gardism in Art and Politics
The free theater manifesto movement launched in 1990 set the stage for an 
emergent Egyptian avant- garde on the margins of state theater, which built 
its repertoires at regular festivals. Formed through intergenerational col-
laboration, the manifesto claimed “a space of unauthorized theatricality”62 
and ushered into being an independent, interstitial mode of making theater 
nationwide. Its path was marked by spectacular gestures and unexpected 
turns, highlighting the fugitive quality of an avant- garde that moved under-
ground and emerged occasionally into the national spotlight. Its recognition 
by the state cultural establishment nevertheless brought into mainstream 
theaters new narratives of generational identity, which had once been lim-
ited to university and amateur stages. The movement’s success promised its 
new avant- garde theater a future beyond state institutions. There remained a 
particular symbolic value to performances at official sites of cultural author-
ity, where independents played the part of prophets of the future of culture. 
Simultaneously, their less visible work to put in place an infrastructure of 
negotiation, contracts, newsletters, and festival protocols framed their legal 
claims to independent status within a respectably liberal tradition.
The festival model adapted from CIFET became the key frame for perfor-
mances of cultural citizenship, allowing the independent theater movement 
to sustain its work across decades. The role of “youth of the theater” devel-
oped in the movement’s dramatic repertoires, which fashioned new genres 
of social critique. Independent dramatists still deployed deferential rituals— 
such as inviting senior officials to the opening night of festivals— to legitimize 
their critical gestures within respectable repertoires. However tactical these 
rituals of affiliation with state theater were, they carried the risk of co- opting 
the movement into state avant- gardes. Artistic independence often proved 
a utopian ideal in a military dictatorship, even for the handful of drama-
tists who won success in the state project of cultural democracy. The annual 
free theater festival staged democratic participation as a spectacle, but it was 
valued as a promise for the future nonetheless. The independent troupes’ 
cooperative labored to protect and extend it. Eventually their festival moved 
to the troupes’ new Rawabet Theater in downtown Cairo in 2006, funded 
by a combination of ticket sales and grants.63 The foundational scenario of 
a theater festival that showed off the work of young dramatists, first seen 
at CIFET, gained a transformative edge when it moved into new times and 
places, allowing these dramatists to claim their mantle as pioneers of a new 
Egyptian avant- garde.
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The performance repertoires of independent theater gradually transformed 
as troupes began working at more unofficial venues, such as the CFCC. In 
Diana Taylor’s terms for thinking about the relationship between scene and 
scenario in a repertoire, independent dramatists reworked festival scenarios 
when they transposed these outside official state theaters.64 Their festi-
val rituals and dramatic genres presented independent dramatists both as 
respectable youth and as a dissident new generation of artists. Moreover, 
their development of independent theater as a fugitive cultural phenome-
non extended the representational means of avant- garde performance in the 
aftermath of the festival. The mix of semiofficial theater festivals and under-
ground performances in the late Mubarak era resonated with the partially 
visible intellectual worlds that Harney and Moten term undercommons. Like 
members of those intellectual worlds, independent Egyptian dramatists were 
always in danger of being conscripted into the regime’s spectacles and institu-
tions.65 However, independent dramatists negotiated with different authorities 
and worked to keep their labor out of the appropriative reach of state power. 
Their self- regulated status produced renegade performances that sometimes 
resembled what Michel Foucault calls a “site of veridiction” within neoliberal 
regimes that allowed their subjects a controlled measure of freedom.66 Activ-
ist episodes in the history of independent theater showed that such careful 
allowances of freedom did, however, have political effects. Theater makers in 
their twenties and thirties claimed rights in the mode of cultural democracy, 
even as they accepted limits to their independence. Their unexpectedly politi-
cal gestures challenged narratives of national theater as a protectorate of the 
state and enacted repertoires of citizen leadership not yet available in political 
discourse.
John Conteh- Morgan argues that there is no clear divide between aes-
thetic and political radicalism in postcolonial theaters where citizenship itself 
is being reimagined. Such avant- garde theater is political “in the way it is 
practiced, organized, and conceived (often as a metaphor of creativity and 
renewal, both of self and community), in the way it enacts a vision of human 
relations, in the way, finally, that it functions as a model of culture and com-
munity.”67 In Egypt’s independent theater, the alternation between sustained 
cultural activism and moments of political drama in 1990 and 2005 revealed 
the intertwining of avant- garde repertoires across stages. Their “model[s] of 
culture and community” played out in narratives of gender critique and gen-
erational struggle onstage. More intermittently, their models of organizing 
and making rights claims carried over from theatrical to political contexts. 
Avant- garde challenges to authoritarian institutions resonated across cultural 
spheres in the late Mubarak era. These critical repertoires of youth culture 
framed the future as a site of social change.
During the liveliest years of independent theater in Egypt (2002– 6), the 
movement that began with a stirring civil manifesto settled into a placid 
rhythm of annual festivals. Its democratic gains were often pushed back by 
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the Ministry of Culture. A chronological historical narrative of independent 
theater thus reveals slow progress. Attending to the fugitive motions and rip-
pling waves of free theater culture across Cairo’s urban landscape offers a 
more dynamic view of this theater movement. My ethnographic observations 
at festivals and of organizational campaigns focused on both slow- forming 
repertoires and sudden political gestures, which show how the avant- garde 
grew both in space and time. Further, the performances I examine in the fol-
lowing chapters attest to a range of narratives of a new society, with respect 
to media, politics, and gender roles. By analyzing these collectively as avant- 
garde performances of citizenship, I seek to show how repertoires of cultural 




Youth in the Time of New Media
In January 2004, scenes from the Iraq War played repeatedly across Egyptian 
television screens, evoking popular horror but no condemnation from official 
quarters. Then, Cairo’s Hanager theater ended the artistic silence on the inva-
sion with a new antiwar play. Opening- night crowds buzzed with anticipation 
at the revival of dissident politics on this semiofficial stage of experimental 
theater. The Haraka (Movement) troupe’s performance took even the criti-
cal Hanager audience by surprise. A group of actors dressed as U.S. Marines 
burst in, waving fake guns and herding audience members (including me) 
into the theater with curses and shoves. Once inside, we found the wartime 
atmosphere replaced by familiar sounds from Egyptian television. The house 
was set up as a talk show studio, with warm lights and music, and a producer 
gave us instructions on when to applaud. It soon became clear that the play’s 
title, Al- la’b fi- l- dimagh (Messing with the Mind) referred to how television 
manipulated Egyptians through political reporting and entertainment. But 
there was a twist: the regime (al- nizam) represented on television was a col-
laboration between an Egyptian producer and the American general of the 
occupying army. Over a three- hour extravaganza of skits and songs, the play 
dramatized a corrupt alliance between television networks, Egyptian elites, 
and foreign leaders. There was no nationalist hero. The prototypical citizen 
character was a young man seduced by the pleasures of satellite television.
Just weeks later, another independent production showed that satellite 
television was producing a crisis of Egyptian identity. Al- Ma’bad (Temple) 
troupe’s Mama ana awez aksib al- milyun (Mother I Want to Be a Million-
aire) dramatized the lure of American Idol– style talent contests for youth to 
whom the nation no longer offered traditional paths to a bright future. The 
opening scene of a classroom featured two students sitting through an out-
dated curriculum. “We want to concentrate on today’s lesson, which is the 
first and most important lesson in the Arabic language: the letters of the 
alphabet,” their teacher droned. Then the lights changed, and upbeat music 
took the boys to the livelier space of a television studio. Another patriarchal 
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figure appeared: the male host of a singing contest in which thousands of 
young Arab men and women cast their votes for the contestants via text mes-
saging and online voting. “Don’t forget that the winner, the champion you 
will choose, will win not one or two or five, but fifteen million pounds! It 
is you who will determine and choose and decide who is the champion!” 
Voting and performing in a youth- oriented show was alluring for the young 
characters, including the protagonist Hasan, who imagined an alternative 
biography through media. Yet his hopes came crashing down by the play’s 
end. Once again, the young man who should have been an icon of Egypt’s 
new cosmopolitanism appeared as a failed citizen.
The two plays about satellite television, and the new world order that 
it represented, staged an impasse of Egyptian citizenship in an era of cul-
tural democracy without economic or political rights. Protagonists Ashraf 
and Hasan tried to play their own version of cosmopolitan youth, only to 
be manipulated by media machinery. Their failures offered unusually cyni-
cal views on whether young Egyptians could represent themselves through 
media. However, the runaway success of Messing with the Mind (and the 
transnational accolades for Mother I Want to Be a Millionaire) showed that 
independent theater was well positioned to represent the crisis of Egyptian 
identity in an age of neoliberal globalization. The two 2004 productions ana-
lyzed the promise of media globalization through satellite television, then a 
Television presenter in Mother I Want to Be a Millionaire. Courtesy of Ahmed 
el- Attar.
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new phenomenon, in slow theatrical time. As they staged the youth culture gen-
erated around the media phenomenon for audiences, they demonstrated the 
absence of opportunities for self- representation under the Mubarak regime’s 
policies. If anything, the new ideology of freedom through media covered up 
dismal political and psychological realities for the young people showcased 
on television. The embodied practice of self- representation was presented as 
more authentic in both plays. By bringing their knowledge of satellite televi-
sion to stage, directors Khaled el- Sawy and Ahmed el- Attar staged impasses 
of youth citizenship grounded in the contemporary experiences of television 
viewers.
The Haraka troupe also included two television producers, Sayed Mahmoud 
and director El- Sawy. Their experiences of workplace dissimulation and their 
leftist politics brought them to devise the self- styled “political cabaret” about 
fake media images of freedom. It resonated widely at a time of discontent 
with the Mubarak regime’s support for the United States’ military action in 
a fellow Arab country. Messing with the Mind played to packed houses at 
the Hanager for three months and won positive reviews from cultural critics 
across state and private newspapers.1 Reviewers applauded the independent 
troupe for rising to the intellectual challenge of critiquing the Iraq War and 
even ushering in the rebirth of political theater.2 Within the state cultural 
establishment, critics in search of nationalist icons downplayed the dark sat-
ire and embraced the patriotic hope that the show offered. National theater 
still had something to say about Egyptian identity, they enthused. The ges-
ture of replacing television chicanery with more authentic representations of 
contemporary life won the pioneering independent Haraka troupe its biggest 
success to date.
The ironic success of plays with failed protagonists marked an impasse 
of recognition with which independent theater makers were familiar. They 
worked against triumphal representations of youth in new media, including 
satellite television, to depict flawed young citizens who embodied paradoxes 
of Egyptian liberalism without democracy. As subjects of a regime that offered 
rights to a narrow part of the population, these dramatists staged the struggle 
of regulating their desires for freedom according to norms of cultural democ-
racy. The rousing performance of activism that ended Messing with the Mind 
contrasted with the lonely anger of the protagonist of Mother I Want to Be a 
Millionaire, whose freedom to consume global media drove him to despair. 
The positive performance of citizenship in the former case resulted in a polit-
icized drama that was well received at home. Meanwhile, the latter drama of 
alienation was hailed as a representation of the despair of Arab youth at the 
Berliner Festspiele.
Messing with the Mind and Mother I Want to Be a Millionaire displayed 
disjunctures between the hopeful futures represented on Egyptian television 
and the contemporary lives of middle- class youth. The story of the alienated 
young man was a focal point for staging this disjuncture in each play. His 
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misguided faith in the new future promised by television pointed to a mis-
recognition of freedom, although his enduring hope helped him survive dark 
times. I analyze visions of the national future through two strands in each 
play: one of identity crisis, and the other of hope. Scenes that critiqued satel-
lite television, and its representations of youth culture, sometimes aligned with 
nationalist attacks on new media by state- employed intellectuals. The per-
formances also produced new cosmopolitan culture by refracting television 
narratives through avant- garde theater repertoires. These critical stagings 
approached new media without prior ideological binaries between national 
and foreign culture. Each of the performances analyzed here thus showed 
how theater in the era of neoliberal globalization itself mediated new media 
for middle- class audiences. Independent avant- gardists staged their experi-
ences with media as part of an emerging youth culture.
As the independent theater movement developed new narratives of youth 
culture, it redefined the classic protagonist of modern Egyptian fiction, the 
young, middle- class man. This symbolically charged figure questioned his 
masculinity at a time when the parameters of youth, citizenship, and desire 
were all shifting. With the rapid privatization of education, and the spread 
of global media, national pedagogies of masculinity were replaced by sub-
tler means of shaping the proper male subject. Formal institutions that 
molded identity were superseded by free- form mechanisms that modulated 
it.3 Multimedia theater examined the dialectic between mass media and the 
performing body through live performances that showed how media stand-
ardized identity in contemporary contexts.4 Media had specifically political 
implications in Egypt, where television was a privileged means of dissemi-
nating state ideologies of identity. Challenging satellite television norms of 
cosmopolitan citizenship in theater was thus an oppositional gesture. The ide-
ology of media globalization as a means to liberal democracy was countered 
by staging the contemporary impasse of young masculinity and, by extension, 
contemporary citizenship.
The young protagonists of Messing with the Mind and Mother I Want 
to Be a Millionaire struggled to act ethically in times of sexual and finan-
cial corruption. These characters built on familiar types in university theater, 
where dramatists honed the art of representing existential dilemmas. The 
alienated young man was also a prominent figure in Arabic literary drama, 
manifested, for instance, in Hamlet- like characters struggling to act against 
unjust power.5 Independent dramatists built on these available repertoires to 
fashion contemporary narratives that responded to moral panics about glo-
balization by representing their generation in its own terms. In 2004, several 
Egyptian media commentators had sounded alarms about the mindless con-
sumption of satellite television programming by youth, warning that cultural 
difference was causing psychic dissonance.6 Academics likewise argued that 
the new consumerism was producing a crisis in norms of Egyptian mascu-
linity.7 Independent theater makers took up the trope of masculinity in crisis 
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and gave it a story. Thus they entered into debates on the future of masculin-
ity in neoliberal times, as intellectuals representative of their generation and 
its historical experience.
The Haraka and Ma’bad troupes were formed in the university theater 
scene of the 1990s, and their male directors were well versed in staging youth 
culture in this period of accelerated globalization. Directors El- Sawy and El- 
Attar were now in their thirties, and they took a broad, generational view of 
the struggles of younger Egyptian men. Their respective positions, one as an 
employee of the Nile Television Network and the other as a well- connected, 
polyglot graduate of the American University in Cairo, also informed their 
perspectives on precarity in the generation that came of age amid economic 
reforms and widespread unemployment. Their reflections on contemporary 
youth centered on the analysis of freedom and its ethics. These dramatists 
saw that norms of good citizenship were changing in an era of economic 
transformation and investigated the shift in stories of young men and their 
desires.
Guarding Critical Culture in Neoliberal Times
In October 2003, El- Sawy began rehearsals for a play that was close to his 
heart, as a socialist who no longer had time for regular activism. He shot to 
fame as a film actor with his role as the eponymous president in Gamal Abdel 
Nasser (1998). While he earned his bread and butter as a television producer, 
he was also busy shooting Ramadan television serials, where his acting skills 
were in high demand. Yet he remained committed to sustaining the theater 
troupe he had founded as a law student at Cairo University. “The Haraka 
troupe focuses on political and social matters, and on comedy,” he told me, 
emphasizing that its name, Al- Haraka (Movement), referred to both physical 
and political movement. As El- Sawy narrated his coming- of- age as “a left-
ist and a revolutionary” over beer in Cairo’s radical- chic Estoril restaurant, I 
began to make sense of his combination of commercial success and outsider 
identity. His work for Haraka complemented the day job that enabled his 
Marxist ideals, and fed on his critical view of the institutions that paid his 
salary. “I don’t compromise when I’m directing plays as I do when I’m act-
ing. Directing belongs to your vision, while acting is technical,” he asserted.8 
Every two years, his troupe raised funds to produce a play or a film that con-
veyed its shared leftist vision.
Messing with the Mind germinated in the troupe’s research into living 
conditions in Cairo after the acceleration of economic and media reforms it 
referred to collectively as globalization (al- ‘awlama). As a student, El- Sawy 
had written expressionist (ta’biri) plays on youthful alienation in literary 
Arabic, alongside his activism. Before spearheading the September 5 move-
ment, he had been part of the National Committee for Students, the Lawyers’ 
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Syndicate, and the Actors’ Syndicate. “I work on the struggle, and art arises 
out of it— the art of resistance,” he declared.9 In the current show, his theat-
rical and activist efforts converged. The Haraka troupe had made a decisive 
turn from expressionism to popular comedy as it began to seek audiences off 
campus. Its signature genre was now the satirical musical known in Syria and 
Egypt as political cabaret (al- kabareh al- siyasi). Moreover, the recent wave 
of antiwar protests in Cairo had persuaded troupe members that it was time 
for a political play aimed at mass audiences. El- Sawy claimed he got the idea 
for Messing with the Mind when he was out protesting the Iraq War. In his 
retrospective essay “The Experiment of Messing with the Mind,” he wrote, 
“I called for the troupe to begin from the street, where at the first protest of 
the Iraq campaign we hung up the emblem of the troupe and gathered to go 
protest . . . then met afterwards to discuss it.”10 By the autumn of 2003, the 
antiwar protests that had memorably filled Tahrir Square were gone, but the 
Haraka troupe reenacted scenes in theatrical skits.
The troupe’s standing members included several television professionals, such 
as producer Sayed Mahmoud and actress Nermine Za’za. Their knowledge of 
how television studios worked fleshed out the story of Messing with the Mind, 
set in the studio of a fictional network called Democracy (Al- Dimuqratiyya). 
The actors pooled their experiences of corruption in state television to satirize 
the liberal reputation claimed by networks like Nile TV, which had recently 
Khaled el- Sawy (left) at a demonstration by Artists for Change, August 2005. 
Photograph by Sonali Pahwa.
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added satellite channels in English and French. Haraka troupe members also 
disseminated surveys and conducted interviews about economic reforms to 
supplement their own experiences of liberalization. The outbreak of the Iraq 
War added fuel to their critique of the new world order in which Egypt was 
allied with the United States, where trade and military ties superseded Arab 
nationalism. The fictional Democracy studio was the site of a panoply of 
social and economic changes that the troupe associated with the new liber-
alism. Whereas contemporary television presented these reforms as signs of 
Egypt’s integration into a global economy, the stage play dissected globaliza-
tion as a mode of ideology production. The Haraka dramatists improvised 
various skits about recent media and economic reforms within the frame 
story of television production, setting up a dialogue between institutional 
ideologies and personal experiences. Their Marxist style of critique posi-
tioned the dramatists as mediators of popular discontent and truth- tellers 
about the new economy as advertised by the ideological state apparatus of 
television.
Staging the play nonetheless required the cooperation of state theaters, as 
independent venues accommodated very small audiences. The Haraka troupe 
secured the prize stage of the state- owned Hanager for Messing with the 
Mind. Presenting the play as an antiwar drama made it more acceptable to 
Hanager director Hoda Wasfi than a play explicitly about corrupt state insti-
tutions would have been. With a foot in the door, the troupe guarded its 
critical ideas and artistic independence tactically. El- Sawy manipulated the 
censorship process, for instance, by inviting a large number of friends as wit-
nesses to the dress rehearsal where censors were present. The ploy worked: 
about a hundred people came to that rehearsal, and the script was approved 
in full. And those who attended, mostly dramatists themselves, spread the 
word that the play was exciting. Haraka troupe members also did their own 
publicity. They went to the Cairo International Book Fair, which opened a 
few days before the show, and handed out flyers with a political statement: 
“We want to say no to American occupation, corruption, capitalist globaliza-
tion, media fakery, and the Israeli occupation; so come and see the show and 
add your voice to ours.”11 Blending a familiar nationalist vocabulary with 
antiglobalization rhetoric, the statement hedged against the risk of political 
dissent. The dramatists’ knowledge of the state cultural establishment, and its 
red lines, shaped their self- regulated repertoire of critical performance. I ana-
lyze the play along three strands: unmasking media ideology, staging ethical 
masculinity, and rehearsing revolutionary activism.
Unmasking Media Ideology
Television had an ambiguous presence in the lives of Cairo intellectuals, many 
of whom had day jobs as writers and producers there, but spoke of it as a 
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medium of mass culture and state ideology. The hulking Maspero building 
by the Nile, which hosted state television studios, was tellingly guarded by 
tanks and heavy security. Newer private networks located in Cairo’s western 
suburbs poached personnel from state television and syndicated shows from 
Lebanese, American, and other foreign networks. When satellite television 
took over the airwaves in Cairo, few intellectuals saw media liberalization 
as an opportunity for greater democracy. Independent theater makers in par-
ticular saw television as their enemy, an ideology machine that produced 
polished entertainment without serious social critique. The Marxist philos-
opher Guy Debord’s analysis of spectacle as a means by which “deceptive 
images mediate social relations among people” echoes the cynicism with 
which this community received liberalization in the media economy.12 Yet 
satellite television had large audiences among youth, and the Haraka troupe 
decided to critique it as a newly hegemonic cultural phenomenon.
El- Sawy told me that the aim of Messing with the Mind was to replace 
“television reality” with “theater reality.”13 The play’s very title promised to 
unmask television reality as an ideological construct, showing the scripting of 
apparently live performances on talk shows and talent contests. This simple 
deconstructive strategy produced a complex, three- hour narrative that took 
apart not only satellite television but also a whole web of Egyptian media 
discourses that linked liberalized cultural production with political freedom. 
As such, the cabaret- style sketches of wartime television and domestic talk 
shows in Messing with the Mind formed a chain of gestures unmasking “tel-
evision reality” as the ideological apparatus of the regime and its cultural 
democracy policies.
The format of a television talk show framed both the antiwar and domes-
tic “youth dialogue” scenes in the play, its conversation managed by a stylish 
television presenter (mudhi’a) called Madame Nadia. Her blond hair and 
effusive style were typical of presenters on Egyptian satellite networks. “She 
is sharp- tongued but seems charming, smart though she plays dumb. She is 
always hiding her age and pretending to be the opposite of what she is,” 
El- Sawy described the character. “She is the regime, and the system, not just 
a symbol.”14 Played by television actor Nermine Za’za, Nadia embodied a 
stereotype of seductive middle- aged women. Her wiles enabled an unholy 
alliance with the American army, represented by General Fox. The feminized 
corruption of the Egyptian partner in the alliance contrasted with the naive 
figure of the American general, played by El- Sawy. In “theater reality,” the 
liberation ideology that justified the Iraq War, with support from Mubarak’s 
regime, was propagated by a transnational alliance and not just American 
political ambitions.
The political critique began, however, as a crowd- pleasing satire of U.S. 
policy in the Arab region. General Fox came in wearing fatigues, throwing 
hip- hop moves, and singing of his love for Egypt, its ancient history and street 
food. His charm offensive veered into lyrics that described America’s war in 
Live from Cairo 55
Iraq as an attack “for the sake of democracy.”15 Fox embodied the friendly 
face of American pop culture in Egyptian media, where it offered scenarios 
of youthful freedom. After the American response to September 2001, and 
the Iraq War, that image was changing. Now the United States distinguished 
between good and bad Muslims, and it sought support for its invasions of 
the latter’s states. The Egyptian regime’s ready compliance echoed Madame 
Nadia’s welcome to Fox as the “guest of all Arabdom.” She even invited him 
to hold forth on policies that would benefit the Arab world:
Fox: Look, Nadia  .  .  . Arab youth are deep in my heart  .  .  . fine 
youth . . . I ask myself . . . what do Arab youth want? What do they 
want? They want a bride [‘arusa].
(Nadia laughs at his mispronunciation of the word and asks him to 
repeat it.)
Nadia: Oh my goodness! So, General Fox, if we say the young Arab 
man does want a bride, what can Fox do?
Fox: Oh, Fox can do plenty!16
Moments later, Fox summoned his soldiers to bring onstage what he considered 
an ‘arusa— misunderstanding the Arabic word by its secondary meaning of 
“doll.” A life- size, low- priced mannequin was his answer to the marriage crisis 
caused by unemployment in Egypt. This satire of misguided policies inform-
ing U.S. aid to Egypt, which presented import liberalization as an answer to 
the nation’s problems, was received well among an audience from the left-
ist intellectual milieu. Some audience members who were themselves theater 
makers were particularly struck by the staging of gender politics in the relation-
ship between the United States and Egypt. Usually the corrupt mudhi’a was a 
misogynist trope of social corruption. Now she represented a regime in bed with 
American powers, her self- serving style matching that of General Fox.
Unmasking the collaborative ideology of U.S.- Egyptian alliance was a 
radical gesture enabled by the low- tech means of theater. Fox’s clownish 
friendliness and Nadia’s flirtation appeared onstage unpolished by television 
editing. The “theater reality” that El- Sawy fashioned used the simple satirical 
repertoires of youth theater. It produced scenes that touched a political nerve 
but remained safely within the sphere of carnivalesque comedy. Messing with 
the Mind was a studiedly unpolished version of the mainstream political cab-
aret genre, which used dance numbers and showy costumes to entertain as 
it instructed. By filtering television production through its youthful version 
of political cabaret, the independent play made media the objects of political 
critique. The combined use of leftist satire and misogynistic humor to skewer 
Egyptian and American authorities set the stage for critiquing the freedoms 
that neoliberal globalization offered to youth.
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Ethics of Young Masculinity
Madame Nadia’s fictional show Wahashtuni (I’ve Missed You) turned to 
youth dialogues after the opening political satire to demonstrate how youth 
interpreted liberal culture in new media. The talk show was an emerging 
genre on Arab satellite television, and the most popular ones were modeled on 
Oprah and The View. Their commanding hosts presided over debates on the 
social problems of women and marginalized Egyptian populations. Nadia’s 
fictional talk show went further in discussing international politics as well. 
She was a feminized symbol of liberal state power, sympathetically concerned 
about the problems of young Egyptians. In the opening talk show scene, a 
young man named Ashraf was handpicked to represent the kind of youth 
that Nadia wanted to help. The handsome business student, in trendy clothes, 
came onstage to thank Nadia for her show. He repeated her statement that 
youth must work toward their own goals and not expect the government to 
“wipe their ass” as if it were a mother. Ashraf’s performance of neoliberal 
economic values resonated with that of executives in corporate advertise-
ments. Theatrical details like his westernized lisp and macho swagger made 
it slightly ridiculous onstage, however. Moreover, the sexual dimensions of 
his liberal identity fleshed out the dubious ethics of masculinity in the current 
age of globalization.
Ashraf’s antiheroic persona was established at the outset, but his ethical 
conflicts were narrated to appeal to young audience members. Nadia invited 
him to talk about his romantic life, showing off her liberal standards, and he 
confessed that he did have a girlfriend.
Nadia: Wonderful! I want to say to our honored audience in the studio 
and on screens at home that this is a sign of health, that this genera-
tion is honest. A young man can tell his friend “I love your sister.”
When Nadia pushed further, however, she discovered something scandalous 
that demanded censorship.
Nadia: So if the relationship is honorable what can the objection be?
Ashraf: But how can it be honorable, Madame Nadia, when young 
men are repressed and girls depraved?
Nadia: I don’t understand, truly, Ashraf!
Ashraf: Well . . . we “make love” and such.
Nadia: You might commit a sin, you mean?!17
Not only did Madame Nadia’s Arabic euphemism “commit a sin” (tartakibu 
khati’a) linguistically override Ashraf’s English expression, but she also wrestled 
with her guest and covered his mouth to assert control over his unacceptable 
embodiment of freedom. She imposed a cut, grumbling that “this generation 
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is hard to understand and to rule over.”18 The brief scene affirming young 
love, brutally suppressed, showed the narrow constraints of liberal youth cul-
ture and self- regulation under this regime.
The manipulative tricks of Egyptian television returned to set the new lib-
eralism on a more moral path. Madame Nadia brought a docile young man 
on the show after the cut, to embody her vision of modern ethics with con-
servative morality. The new guest, Ahmed, recited a comical list of pious dreams, 
including prosperity for Egypt, progress in his career, peaceful nuclear power, 
and a pilgrimage to Mecca.19 Offscreen, he was seen as an employee of Nadia’s 
television company. Her emasculation of young men in talk show scenarios 
showed her to be part of a patriarchy that enforced old- fashioned values. As 
an embodiment of the regime and its techniques of power, she demonstrated 
that sexuality was a key site of social control. The freedom of relations 
between young Egyptians were to be defined by state authorities, not way-
ward youth themselves. Deeming the object of her liberal policies incapable 
of self- regulation, the authority figure used censorship to uphold traditional 
values. Even Ashraf, who was eager to play the model citizen, found himself 
at an impasse before the regime’s contradictory policies on cultural and polit-
ical liberalism.
Television and theater repertoires for performing ethical masculinity 
diverged further in the denouement of Messing with the Mind. Ashraf’s plot-
line took a melodramatic twist when it emerged that his lover, Intisar, was 
married to someone else. The polyamorous young couple symbolized a dark 
side of the new liberal culture, particularly when their story was picked up 
by a more salacious talk show. However, such behavior was part of a histor-
ical problem that “theater reality” was well positioned to represent. Intisar 
stated on her talk show appearance that her mother had been “clever and 
ambitious, and father’s only capital.”20 The allusive statement was made in a 
side scene where the mother, a part- time sex worker, entertained Gulf Arab 
tourists while her father turned the child’s head the other way. This web 
of unorthodox sexual relations inherited from an older generation traced a 
link between the liberal opening (al- infitah) of the 1970s and the neoliberal 
globalization of the early twenty- first century. The play’s narrative showed 
the first to have emasculated middle- class men, while the second fostered a 
broader social collapse of sexual ethics. In the carefully censored talk show, 
there was little space for staging such underground histories. Despite their 
lip service to a youth culture of relative freedom, then, media authorities 
returned to uphold official history and patriarchal values.
Messing with the Mind used satire to stage the ethical contradictions of 
young Egyptian masculinity, caught between domestic patriarchy and policed 
opportunities for free expression. Performing on a liberal talk show provided 
no exit from this autocratic system. Moreover, the play debunked the idea 
that cultural democracy could offer a way out, as media and military pow-
ers cracked down on young characters’ attempts at acting on their identity 
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politics. While the highly regulated world of cultural production had few ethi-
cal options for youth, the dramatic narrative swerved to show that the sphere 
of activism did. In the last scenes of the play, alienated characters found 
opportunities for ethical citizenship in what was framed as a space of street 
politics. Instead of claiming illicit sexual freedoms, the motley cast joined in 
a community of patriotic solidarity. Their thwarted desires found recourse in a 
narrative that refused the seductions of media consumption and imagined a 
utopia where freedom could be claimed through collective action.
From Alienation to Revolution
The Haraka actors marked their shift from the symbolic freedom of televi-
sion to real democracy through activist songs and chants. Their dramatic 
abandonment of theatrical narrative for political voice came after images of 
the invasion of Baghdad played on the video screen across the back wall of 
the stage.21 The gesture of interrupting the narrative with songs was classi-
cally Brechtian, and the Arab political cabaret genre was indeed influenced by 
the German playwright and theorist of alienation.22 Messing with the Mind 
produced a definitive alienation effect when newsreaders on its fictional tele-
vision station fell silent before images of the war. The actors left their roles to 
form a chorus to one side of the stage, launching into an antiwar song made 
up of chants from the historic protests that took place in Cairo on March 20, 
2003. The break in the dramatic narrative performed a refusal of tragedy. Now 
the show shifted to a new temporality, in which contemporary history was 
interrupted by utopian time. In the new narrative, the young citizen’s voice 
rang as loud as that of the television presenter.
Several songs of the new repertoire of hope were old- fashioned socialist 
anthems. The chorus staged its call for Arab unity on the question of Iraq by 
singing about the pan- Arab project that Egypt had led in the 1960s:
We believed [singer] Sabah when she said simplicity, simplicity
We even sold our clothes and slept together on the floor
Oh you Americanized one, you urchin television
We’ve had enough of your nonsense, you Sylvester Stallone!23
The anthems with a marching beat, comparing cultural icons from Lebanon 
and the United States, gave the protest repertoire a nostalgic tone. Even in 
utopian time, the actors sang in nationalist voices. To some of my drama-
tist friends in the audience, these anthems were uncomfortably jingoistic. Yet 
old nationalist anthems were key repertoires available to would- be Egyptian 
revolutionaries. In the section of the play that could be read as the third and 
final act, the actors playing ethical citizens used these politicized repertoires 
to build a more hopeful narrative of the future.
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How was political revolution imagined in 2004, when the Mubarak regime 
seemed destined to pass power from father to son? Protest scenarios from 
recent years, and songs from decades past, fashioned brief scenes of resist-
ance in Messing with the Mind. The play required a narrative spur toward its 
conclusion, however, which political repertoires from the past did not pro-
vide. And so the troupe members devised a double ending. After a rousing 
scene in which a protester shot General Fox onstage, El- Sawy (playing Fox) 
stood up and offered the audience an alternative. “The resolution is not here 
onstage . . . the solution is with you,” he declared.24 The play’s final anthem, 
with the refrain “the day will come,” told of a time when anger would fire up 
resistance to the status quo. El- Sawy’s concluding gesture of handing over the 
protest scenario to audiences pointed to a future when the avant- garde poli-
tics rehearsed onstage could run through the streets.
The play staged a break from a corrupt society with few ethical citizens, 
and imagined a revolutionary alternative, as a shift from media consump-
tion to the production of a more independent and critical youth culture. 
The actors showed that beneath their cynical pragmatism as television pro-
fessionals working in a corrupt system lay ample repertoires of dissensual 
performance. They had developed these repertoires in independent theater 
and antiwar protest, where they felt able to act more ethically than in their 
day jobs. Memories of recent street protests shaped their theatrical imagina-
tion of revolution. Moreover, historical repertoires of political theater, song, 
and poetry were key media for memories, techniques, and slogans of left-
ist nationalism in Cairo. All of these came together in the eclectic political 
cabaret. While these repertoires enabled the resurgence of political theater, 
however, they also constrained imaginations of revolution within proven 
nationalist scenarios. Messing with the Mind showed that interpreting such 
scenarios onstage could end up reproducing traditional norms of leftist pol-
itics, as the society of the future was grounded in the utopian nationalism of 
the past and present. It is little wonder, then, that the revolutionary politics of 
Messing with the Mind struck a popular chord with Cairo audiences.
Rewriting Neoliberal Futures
Messing with the Mind updated the genre of political cabaret to produce a 
performance that audiences deemed more radical than the usual musical. 
Showing how Egyptian satellite television stage- managed popular voice and 
desire was a novel strategy for critiquing an autocratic regime that claimed 
to promote cultural liberalism. After the darkly satirical sketches, the clos-
ing scene staged the transformation of the young characters’ struggles for 
freedom into anger and finally hope. Critics writing in newspapers and mag-
azines lauded the “revolutionary aim” of Messing with the Mind and its 
political courage, arguing that the play revived an older style of leftist Arab 
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theater and song.25 They also described it as a performance of return to lost 
political ideals. “The value of this play emerges at an epochal time in the his-
tory of the Arab nation, sleeping in fear,” wrote Muhammad al- Rifa’i in the 
weekly Sabah al- Khayr. “It pierces the passive state that has turned our minds 
into American commodities.”26 Such approving commentaries affirmed that 
the play’s idealism aligned with that of older critics writing in mainstream 
(usually state- owned) newspapers. It was both revolutionary and familiarly 
nationalist.
My younger friends who watched Messing with the Mind considered its 
popularity a mark of its safe cultural politics. A cynical actor friend com-
pared it to sixties agitprop, privately dismissing the hit play as a piece of 
nostalgia. Linking past and present narratives of Egyptian activism proved 
an effective strategy for framing contemporary struggles of educated youth 
within a narrative that audiences could recognize across generations, and 
gave the play wide appeal. At a time when glossy satellite television images 
of Arab youth elided realities of unemployment and disenfranchisement, the 
Haraka troupe showed that younger Egyptian intellectuals did have a critical 
vision for the future, which resonated with the leftist politics of their sen-
iors. Their quest for recognition from that intellectual generation produced 
a revolutionary vision that eventually centered on familiar icons of ethical 
citizenship: a choir made mostly of men. They sang of a lost pan- Arab unity, 
while contemporary Egyptian activists focused instead on connecting the dis-
enfranchised within the nation. El- Sawy was himself one of those grassroots 
activists. However, representing his revolutionary ethics in nostalgic terms 
was a strategy for appealing to institutional standard- bearers and inviting 
them to recognize the activist underground.
Despite the ambivalence that the hit political play engendered in inde-
pendent theater circles, its provocative gestures were long remembered in this 
community. A notable barrier had been broken in criticizing state media pro-
ducers and amoral politicians, and antiwar repertoires had been repurposed 
to protest a grim Egyptian present. The play’s suggestion of an alternative 
future to that of neoliberal globalization made it unusually hopeful for the 
late Mubarak era. The gesture of breaking from television ideology to write a 
new history was utopian. The performance of this alternative future remained 
possible in theater, as it was not in television, even after liberalization. Mess-
ing with the Mind brought such activist repertoires and revolutionary visions 
from avant- garde communities to large urban audiences over its three- month 
run in Cairo (and further weeks in Alexandria).
Theatrical narratives of Egyptian youth culture grounded the experience 
of economic reform in specific contexts, and slowed down its temporality 
to evaluate the phenomenon of media globalization beyond the idea that 
viewers simply imitated television icons. It showed that middle class men, 
in particular, struggled to reconcile their values with the liberalism idealized 
on television. By staging their thwarted quests for economic citizenship and 
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sexual adulthood, the Haraka dramatists showed the contradictions of eco-
nomic liberalization from above, unaccompanied by new citizen rights. It was 
only by leaving the world of television for that of activism that young citizens 
could act with agency. In the second play I consider, the theme of false hopes 
raised by television played in a gloomier key. Mother I Want to Be a Million-
aire extended the theme of satellite television as a trope for fake liberalism 
in order to dramatize a young man’s personal dystopia. The second play’s 
multimedia genre made a stronger argument that neoliberal globalization 
was pervasive and inescapable. The respective futures of Egyptian neoliber-
alism staged in the two plays weighed the possibility of revolutionary change 
against that of worsening decline. Where the utopian hope of Messing with 
the Mind lay in political action, the neoliberal nation generated unshakeable 
psychological dilemmas in Mother I Want to Be a Millionaire.
Dystopian Youth in Mother I Want to Be a Millionaire
Ahmed el- Attar, the Ma’bad troupe’s founder and director of Mother I Want 
to Be a Millionaire, experimented with Western theatrical styles more boldly 
than others in the independent theater world. As a graduate of the elite Amer-
ican University in Cairo and an advocate for technology in theater, he was 
doubly removed from the Egyptian milieu in which low- budget art was the 
sign of a grassroots intellectual. El- Attar’s multimedia theater was shaped by 
his years of work in France after receiving a degree in arts management from 
the Sorbonne. He remained a member of the independent theater movement 
as he moved between continents, and on returning to Egypt, he disseminated 
his style of theater through workshops in stage technology and, later, acting 
technique (see chapter 5). Networking with curators of international theater 
festivals, such as the Berliner Festspiele, which funded Mother I Want to Be 
a Millionaire, El- Attar fashioned his brand of social realism through a rep-
ertoire of devised theater that offered alternatives to what he considered a 
restrictive Arab dramatic canon.
El- Attar’s cosmopolitan style found a home in downtown Cairo, where 
he lived in a spacious belle epoque apartment and held meetings in nearby 
cafés. We met at one of these in November 2003, when I interviewed him for 
a newspaper article on his workshops in lighting and scene design. I had seen 
posters advertising the workshops on the walls of a nearby sidewalk café. 
It emerged that the Swedish and Lebanese teachers of the workshops were 
working on Mother I Want to Be a Millionaire, currently in rehearsals at the 
downtown Falaki Theater of the American University in Cairo. In his charac-
teristic style of sharing resources, El- Attar took advantage of the technicians’ 
presence in town to organize training sessions for interested amateurs. The 
soft- spoken man in his early thirties was among the few upper- class Cairenes 
who preferred downtown to the gated desert communities where the wealthy 
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now lived. He used his trilingual education to apply for foreign grants and 
gain access to the American University in Cairo’s theater. His collaborative 
generosity gained him acceptance within the independent theater movement, 
and his class background gave him a critical distance from it.
The Ma’bad troupe consisted originally of students from the American 
University in Cairo, with El- Attar as their director from the beginning. Over 
the years, its professional budget and methods attracted the best of Cairo’s 
acting talent, including film and television actors Ahmad Kamal, Salwa Ismail, 
and Sayed Ragab, now acting in their second play with Ma’bad. It retained 
the spirit of a student troupe, however. El- Attar explained that Mother I 
Want to Be a Millionaire was intended as a play about “this generation, 
its dreams and illusions and realities.” Focusing on the prosperous young 
Egyptians who were the target audiences of new media, he conducted 
research on youth culture by watching hours of satellite television shows 
like Superstar (a Lebanese talent contest). El- Attar’s study of generational 
culture led him to believe that young Egyptians’ cultural cosmopolitanism 
not only spanned a broader class spectrum than in his time but had in fact 
become a key part of their identity. “Real time is being transformed into 
cinematic time and space, and I explore its discontinuities in my play,” he 
explained in English.27 With his notion of a new temporality of culture in 
the age of globalization, El- Attar developed characters whose lives moved 
at different speeds.
The experiment with staging disparate lives in the age of new media encom-
passed television- obsessed young Egyptians of different class backgrounds, 
all of whom wanted to escape from reality. The protagonist, Hasan, was a 
familiar type: the conflicted middle- class young man. However, his story was 
disconnected from those of the other characters, just as they were from each 
other. El- Attar had the actors build their characters in separate monologues, 
which he then assembled into a narrative in a process that he described as 
being like film editing. The characters represented television viewers immersed 
in a language that none of them authored. And the nonlinear narrative resem-
bled that of postdramatic theater, where dreamlike temporality replaces the 
progress of time.28 The lack of forward motion meant that each of the char-
acters was caught, like the alienated young protagonist, in a story without a 
future.
El- Attar asked the actors to improvise aspirational versions of their own 
social personas, who dreamed of winning a television talent contest. Each 
picked one personality trait and one physical gesture to define their charac-
ters. In the last month of rehearsals, which I attended, El- Attar had assembled 
their contestant scenes into a loose plot, framed by darker everyday scenes 
he had written. Hasan was the only character whose story ended conclu-
sively. As the prototypical viewer of a satellite television singing contest, he 
represented the doomed hopes of young Egyptians who thought new eco-
nomic reforms would lead to freedom and meritocracy. The film- like play 
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decentered the protagonist, however, so that all characters’ dreams appeared 
as part of a grand national illusion. El- Attar’s preference for technology- rich 
theater, including electronic music and video screens, produced a dramatic 
narrative that cycled between spatial settings more than it progressed for-
ward in time.
The bi- level stage was split into cage- like metal frames, where characters 
alternately lived out everyday routines and performed for the American Idol– 
style talent contest. In the latter dreamlike space, they were stylish figures 
and accomplished performers. Only Hasan was excluded from the back- and- 
forth between quotidian and utopian time. As a more traditional dramatic 
character, he lived his life and tried to build relationships within a web of 
media content that visibly overwhelmed his bodily movements. Hasan’s 
everyday life unfolded in slow, theatrical time, which accentuated his aliena-
tion from the exciting world of television. The play staged the experience of 
satellite television, for this youth, as one of attempting and failing to enter 
an economy of hope. Video cameras focused on Hasan’s body and its misery, 
while gloomy lights and sound situated him in a static lifeworld. His aliena-
tion from the dreamworld of the television contest stood for the experience 
of many young Egyptians with media globalization.
Dreamtimes of Television
The opening tableau of Mother I Want to Be a Millionaire saw six actors 
frozen in postures of hopeful supplication under white light while disso-
nant electronic music permeated a grim scene of waiting at the “Government 
Office.” A similarly repetitive rhythm marked the opening stories of young 
men in the play. In the classroom scene, Hasan and his classmate Walid sat on 
chairs and repeated lines from a textbook after their teacher. As the Soldier, 
Walid repeated the Egyptian military pledge in a separate frame, enacting the 
ritual of young Egyptian men’s entry into compulsory service. These spare 
scenes showed young men voicing public texts in a flow of speech where 
language seemed absurd. The actors had little affect to add to the formulaic 
scenarios of masculine aspiration, which trapped their bodies in rigid pos-
tures within the cage- frames.
Warmer lights and an upbeat electronic melody marked a transition from 
the dreary classroom to a television studio. Here the young students— and 
their teacher— devised lively performances for a singing contest called Min 
huwa al batal? (Who Is the Champion?). Their solo scenes of interviews for 
the camera, and brief song verses, showed three men and one woman per-
forming in stylish clothes and unique musical styles. They were given a script 
on which to improvise: a classic Egyptian song by 1960s and ’70s icon Abd 
al- Halim Hafiz titled Ya khali al- qalb (O Heartless One). As they gathered in 
a shared project of voicing the youthful love song, they gave a contemporary 
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interpretation to its sentimental vision of young desire, heard in lines such 
as these:
We would embrace our love, go far away
From the eyes of the world, and all eyes
If your heart loved as much as mine.29
The male contestants of Who Is the Champion? interpreted Hafiz’s song 
in different contemporary styles. Ramadan assumed a faintly thuggish per-
sona, dressed like the working- class sha’bi (folksy) pop singer Shaaban Abd 
al- Rahim. The student Walid sang as a rapper, dressed in American- style 
clothes and using a smattering of English. His performance satirized the 
singer’s hybridization of classic Egyptian song and modern hip- hop lan-
guage with a startling reference to “the motherfucking moon.”30 Combining 
the roles of the Egyptian romantic hero and American star was a challenge, 
and Walid’s performance showed that cultural globalization generated deep 
contradictions of masculine desire. He struggled in his interview to embody 
simultaneously an insouciant American selfishness and the role of the good 
Egyptian son.
When I become the champion, I’ll have four bodyguards, chicks and 
dollars, Ferraris and Porsches, I’ll take care of my body and appear-
ance and clothes, my value and position. I won’t give out my number 
and address to just anyone . . . 
I have to become a champion, because my father is proud of me. 
I’ll get my mother what she wants— a fortress on the sea, a villa on 
the Nile. And I’ll spoil my sisters as I like. Because, in the end, one has 
only his family and relatives.31
Even in his fantasy, the young man struggled to balance demands of career 
success and family commitment. Walid’s performances as a student, military 
conscript, and talent show contestant produced a rotation of roles without 
adding up to a single, successful persona. The disjuncture between these roles 
underscored the social pressures that fractured the young man’s sense of the 
self to which he aspired.
The audibly different rhythms of the talent contest, classroom, and other 
spaces in Mother I Want to Be a Millionaire sounded out diverging narratives 
of Egyptian youth identity in the age of satellite television. As the contest 
went on, the television producer announced its next stage in increasingly 
frenzied tones, with maniacal laughs and flashes of blinding lights. Its grand 
promises now appeared overblown.
More than a thousand young men and women applied from 15 Arab 
countries, over twelve months, each week you chose the winners who 
Live from Cairo 65
continued, and now it is you in whose hands rests the choice “who 
is the champion??”
Don’t forget that the winner, the hero whom you’ll choose, will win 
not one or two or five but 15 million— 15 million pounds! It is you who 
will determine and choose and decide “who is the champion??”32
The show encouraged young Arabs to participate in a contest that could 
make them millionaires, and it evoked livelier and more heartfelt performances 
than the classroom scenes. However, these were manipulations of desire on the 
part of media producers. They attracted viewers and made money, but ended 
up giving very few participants a materially better future. Yet the promise of 
meritocracy in the contest fostered hope among viewers like Hasan. His expe-
rience of the disjuncture between static everyday life and hopeful narratives 
of globalization showed the psychological (and potentially political) stakes of 
aspirational performance in the neoliberal era. Hasan’s inability to act on his 
desires led to a psychotic break and revolt against his reality.
The Trauma of Desire
Halfway into the play, Hasan spoke for the first time. He was seen watch-
ing satellite television passively at first, presumably absorbing its lessons. 
Walid the hip- hop singer in Mother I Want to Be a Millionaire. Courtesy of 
Ahmed el- Attar.
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Unshaven and affectless, he slumped in a chair while his words played in 
voice- over. At first, he tried on the role of the young lover, in flirtatious tele-
phone chats with a young woman on another level of the stage. Hasan’s first 
conversation with Du’a offered hope of a blossoming relationship:
Hello.
How are you?
Well, by the grace of God.
What are you doing?
Nothing.




I’ve missed you very much.
Me too.33
Hasan adopted a fantasy nickname for their second conversation. Taking the 
obviously fake name Al- Shatir Hasan, after the Egyptian fairy- tale hero, he 
performed the persona of a macho sportsman:
Miss Du’a?
Yes, who is it?
I’m Shatir Hasan.
Hello. What can I do for you?
Don’t you know me?
No.
I’m the handball player.
Really, what club do you play for?
I play for the league.
Then you must be a very good player. From where do you score 
your goals?
From all positions. Where do you like to see goals scored from?
I like goals from all positions.34
Hasan was able to pursue his narrative of sexual potency only within this 
language of fantasy. The scene evoked internet chat rooms in which young 
Cairenes (in 2004) were able to conduct more adventurous conversations 
than on the phone. It was very much his own fantasy, however. After the fore-
going scene, Du’a stopped responding to his flirtation. When Hasan called 
next, she said coldly that he had the wrong number. The audience saw that 
the young woman was now wearing an Islamic headscarf. Hasan’s dream of 
acting on his desire had to account for the ethics of a society where love out-
side marriage was dangerously transgressive for women. The advent of global 
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media had not changed this, as young women’s lives were still policed more 
strictly than those of their male peers. The play staged the gendered disjunc-
ture spatially, showing the different worlds each inhabited at home. Hasan 
and Du’a could not perform the same script of legitimate desire beyond brief 
phone conversations.
The lives of young Egyptians were represented on satellite television as 
being full of opportunities for freedom and fun. Hasan’s story showed, how-
ever, that cultural globalization elicited stricter forms of repression in Egyptian 
homes. Nor could the unemployed young man make a home of his own. His 
sexual frustration became a metaphor for an inability to act as an adult. Hasan 
sat bare- chested in a scene at a doctor’s office, moving a probe around his torso 
while he recited symptoms of his depression. His body gave him no pleasure. 
Instead, he spoke about it as an inadequate instrument:
Failure.
Nothing I do succeeds.
Lost.
I don’t know what I want from the world and don’t see a purpose in 
my life.
Stupid.
I’m slow to understand what others get right away, and sometimes I 
don’t understand at all.
Full of complexes.
I always feel inferior to those around me, and whatever I do, I can’t 
be like them.
Repressed.
I want to do many things, but can do nothing.35
The language of depression in which Hasan voiced his struggle was com-
monly heard in the theater world. However, its ugly embodiment was new to 
the stage. As the play’s protagonist, Hasan centered such alienation as a phe-
nomenon of aspirational youth culture, no less than satellite television itself. 
The play’s controversial ending implied that the gap between the upbeat new 
medium and slow- moving reality could even be psychologically dangerous.
Hasan rose from his chair at the play’s end to act a scene in which he 
dressed as a talent contestant, sang a tuneless version of the prescribed song, 
and won first prize in Who Is the Champion? The music went atonal, and 
then silent, as the stage lights dimmed: Hasan was in a delusional dream. 
He stripped down to his shorts and assumed the stance of a boxer. A leg of 
beef was lowered from the ceiling and he punched it, launching into a tirade 
against all Arabs. With each jab at the meat, he said he hated Iraqis, Syrians, 
Libyans, and so on. His rant climaxed with a final violent jab as he snarled, 
“And I hate— hate— hate the Egyptians!” As he lashed out against a symbol 
of his fleshy physicality, which could not adapt to the new order, his anger 
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was directed at his own country. The legs of beef that hung at local butcher 
shops also became symbols of wealth as food prices rose in Egypt. Hasan’s 
fury sent drops of blood from the meat into the front row of the audience.
The concluding scene staged a violent claim to agency as Hasan’s body 
revolted against its meaninglessness. The desperation of his final gesture, so 
unlike the hopeful song at the end of Messing with the Mind, was similarly 
a claim to voice. Its political message was more ambiguous. Hasan’s per-
formance as a self- hating middle- class man created a figure rarely seen in 
contemporary Egyptian theater: that of a failed citizen who voiced anger 
against the nation itself. It was more politically expedient to make statements 
against globalization or the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Such a bold statement 
could likely not have been made outside a protected space like the American 
University in Cairo. Even at this training ground for Egypt’s elite, the play 
hinted, national identity was thrown into dangerous confusion. The Egyptian 
stories sutured together in this theatrical space failed to reconcile the liberal 
promise of new media with an oppressive social reality.
Hasan fights a leg of beef at the end of Mother 
I Want to Be a Millionaire. Courtesy of Ahmed 
el- Attar.
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Reimagining Citizenship in an Age of Globalization
At the reception after the opening performance of Mother I Want to Be a Mil-
lionaire, an invited audience of dramatists, academics, and critics buzzed with 
confusion at the play’s nihilistic ending. The friend with whom I attended 
was disappointed that the high production values of the show framed such 
grim content. Even this sophisticated crowd expected a play about youth to 
gesture at a hopeful path out of the current sociopolitical impasse. Franco-
phone critic Menha el- Batraoui criticized the ordinariness of the language in 
the script, which she described as “a sampling of the parameters of quotid-
ian inanity in all domains.”36 Even Al- Ahram Weekly’s unfailingly supportive 
Nehad Selaiha wrote, “The significant scarcity of dialogue and predominance 
of hectoring, speech- making and monologues in Mother I Want to be a Mil-
lionaire, deepen the gloom.”37 The use of elaborate stage technology more 
than verbal artistry troubled viewers who looked for a language they could 
embrace and a protagonist who represented them. Young male heroes con-
ventionally embodied an aspirational vision for the national future, after all. 
The cynical Hasan deflected any such emotional investment. His persona 
instead showed the dystopic side of urban youth culture, where depression 
and drug abuse were as much a part of life as dreams for the future. Staging 
this subculture through the voices of young characters, and embodying its 
darker dimensions in the protagonist, provided an unusual example of the 
failed citizen in independent theater.
As new- generation dramatists worked to dismantle the theatrical reper-
toires they had inherited, the convention of the young male hero as model 
citizen proved difficult to abandon. Messing with the Mind countered its 
antihero with a collective of ethical actors. The plot of Mother I Want to 
Be a Millionaire offered no such gestures of hope in the absence of a hero 
who represented legitimate dreams for the future. Arab and Egyptian nov-
els offered many examples of the alienated young man, but their narratives 
typically affirmed his moral high ground. At a time of media globalization, 
ethical Egyptian role models were desired, as critical responses to the plays 
made clear. But neither of the plays could offer more than a negative hero, 
who showed how his society failed ambitious youth. In theater, unlike novels, 
the embodiment of dystopian youth and traumatic desire fashioned a narra-
tive of failure that directed blame uncomfortably at an older generation.
Reviewing both television- themed plays in an article for popular weekly 
Ruz al- Yusuf, Wa’il Lutfi commended their “sharp and ironic satire of our 
Arab society, which evokes tears.” He compared them favorably with Euro-
pean classics such as Hamlet, recently revived at the National Theater, noting 
that Messing with the Mind and Mother I Want to Be a Millionaire were 
“particular to us and speak of us, not of the piano or cherry orchards or the 
cares of some Dane!”38 The respective contributions of these plays, for the 
critics, came in their representations of contemporary youth identity. Mother 
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I Want to Be a Millionaire did so negatively, and only a handful of Egyp-
tian critics appreciated its style of avant- garde critique. Meanwhile, Messing 
with the Mind won wide praise for staging repertoires of vigorous young 
desire and active citizenship, despite private criticism from young viewers 
who found its nationalism old- fashioned. Even a columnist for the New York 
Times described Messing with the Mind as a sign of the rise of anti- American 
Arab nationalism.39 The impasse of avant- garde theater was clear in critical 
responses to the two plays: political critique veered into nationalism, while 
cultural critique ran the risk of sounding hopeless.
The challenge of representing ethical Egyptian citizenship at a time of 
domestic dictatorship and economic globalization was keenly felt by inde-
pendent dramatists who rejected each of these policies. Even after Messing 
with the Mind became an unexpected hit, El- Sawy wrote an introduction to 
a script of the play, published in an online journal, that clarified his independ-
ent stance and disavowed the nationalist politics that several commentators 
attributed to him. He had struggled to distance his vision from that of Minis-
try of Culture officials, who took credit for funding the play via the Hanager. 
“The Hanager is proud of being a semiliberal institution that grew on the 
margins of the Ministry, but we should not forget that an important reason 
for its formation was to extend the shadow of the government,” he wrote.40 
El- Sawy’s uncompromising refusal to ally with the Hanager put him at odds 
with some colleagues in the Haraka troupe. His reflection described the con-
flicts this produced, which ended with the troupe disbanding two years later. 
When welcomed into a national canon of which they were critical, inde-
pendent dramatists found themselves fighting to retain authorship of their 
dissident narratives.
El- Sawy’s statement attempted to rescue the play from political domes-
tication, as he described its success among more radical audiences than the 
establishment journalists who praised it. Messing with the Mind played next 
at the theater of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina. “We collected our pamphlets 
and distributed them to all the youth groups in Alexandria,” he wrote, “and 
we circled the city in a car hung with invitations.” Returning to the envi-
rons of students and activists, the troupe reasserted its independent identity. 
Moreover, he emphasized that Messing with the Mind faced opposition in 
official quarters. Egypt’s television censor, for instance, had not approved the 
recorded show for broadcast. Meanwhile, the troupe participated in the Med-
iterranean festival at Milan’s Piccolo Teatro in November 2004, where the 
play was reportedly a success. “Italian and Arab youths held the Palestinian 
flag in the hall on the fourth night, and there was a wonderful conference . . . 
where people asked with great enthusiasm to join the international front for 
the resistance of imperialism and capitalist globalization.”41 El- Sawy’s leftist 
politics, underscored by the Rosa Luxemburg quote used as the epigraph of 
Messing with the Mind, made this recognition as welcome as the applause of 
Egyptian audiences.42
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The quieter critical response to Mother I Want to Be a Millionaire showed 
that anger and other negative social affects fit uneasily within youth reper-
toires that celebrated hope. As independent troupes like Haraka and Ma’bad 
developed avant- garde theater for their time, they adapted available the-
atrical genres (such as political cabaret) to reconceptualize youth outside 
progressive national time. Yet young male protagonists and their quests to 
achieve adulthood continued to represent hopeful futures, whether by return-
ing to socialist values or finding romance. The failures of these protagonists 
showed where the temporalities of quotidian life and utopian future could 
not be reconciled. Moreover, they showed how difficult it was to stage youth 
outside a vision of the social future. The young citizen in the neoliberal era 
was still part of a nation and its history.
Regulating Masculinity in Neoliberal Theater
Staging failed performances of masculinity was a way for independent dram-
atists to represent how youth struggled to achieve desires either for global 
consumerism or for national cultural authenticity. As independent dramatists 
themselves navigated the contradictions of leftist and neoliberal citizenship, 
they came to question performance repertoires associated with iconic male 
protagonists in Egyptian drama. The character of a hypersexual or impo-
tent man in their plays staged the impasse of masculinity produced by shifts 
in state ideology. Disidentifying with the option of either the good or the 
bad masculine subject, young avant- gardists often questioned the symbolic 
valence of male desire in conventional dramatic narratives. Their alternative 
narratives of thwarted aspiration, which featured mental illness or sexual 
frustration, were controversial with older critics and popular audiences. 
However, struggles to regulate sexuality and other forms of bodily desire 
were crucial indexes of social dysfunction in a neoliberal era. The life politics 
of young male characters were particularly revealing barometers of contra-
diction within nationally authorized identity politics in the late Mubarak era.
The struggles of masculinity under autocracy have occupied many Egyp-
tian theater makers, whose protagonists’ quests for ethical lives often ended 
in tragedy. In Margaret Litvin’s history of Arab Hamlet adaptations, we see 
generations of dramatists reimagining the scholar- prince as a symbol of their 
struggles with authoritarian regimes.43 Some contemporary Egyptian dram-
atists continued to use canonical texts, such as Hamlet, as frame tales for 
reimagining masculinity. The subjects of my case studies in this chapter were 
unique for their ambitious strategies to overhaul the symbolic repertoires in 
which masculine identities were narrated. El- Sawy and El- Attar built con-
temporary male protagonists by quasi- ethnographic means, drawing on 
language and narrative forms from media and their paratextual culture. At a 
time when youth were immersed in different media, produced at home and 
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abroad, their identity politics engaged with more than classic Egyptian narra-
tives. The multimedia plays re- created the effect of the hybrid and pervasive 
cultural forms that interpellated youth at this time. Their stories of alienation 
played not as tragedy, then, but rather in the mode of exclusion from desired 
worlds at home and abroad. The postdramatic form of Mother I Want to 
Be a Millionaire staged a more extreme version of youthful alienation, from 
everyday as well as media language, “calling the very bases of everyday com-
munication into question.”44
Approaching satellite television in each play as a metaphor for regime ide-
ology, as El- Sawy suggested, I read the protagonists’ psychosexual rebellions 
as forms of resistance against the domestic and foreign powers that made out-
landish demands on Egyptian youth. Caught between respectability politics 
and illicit self- indulgence, they modulated informal, often precarious, modes 
of performing liberal masculinity. In this respect, the protagonists resembled 
independent dramatists who cobbled together livelihoods and found their 
freedom in theater. To come into full citizenship, in this context, often meant 
departing from the norms of an older generation for which marriage and 
employment were prerequisites for adulthood. The dark stories of the young 
protagonists staged the real risks of rejecting these social norms. At the same 
time, they introduced the earthy language and ethical conflicts of recogniz-
ably contemporary characters into a theatrical repertoire where these were 
scarce. Theater about television was a postdramatic genre of alienation from 
official language.
As the independent theater movement shifted away from the norms of 
official avant- gardism, its politics of desire grew more complex. Yet heteronor-
mative masculinity stayed at the center of independent theater, and young men 
endured as icons of representative citizenship. The symbolic weight of male 
protagonists meant that their sexual politics attracted particularly critical 
scrutiny. Could these politics shift by decentering male desire as a metonym 
for national hope? Several female theater makers developed innovative new 
genres of performance that attempted to remake avant- garde norms. Their 
narratives of generational identity from the perspective of women made up 
a small but celebrated part of the independent avant- garde. Given the pau-
city of Egyptian drama with central female characters, women directors were 
relatively unburdened by canonical expectations when they staged their sto-
ries. Folk narratives, translated texts, and modern dance made up the eclectic 
repertoire of “women’s theater.” In addition to bringing different biogra-
phies into the world of theater, woman- centered troupes also imagined social 
change in more modest ways. Their gendered performances of generational 




Making Women Matter in Avant- Garde Theater
Women directors were renowned for making a particular splash at Cairo’s 
independent theater festivals. They took the proscenium stage and turned 
it into new space, as seen in Mirette Mikhail’s dance theater piece Details 
(Tafasil) for the Centre Français de Culture et de Coopération (CFCC) festi-
val in 2004. A spotlight narrowed on the actor, creating an intimate version 
of the stage to represent a bedroom where she read Marguerite Duras’s novel 
The Lover. The autobiographical show told how Mikhail took refuge from 
an oppressive city in dance and fiction and found herself. At the Independent 
Theater Festival in July, Abeer Ali’s Misahharati troupe told women’s stories 
in a diametrically different genre. The performers of Harem Tales (Hikayat 
al- haramlik) set up their chairs in a rural Egyptian storytelling circle (samir), 
and two young women in black sang the folk ditty “For Whom Do You 
Sing, O Pigeon?” (“Bitghanni li min ya hamam”). A female storyteller in an 
embroidered galabiya then began narrating a fairy tale to frame the feminist 
revue of stories and songs. Each of these prizewinning performances made a 
place for women at theater festivals by fashioning worlds that looked beyond 
the spaces represented in mainstream plays. In order to center their stories, the 
women directors found it necessary to hybridize performance genres and rep-
resent subaltern spaces in an avant- garde vein.
Given a striking lack of stories about women in Egyptian (and Arabic) 
dramatic literature, independent women directors grew accomplished in 
building theatrical worlds by drawing on outside repertoires. Ali’s troupe col-
lected oral histories and texts, Effat Yehia used translated American drama, 
and Nora Amin interpreted her own autobiographical novels for the stage. 
Their staging of other worlds than the modern city included feminized spaces 
like the home and the storytelling circle. Women directors’ efforts to represent 
these worlds on Cairo stages ended up bringing marginalized performance 
genres, such as dance and storytelling, into the mainstream of independent 
theater. Their neofolk and dance theater performances expanded the reper-
toire of avant- garde forms within the “experimental” canon. By building new 
genres, these performances turned debates on representing women in theater 
into larger questions of representational practice. What did it mean to stage 
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Egyptian stories in their plurality? How did texts from outside national dra-
matic literature help to represent people not yet recognized as citizens with 
full rights? The women onstage at independent theater festivals embodied 
answers to these questions, making claims to self- representation in subaltern 
voices.
In Arab postcolonial performance, women’s genres frequently signified sites 
of indigenous authenticity within webs of transnational culture.1 Twentieth- 
century Egyptian novelists and cultural historians likewise figured the nation 
as a woman.2 A symbolic link between femininity and national cultural 
authenticity lingered in the association of women with folk and belly dancing 
in contemporary Egypt.3 Feminist performers had thus to respond to a double 
demand of authentic yet cosmopolitan narratives for women. One strategy 
for doing so was to build hybrid repertoires that staged women’s lives across 
home and the world. The neofolk repertoire of the Misahharati troupe ech-
oed that of Cairo’s pioneering feminist storytelling collective, the Women 
and Memory Forum (Multaqa al- Mar’a wa al- Dhakira). “We are a group 
of researchers interested in reading Arab cultural history from a perspective 
that takes into consideration the cultural and social construction of the two 
genders,” the forum’s mission statement declared.4 The academic members’ 
sophisticated feminism relied on folksy storytelling to create a cultural reper-
toire that carried over into popular circles. They narrated rewritten fairy tales 
from their collection in a show, The Storyteller Said (Qalat al- rawiya), that 
they performed in schools and community centers. Theater makers similarly 
fashioned strategic hybrids between the world of folk culture, considered 
authentic but primitive in the avant- garde, and that of feminism, which many 
avant- gardists considered a Western import. They performed womanhood 
as a site of cultural connection between worlds. Recoding authenticity as a 
quality of voice rather than culture, their performances developed an avant- 
garde aesthetic that signified organic feminism.
The character of the storyteller embodied this voice. She proliferated in the 
songs and stories of Harem Tales, which were narrated by a single wise woman 
and then a host of modern voices. And she was embodied by the author of 
the autobiographical show Details. As in other theater traditions, the story-
teller served as an intermediary between worlds. “She embodies the locus and 
means of communication,” Diana Taylor describes the truth- telling Mexican 
storyteller.5 This storyteller’s Egyptian counterpart similarly countered the 
power of official history with authentic experience. The woman’s body and 
voice grounded her narratives in quotidian, local space. By deploying story-
telling, then, Ali and Mikhail claimed recognition for their performances as 
contributions to an authentic feminist genre. Their implicit argument was that 
an abundant Egyptian repertoire of feminist material could be found once dif-
ferent voices were included onstage. While feminism remained controversial 
in intellectual circles, the process of uncovering an unheard, private world 
onstage compelled theater audiences. The performers’ strategically essentialist 
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use of women’s spaces— the harem and the bedroom— framed Egyptian fem-
inist theater as a genre of intimate realism.
Feminine voices were woven into these performances by using texts gathered 
through ethnographic research, autobiographical writing, and translation. 
The women’s repertoires that performers brought to the stage were a stra-
tegic mix of Egyptian and translated stories about family, home, and nation. 
Expanding traditional storytelling repertoires through intertextual linkage was 
a time- honored strategy by which guardians of folk culture added new mate-
rial to familiar genres. Leaving broad intertextual gaps between the texts 
marked these feminist performers’ new material as intentionally innovative.6 
Their intertextual strategies thus made these plays novel contributions to 
the Egyptian avant- garde, built from outsider corpora of folklore or trans-
lated literature. Hybridizing genres also enabled female performers’ bodies 
to be viewed onstage outside the distorting lenses of traditional literary 
drama.
In an avant- garde with limited means for centering women as authors, Ali 
and Mikhail fashioned genre frames in which women could speak and act 
with authority. The folksy (sha’bi) repertoires that signaled national authen-
ticity in Cairo theaters, and the contemporary dance (al- raqs al- mu’asir) made 
fashionable after the Cairo International Festival for Experimental Theatre 
(CIFET), each offered strong roles for women. By virtue of being histori-
cally considered “not theater,” these were feminized performance traditions 
in which women played central if prescriptively decorative roles. Appropri-
ating their repertoires for feminist purposes was a calculatedly risky move: 
directors could be assured of audiences for work in feminized genres, but it 
came with conventional expectations. The task of their performance, what 
Elin Diamond calls “feminist mimesis,” was to use conventional genres as 
mutable frames through which to make visible and question the relationship 
between representational apparatus and practice.7 My Egyptian interlocutors 
approached such mimetic strategies with more caution than their feminist 
peers elsewhere, since their position in the avant- garde was more precarious. 
Lacking an archive of woman- centered drama, they constructed their own 
expansive feminist repertoire. They took advantage of the fashion for hybrid 
genres in the experimental wave to foreground women’s voices through 
mixed strategies of representation.
In the scenes that I examine in the following sections, I evaluate the fem-
inist possibilities of intertextual hybrids across foreign and folk repertoires. 
Women directors who used these outsider texts claimed the authority that 
they offered, with relative freedom from masculinist norms of authorship. 
Their alternative repertoire of critical voices, built with marginal texts, 
offered a rich model for performance practice outside state institutions and 
their majoritarian culture. By assembling a new corpus of texts to represent 
women’s voices, feminists centered outsider voices in the independent avant- 
garde. Their techniques for evoking such voices through sites of alterity 
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expanded the representational terrain of the avant- garde as its performance 
territory grew.
Scenarios of Womanhood in Literature and Dance
Mikhail studied ballet as a girl, like many bourgeois Cairo women, and 
associated it with learning proper feminine comportment. The twenty- seven- 
year- old dancer now used this training to choreograph musical numbers for 
commercial theater productions and teach at the Modern Dance School on 
the opera house campus. When I first met Mikhail, however, I found her per-
sona intriguingly unlike that of the opera house ballerina. With her natural 
curly hair and fondness for cigarettes and urban walks, she was a familiar 
downtown type of independent woman, and an age peer to whom I gravitated. 
She spoke about her transition from ballet to contemporary dance as part of 
her coming- of- age as a feminist. “Discovering contemporary dance was a kind 
of self- revolution for me,” she explained. “It showed me all the inheritances 
that shape the female body.” After moving with her family to the Gulf, then 
coming back to Egypt for college, Mikhail realized she was no longer inter-
ested in dancing Western “ideas, myths, and legends.”8 She wanted to learn 
a style that let her tell her own stories. Encountering contemporary dance 
through a chance workshop with an American dancer visiting Cairo, she 
found a suitable medium for her autobiographical narrative.
With her interest in storytelling, Mikhail found a spiritual home in 
avant- garde theater rather than the dance world. She befriended independ-
ent dramatists at the Hanager and choreographed the ensemble movement 
scenes for the 2003 CIFET show Masks, Fabrics, and Destinies. After teach-
ing a class at the dance school, she often sat at the outdoor cafeteria of the 
Supreme Council for Culture next door. She read in English and French, as 
well as Arabic, and one day, I found her leafing through a thick photocopied 
text. It turned out to be the Arabic translation of Duras’s autobiographical 
novel The Lover (L’Amant). She had underlined within the text “lines that 
resembled” her,9 as she worked on her own text of coming of age, inspired 
by the young Duras. Mikhail’s story of womanhood was inspired by working 
with her friend Nora Amin, also a translator and interpreter of Duras. She 
realized a French text would also give Details an edge within the French cul-
tural center’s festival. And so Mikhail built a hybrid apparatus of translated 
text, dance, and monologue to carry her coming- of- age story from the world 
of contemporary dance into that of avant- garde theater.
Mikhail formulated a verbal language for her story through textual col-
lage. The eventual script she assembled, interweaving Duras’s novel with 
her own autobiography, consisted of just two dense pages in tiny print. In 
rehearsals, which lasted about a month at the CFCC theater, she interpreted 
the text fragments in a surprisingly long sequence of dance and storytelling 
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scenes that staged the landscapes of memory the text called up. Mirette was 
emboldened to see this as a story that extended beyond her own experience 
after reading other texts in the coming- of- age genre. “It was very difficult 
for me to go on stage and speak my words,” she confessed. Talking about 
female sexuality was particularly awkward, and she borrowed Duras’s lines 
to do so. The translation had the advantage of being in the formal register of 
literary Arabic (fusha), which other Egyptian women preferred for scenes of 
romance and sexuality. Poet Iman Mersal, for instance, wrote autobiograph-
ically in fusha, with literary locutions conveying desires that might sound 
shameful in colloquial language.10 This technique for finding authoritative lan-
guage for women’s stories was used in literary theater as well. At a panel of the 
2004 Cairo International Book Fair celebrating the publication of a translated 
volume titled Nusus min al- masrah al- nisa’i (Texts from Women’s Theater), 
a group of directors and critics noted that translation addressed a major 
absence in Arabic dramatic literature.11 Some panel members had adapted 
these texts, and they argued with a young man in the audience who asserted 
that Western plays could not apply to Egyptian women’s lives. They saw these 
texts as flexible means of staging stories that otherwise went unrepresented.
Translating Duras’s 1930s story into a contemporary Cairo milieu entailed 
creative adaptations of the narrative. Mirette first excised references to colo-
nial Vietnam, the setting of The Lover, in her selection of lines from the novel. 
Then she fashioned a distinctly personal home space onstage, with projected 
slides of drawings she had made and photographs of herself as a teenager. She 
described Details as “a kind of visual theater, in which [she] had to let the 
body say certain things” as the performance burgeoned beyond its text.12 The 
lighting design, by fellow director Hany El- Metennawy, created shifting moods 
and spaces on the tiny stage. Its homelike space framed her translation of the 
French novel while highlighting the difference between original text and new 
context. It was important to Mikhail to perform a local woman’s world, down 
to the self- portraits and colloquial Egyptian lines, so she would not be accused 
of imitating Western feminists. But she struggled to find the right everyday 
embodiment. At first, she wanted to wear jersey pants, as she would for dance, 
but El- Metennawy persuaded her to perform in a “more everyday” skirt and 
sweater. Representing onstage the modern feminine persona she inhabited 
so comfortably outside the theater required careful performance strategies. 
The dramaturgical advice of friends helped to turn her experiences of read-
ing novels, writing autobiography, and performing contemporary dance into 
a representational repertoire for feminist theater. Her translation of autobio -
graphical text was thus a process that involved multiple moves toward a space 
and language sufficiently Egyptian that her cosmopolitan Cairo audience would 
recognize her story as part of their world.
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Staging Freedom of Movement
Young women who wanted to walk alone in Cairo often experienced uncom-
fortable surveillance, ranging from unwanted comments to physical harassment. 
The opening scene of Details enacted the protagonist’s move from the street 
to safer space as a preliminary to performing. A lone spotlight illuminated 
an open book onstage, and Mirette strode in angrily. She spoke in the dark 
about how she hated to be followed by men. Coming into the light, she said, 
“A woman who has a body like mine must be terrified.”13 At home, she was 
more comfortable— and the stage allowed her to act with protected free-
dom. The open book on the floor showed she moved more freely through 
the world of literature, and claimed the right to expressive embodiment in 
dance.
Mirette’s taut, angry body conveyed more confidence when she interpreted 
translated lines from Duras’s novel. She used simple contemporary dance 
moves for the literary text, and straightforward storytelling for her own lines 
of autobiography. Her weaving of personal and translated text framed the 
dancer’s space of self- representation as one assembled from diverse scripts of 
identity, each of which she used as an alternative to patriarchal social rules. 
Three extracts of translated text Mirette borrowed from the novel show how 
intertextuality helped her build a frame for representing a young Egyptian 
woman who desired to escape home:
I’m wearing a dress of real silk, but it’s threadbare, almost transparent. 
It used to belong to my mother . . . She gave it to me. It’s a sleeveless 
dress with a very low neck. It’s a dress I remember. It suits me.14
My mother is a lonely woman. She lives out tragedy in all its dimen-
sions. As if she were speaking in a barren desert. All her life, she has 
been seeking someone to whom to tell what had happened to her.15
The time has now probably come when she can no longer escape cer-
tain duties toward herself. And that her mother will know nothing of 
this . . . she’s excluded from the family for the first time and forever. 
From now on they will no longer know what becomes of her[.] That 
is their fate henceforth. It’s already enough to make you weep.16
The first extract was accompanied by projected photographs on the wall, 
of a hand sketching a woman, then of a dress. For the second extract, Mirette 
played the mother, sitting silently in a chair with ankles primly crossed. 
Finally, she danced with her male partner Amir to the voice- over of the text 
about leaving her mother’s prohibitions behind. Their duet of approach-
ing each other, then swinging apart, staged the back- and- forth of intimacy 
between the woman and her lover in less explicitly sexual terms than in the 
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text of Duras’s novel. Finally, the woman jumped into the man’s arms in a 
gesture of trust, and he carried her offstage.
The spare dialogue allowed Mikhail to stage evocative dance scenes about 
the relationships she said were key to shaping a young woman’s sense of 
self: those with “her loneliness, her mother, and her lover.”17 Her own words 
about these experiences were brief and, as she said, difficult to voice in public. 
The translated lines allowed her to frame her story within a more respectable 
literary text. Duras’s novel was particularly useful in this regard for offer-
ing a rare negative depiction of a mother. The girl embodied her loneliness 
as an imitation of her mother, then disidentified with it. Onstage, Mirette 
calibrated her distance from her inherited feminine comportment, and the 
emergence of a more distinctive self, through a dance of detachment and 
attachment. After this physical transition, she found a space from which to 
speak more easily. Now she sat on a chair and played with her hair, speak-
ing of her body in her own, colloquial lines: “I want to embrace you . . . I 
have long arms that feel bored. I open them apart and then close them again 
to feel the empty space. Why do I feel that everything is simple and that I’m 
merely a small creature who can fit easily into your hands?”18 The feminine 
body that Mikhail’s embodied translation produced shifted between the reg-
isters of dance and plain speech. The second, realistic mode caused her some 
angst in rehearsal. In one storytelling scene, she spoke her lines while sit-
ting with a leg hooked up on the chair and lighting a cigarette. It was a pose 
familiar to her, but she confided to her lighting designer that she was worried 
she might “look like a prostitute” if she smoked onstage.19 Too much real-
ism risked alienating audiences more comfortable with the stylized body of 
a woman dancing onstage than with one who smoked and spoke about love. 
She used the distancing mechanisms of translated text and stylized contem-
porary dance to maintain a gap between role and self but eventually went 
ahead with the realistic scenario. The frame of a French text provided enough 
cultural distance to protect it from criticism.
Using a translated text to stage controversial identity politics was a familiar 
strategy in Cairo’s independent theater world. Politically critical dramatists 
often adapted European drama to voice bold ideas through characters that 
belonged to other places. Translators tended to render foreign texts in a par-
ticularly ornate and foreign- sounding register of formal Arabic, creating an 
effect of distance from the here and now. However, Mikhail’s use of inter-
textual gaps and separate bodily styles for each textual register exploited the 
foreignness of the French text strategically to build a genre frame around 
her autobiographical voice. The contrast between elliptical lines borrowed 
from Duras and her own simple text set up a hybrid linguistic register. It 
framed the emergent mimesis of the young woman’s story, in which the actor 
assumed her character gradually, showing the process by which she came into 
her voice. Making the translation process visible served a double purpose in 
Details: it allowed Mikhail to distinguish her voice from the foreign text and 
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to narrate how dance theater helped her find her truest, most expressive body. 
At the end of the performance, she gestured at closing the gap between role 
and self with autobiographical statements about coming into her own.
After scenes of dance that moved between home and the world, the final 
minutes of the show focused on intimate details of Mikhail’s own story. Her 
narrative of moving from an angry public body to the more comfortable 
dancing body was also a story of distancing herself from family and embrac-
ing sexual love as a claim to personal happiness. As the actor settled into her 
theatrical home, made up of a chair, a lamp, and artwork, she began to speak 
in an unpoetic, everyday voice: “Here I am, completely naked. I find myself 
baring my body time and again and standing like this. Now I am able to see 
myself clearly.”20 While fully clothed onstage, the actor spoke of facing her-
self confidently in the mirror of her space of memory. She was finally able to 
recognize herself. It was striking to hear a young bourgeois woman speak so 
frankly about love in a Cairo theater. A hushed audience watched attentively 
as she concluded her twenty- minute performance of “self- revolution” with a 
scene that mirrored the play’s opening. Once again, a spotlight illuminated an 
empty chair, and Mirette strode over to it. This time, she removed her sweater 
to reveal a sleeveless shirt. She placed the sweater on the chair and walked 
confidently away as voice- over text from Duras’s memoir narrated how that 
protagonist had found the strength to escape her mother’s rules.21
Mirette’s performance of her memory of coming of age required a care-
ful collage of voices, though it had the effect of transparent self- expression. 
Her story of formation as a dance theater practitioner, alongside that of her 
sexual awakening, required both textual and physical scaffolding in order to 
be heard. It was not enough for Mirette to draw on her memories to tell her 
story, when such autobiographical women’s theater had no genre history to 
authorize it in Egypt. Her construction of a dramatic repertoire was more 
artful and politicized than the simple, twenty- minute performance suggested 
at first glance. The dense web of texts and dance scenes that framed her 
everyday voice and body demonstrated that having a stage was not enough 
for a woman performer: she also required a representational apparatus to 
convey her autobiography in legible terms. Translation amplified her voice by 
linking it with that of Duras, and the frame of dance affirmed her gendered 
performance skills. Through these experimental techniques, the hypervisible 
woman’s body claimed a self- authored representational space.
The Dance of Recognition for Women’s Drama
A standing- room audience of about eighty at the Young Directors festival 
at CFCC responded enthusiastically to Details. Mikhail won a special jury 
award for “delicacy of expression” (riqqat al- ta’bir) in addition to the best 
actress prize, and the French cultural center invited her to restage the show 
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at its celebration of International Women’s Day. It was invited also to the 
dance festival organized by the head of the Modern Dance School, Walid 
Aouni, in June. Mikhail’s remarkable success demonstrated the merits of 
working across dance and theater to weave an unusual yet resonant perfor-
mance. As she represented a community of contemporary dancers seeking 
to be included in the theatrical avant- garde, she also claimed recognition 
for her feminist narrative as more than an instance of mimicry. The Egyp-
tian woman’s coming- of- age story was full of personal and local details that 
asserted its authenticity. Where few independent theater productions (even at 
Young Directors) had strong female characters, it was significant that the best 
actress appeared in a dance theater piece.
Mikhail’s performance of identity in translation foregrounded the exten-
sive labor of representing women in independent Egyptian theater. It was not 
enough to improvise sketches from contemporary life, as male dramatists 
did, when women’s public personas were extensively policed and criticized. 
Creating recognizable women characters required a detour through outsider 
performance genres in order to excavate scenarios of self- representation. 
Novels like Duras’s offered scenarios for underrepresented aspects of gender 
performance (such as women’s sexuality), which lent the weight of cultural 
authority. The young Egyptian theater maker enlisted the support of a leg-
endary French novelist to perform her coming- of- age. The dialogue of texts 
played a role above and beyond that of making the work of translation visi-
ble. It also expanded the tiny Egyptian genre of women’s theater. As Charles 
L. Briggs and Richard Bauman argue, intertextual linkages render genre 
a flexible concept capable of accommodating new material.22 It was thus 
equally possible to read Details as a contribution to the genre of adapted 
translations in Egyptian theater and as a contribution to feminist theater.
The use of dance and translation to frame feminist performance created 
certain problems of cultural recognition. As a marginalized figure in theater, the 
storytelling woman took center stage in exceptional circumstances. Mikhail’s 
storytelling voice was authorized by the cultural stature of French literature, 
as well as the event of a festival sponsored by a French cultural center. It was 
within this frame that she was able to perform her autobiography. How-
ever, the visibility of the woman’s body, and audibility of her voice, remained 
precarious in independent theater. Such culturally marginal scenarios as 
Mikhail’s proved difficult to re- create, and women had to perform constantly 
for recognition and validation. This “burden of liveness” turned their per-
formances of subaltern identity into an endless process of appeal to cultural 
authorities.23 Thus, the awards and various forms of recognition for Details 
did little to secure the place of feminist dance theater within independent fes-
tivals. It remained an occasional genre. Doubly minoritized as a woman and 
a dancer, Mikhail capitalized on the novelty of her performance style but also 
wished she could be accepted as an unexceptional member of the independ-
ent theater community.
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The persistent demand of Egyptian cultural authenticity even in the avant- 
garde showed that theater bore an enduring link to national identity politics, 
and women were disproportionately charged with representing that identity. 
At the same time, the demands of avant- garde theater drew performers to 
stage marginal stories. The subaltern status of women directors within the 
avant- garde necessitated alliance building to affirm their cultural authority. 
Bridging feminist and mainstream avant- garde theater through an established 
Egyptian genre proved a more sustainable way of validating feminism than 
translation, as Abeer Ali found in her troupe’s signature mix of sha’bi (folksy) 
and feminist narrative. While the aesthetic style of Mikhail’s dance theater 
would fit into a European avant- garde festival, Ali’s Misahharati troupe had 
a folk- feminist repertoire with a more traditional look. Yet it carved out a 
solid space for women’s theater within the independent movement. It was 
the sole independent troupe that worked professionally as a self- styled wom-
en’s theater company. The politics of performing marginal identity in a folksy 
mode resonated more easily with the styles of critique central to independent 
theater, allowing the troupe to link feminism to broader calls for subaltern 
representation in national culture.
Mediating Feminism through Popular Culture
Ali’s Misahharati belonged to a group of independent troupes (including 
 Al- Suradiq, Al- Daw’, and Al- Warsha) that flourished in the 1990s and adapted 
folk performance genres for urban stages. They used a range of styles, from 
acrobatic satire to comic monologues, in keeping with the broad conceptu-
alization of folk culture in modern Egyptian theater. The term sha’bi theater, 
or masrah al- sha’b (theater of the people), per historian Ali al- Ra’i’s volumes 
on the topic, assembled within the genre different performance traditions 
from rural and working- class Egyptian life.24 It referenced all kinds of perfor-
mance that took place outside an Italian box theater, which the Arabic word 
al- masrah (theater) had described for about a century. In the 1960s, Egyptian 
intellectuals began to call for including more local repertoires within modern 
theater. Most famously, novelist and playwright Yusuf Idris called for cultur-
ally specific theater in his manifesto Nahwa masrah ‘arabi (Toward an Arab 
Theater).25 Idris’s contention that Egyptian folk culture spoke more directly 
to Egyptian audiences than European theater did won affirmation both from 
literary playwrights, who wove folk forms into their dramas, and from direc-
tors like General Organization of Cultural Palaces veteran Abd al- Rahman 
al- Shafi’i, who modeled his musical theater on “the folk spectacle” (al- furja 
al- sha’biya).26 The sixties wave of cultural nationalism that brought sha’bi 
repertoires into state- sponsored theater was consolidated with the establish-
ment of the Mass Culture Organization, which was dedicated to producing 
art in the service of national identity.27
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In public cultural institutions of the Mubarak era, folk culture was marked 
off as belonging to a space of roots and traditions, from which modern artists 
had come a long way. This was true in the fine arts as well as theater.28 Tell-
ingly, the Institute for Folk Arts (Ma’had al- Funun al- Sha’biya) and Theater 
Institute (Ma’had al- Masrah) occupied different buildings on Cairo’s Acad-
emy of Arts campus. Ali and her fellow folk- oriented independent dramatists 
challenged such institutional separations by arguing that popular culture 
was an organic part of modern urban life. Ali came from the town of Suez 
and was raised on popular performance styles. She dedicated her theater to 
demonstrating their contemporaneity and closeness to what counted as modern 
culture, particularly in urban neighborhoods. Her day job at the Folklore 
Atlas at the Giza Cultural Palace helped her develop field methods for research-
ing popular culture, which she repurposed for her own troupe. It staged a 
return to the ideals of the cultural palaces with a twist, centering women’s 
stories within folk culture.
The name of the Misahharati troupe, “awakener” in Arabic, referred to the 
drummer who woke sleepers for dawn prayers during Ramadan. Ali intended 
it as a metaphor of social consciousness- raising. Although she had trained 
in fine arts, she chose theater as her medium because “a theatrical show dis-
cusses an idea that one is afraid to approach in reality, it breaks the wall of 
fear.” To this end, popular culture gave her language for “things not broadcast 
in society, which the middle class in its refinement covers up.”29 The troupe’s 
“theater lab” (mukhtabar al- masrah) gathered oral texts on themes that Ali 
outlined in accordance with her projects for women’s rights nongovernmen-
tal organizations or broader feminist goals. In 2004, the research project on 
“the history of Egyptian homes” focused on themes of love and marriage. 
Ali, her dramaturge Rasha Abdel Moneim, and actor- researcher Muhammad 
Abdel Mu’izz collated the songs and stories that troupe members brought 
to form a corpus for training in voice and rhythm. “Someone may bring me 
a song she heard from her grandmother, which was not recorded,” Ali said, 
“but someone else might bring a ‘pop’ song in the sha’bi style from the mar-
ket. I include both songs, because I want to say something through them.” 
The troupe performers adapted these narratives into their signature samir 
(storytelling circle). The intertextual connection between the narratives was 
embodied by the performers seated together in a semicircle that now repre-
sented a spectrum of national popular voices.
Misahharati’s repertoire of texts in colloquial Egyptian Arabic affirmed 
that this language register was as much a medium of modern culture as was 
formal literary language. “We love and hate, rejoice and are sad, sing and 
dance and gesture in Egyptian,” the troupe’s mission statement asserted. 
Indeed, films, pop music, and folk songs in Egyptian Arabic linked more and 
less well- educated Egyptians. Yet middle- class youth raised on globalized 
cultural production seemed less interested in live performances of popular 
repertoires. When the troupe held monthly performances of its new songs 
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and stories at Cairo’s Atelier art gallery, the rows of folding chairs in the 
gallery’s courtyard filled mostly with older literati who enjoyed the folksy 
warmth of the sihriya (soirée). As an open rehearsal of repertoire, the soirée 
aimed at building a shared aural memory between the performers. The gaps 
between songs and stories from different historical contexts were minimized 
by singing in the same key and using quick transitions. This musical collage 
style of performance became Misahharati’s signature and its key technique 
for suturing the oral texts selected as an archive of popular voices comment-
ing on gender relations.
The full- length dramatic work Harem Tales grew out of that year’s research 
project in Egyptian homes. After several years of building its fan base, the 
troupe now attempted an ambitious synthesis of folk style and feminist mes-
sage. It framed the circle of storytellers and singers interpreting the collected 
oral texts as a haramlik, or women’s quarters in a historical Ottoman home. 
Setting the texts from a range of modern contexts in this atavistic milieu 
was an overt authenticating strategy. Moreover, the performance included 
working- class men as members of the subaltern harem. All of the actors wore 
wigs, shawls, and other bits of costume over their black shirts and pants to 
act as urban dramatists impersonating folksier characters. Their use of iden-
tity drag synthesized urban and rural, historical and contemporary voices as 
elements of popular culture. In performing their eclectic repertoire as wom-
en’s culture, moreover, Misahharati asked audiences to find parallels between 
feminist ideas and traditional Egyptian figures of subaltern strength.
The troupe’s oldest members were Minha Zeitun and Nihad Abul Einein, 
experienced television actors in their forties. They worked for little money in 
Misahharati because they liked strong roles for women their age and enjoyed 
the communal process of theater making. Maryam Ahmed and Fairuz 
Karawya were rising young singers who found singing with Misahharati 
a more respectable option than performing at music venues. Mu’izz and 
Yahya Mahmoud, the two male actors in the troupe, performed occasion-
ally in amateur General Organization of Cultural Palaces productions. The 
troupe’s reputation for feminism attracted more women, but it welcomed all 
who were interested in subaltern storytelling and oral history. Abdel Moneim 
curated the collection of stories and songs for the monthly soirée. Choosing 
the collage of texts to represent popular culture was the job of the director 
and dramaturge, both of whom identified as feminists and chose to tell sto-
ries reflecting their politics.
Abdel Moneim’s scholarly training in theater criticism complemented 
Ali’s background in cultural palace management to foster a highly produc-
tive and well- run troupe. As dramaturge, Abdel Moneim took charge of the 
handwritten stories that troupe members brought in, edited them, and sim-
plified the language after actors had tried narrating them. She synthesized 
an urban, feminine language register across the stories from different popu-
lar genres. Ali coached the actors in storytelling using these texts and helped 
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them develop realistic versions of folksy voices. “We don’t want melodrama,” 
she cautioned actors when they slipped into broad emotional tones and rus-
tic hand gestures. A modern, urban register of speech, and gestures to match, 
built the tonal base for the play. Then the dramaturge and director distrib-
uted tales and songs among storytellers and scripted dialogue between them.
The Misahharati troupe began rehearsals for Harem Tales in June 2004, 
in preparation for the August edition of the Independent Theater Festival. 
As the actors sat down to practice their stories in the shady courtyard of 
the Atelier gallery each evening, they developed voices that fleshed out their 
words with minimal bodily movement. Ali and Abdel Moneim paired tales 
and songs that echoed each other, building a narrative that progressed along 
the lines of the frame story, of an ill- fated romance between a fairy- tale man 
and woman. The pieces ranged widely in genre: some songs were from the 
1920s, and others from a decade ago. In addition to oral texts gathered in 
field research, Abdel Moneim scripted others in the same tone, with a more 
intentionally feminist message. Incorporating all of these into the dramatic 
collage of Harem Tales built intertextual links across gaps between genera-
tions, social classes, and geographies in the origins of the texts. The fantasy 
of a shared, protofeminist popular culture was the subject of some debate in 
the troupe. “Isn’t the fairy- tale language a bit exaggerated?” asked a skepti-
cal actor. This recurring concern led Ali to condense the frame tale, built from 
a Palestinian fairy tale. The other texts were performed in a more conversa-
tional register signifying contemporary time.
The combination of traditional and contemporary texts that the troupe 
wove experimentally in its “theater lab” fashioned a mixed space of popu-
lar culture. The performers’ carefully homogenized speech register gave the 
various scenarios the illusion of a common ground. The sha’bi performance 
genre evoked a warm and welcoming home, which nonetheless accommo-
dated tales of gender conflict. It was a quixotic use of the samir, which other 
Egyptian dramatists used for collective narrations of epic ballads.30 The met-
aphor of the harem, the director explained to her troupe, was intended to 
invert the typically masculine samir and include all who wanted their voices 
to be heard. “All of us live in a harem,” she said, describing life in a patriar-
chal society where subaltern subjects suffered together.
The main thread of Harem Tales was a dialogue between folksy stories 
and feminist polemics, staged as a running battle between the Old Ladies 
at a Wedding (‘Awagiz al- Farah), played by men in drag, and a feisty young 
woman called the Masculine Girl (Al- Bint al- Mustargila). In the familiar sce-
nario of a family wedding, generational differences were clearly defined. The 
Masculine Girl was a college- educated, contemporary young urban woman 
whose part grew larger as the fairy- tale narrative was whittled down from the 
original script of Harem Tales. The tragic love story in the frame tale, between 
embattled fisherman Ali and his beloved, Nur, had been written as an allegory 
of the difficulty of marriage in Egypt’s current economic situation. After false 
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starts in rehearsal, the Masculine Girl’s feminist voice replaced that of Nur. 
Her salvo in response to an old woman telling her to marry was character-
istically earthy: “Lord, give me a man. Or anything with a mustache— a rat, 
a cockroach— so I can be rid of people’s nagging!”31 Giving her a folksy wit 
that matched the Old Ladies’ placed the Girl on a shared footing with them.
The dramatic scenario of inclusive popular culture was not an even play-
ing field, however. The Old Ladies, played by male actors Mu’izz and Yahya 
in wigs and shawls, embodied old- fashioned gender roles as hyperfeminine 
Mai and bespectacled, gray- haired Elene. They had a large repertoire of 
verbal art at their disposal. Performing in drag allowed the male actors to 
improvise lines by drawing on styles of repartee conventionally gendered 
masculine. The Masculine Girl held her own in the clash of generations. 
However, the male actors’ comic ad- libs weighted the script in a tradition-
ally folksy direction that worried dramaturge Abdel Moneim. She advocated 
for more scripted feminist parables, in the form of tales paired with popu-
lar songs that echoed their message. The troupe’s path from collecting songs 
and stories to performing a full- fledged show revealed some friction between 
the different registers of folk storytelling incorporated strategically into the 
feminist narrative. The reception of different stories in the samir perfor-
mance tested how a feminist concept of gender roles carried over in popular 
styles of voice.
Keying Sha’bi Performance for Avant- Garde Audiences
Harem Tales premiered at the Independent Theater Festival in August 2004 
and invited the sophisticated Hanager audience into a world of fairy- tale 
wonder. The black- clad actors and spare stage set made it clear that the 
harem of the play’s title was metaphorical. A well- known folksong, to which 
the audience was invited to clap along, generated a shared warmth (al- difa) in 
the troupe’s signature opening gesture. Then, Nihad the Storyteller, in a Pales-
tinian galabiya, launched into the frame tale about the fisherman Ali: “When 
he slept, he saw himself dressed all in silk, his pockets filled with money, and 
owner of a big palace. The endless gardens of his palace were filled with 
deer and canaries and ostriches, and girls so beautiful as to say to the moon, 
‘Move over, I’ll take your place.’” Gray- wigged Elene brought the Storyteller 
firmly back to the present with a skeptical question: “I say, when Ali goes to 
heaven will he find girls as pretty as those in advertisements on satellite tel-
evision?” Her friend Mai lamented the prospect of husbands ogling women 
in heaven too. The three older female characters together embodied an inter-
textual repertoire of popular culture that was both folksy and contemporary. 
Their conversation opened up a space of savvy sha’bi womanhood beyond 
stereotypes of melodramatic peasants on television. Their forms of feminine 
knowledge came readily into dialogue, as each sought to outwit the other. 
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The opening scene set the tone for “the harem” as a space of subaltern wis-
dom and wit.
The performance shifted to a more modern key when the Masculine Girl 
took her turn, telling of her travails in love. The Old Ladies urged her to dress 
and wear makeup in order to attract men, though their own fussy wigs and 
shawls marked the advice as slightly comic. Mai delivered a piece of prover-
bial wisdom— “a man can set up a house for you”— that the Girl countered 
with facts about how contemporary Cairo women earned their own money. 
Her scathing, earthy monologue on husbands who expected wives to come 
home from work and indulge them as if they were children elicited roars of 
laughter from the Hanager audience. The Girl’s feisty performance resonated 
with many women’s conversations about marriage, Ali noted, telling me that 
women regularly came up to her after the show to say so. Airing such stories 
in a bluntly folksy voice was among the most successful performance tactics 
in the play. The Girl’s telling of home truths showed that ordinary Egyptian 
women had a rich vocabulary for problems that professional feminists were 
seeking to make visible.
Women’s domestic tactics were not always opposed to patriarchal values, 
however. When Mai took over the story and told of the manipulative marital 
repertoires of her own generation, she also won applause from the audience.
Mai: I used to slave for my mother- in- law, oh my, and as soon as 
he came home I’d put on lipstick and kohl and wear my outfit— 
(to Elene) do you remember it?
Elene (nodding): A belly dance outfit! No bride was without one in 
those days . . . 
Mai: So as soon as he entered . . . “See, sir!”— innocently of course— 
(whispers in his ear).
Husband (Yahya sheds Elene’s clothes and puts on a mustache): Oh 
goodness! I owe you, my pretty one (reaches out to embrace her).
Mai (withdraws, covering her arm): Ouch! My arm hurts from help-
ing your mother— I mean mama, dear thing. I’m sure she means 
no harm, but . . . 
The scene of traditional husband management was paired with a 1920s 
Egyptian song. Young singer Maryam interpreted “It’s Me or Your Mother,” 
a gramophone classic by Ratiba Ahmed, in the signature nasal tone of that 
era and wore the netted Ottoman face veil called the yashmak. Her transgen-
erational embodiment of the ‘alima (dancer/singer) repertoire showed that 
Egyptian feminists had other verbal resources available to them than logical 
argument. The intertextual linkage between wifely tactic and classic song sit-
uated a protofeminist repertoire within a national popular culture.
In its most utopian form, the capacious harem accommodated different 
generations of women’s performance tactics. The cultural gaps between their 
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voices were minimal, since all spoke or sang in the same language register. 
Differences between warring couples, too, were readily resolved by comic 
repartee. Yet the scenario of battle between generations often was skewed in 
favor of the Old Ladies. These fast- tongued characters unwittingly showed 
that folksy repartee was a weapon in patriarchal repertoires, as their put- 
downs of the Girl brought laughter at the expense of women into the theater. 
Moving between different keys of folksy women’s speech was a riskily inclu-
sive gesture on the part of the feminist dramatists. In performance, their 
mixed repertoire showed itself to be marked by gender hierarchies, which 
put young feminists at a relative disadvantage as outsiders to popular com-
edy and traditional repertoires of storytelling.
Harem Tales beckoned to a broad Egyptian audience through an inclu-
sive discourse about strong women across contexts. It presented “stories of 
Egyptian homes” as a hidden popular culture in which women were pro-
ficient. Gendering popular culture in this way was a strategy the troupe 
borrowed from academic feminists, who used folktales and fairy tales to fash-
ion woman- centered stories. However, the utopian postcolonial gesture of 
unearthing critical culture from subaltern genres encountered limitations in 
performance. Men in drag embodied archetypal folksy humor with more suc-
cess than female actors and made some misogynistic jokes. The harem itself 
sometimes appeared as men’s public culture in drag; the modified samir was 
after all a traditionally masculine form. The feminist storytelling in Harem 
Tales was thus a partial success: audiences sometimes failed to applaud when 
they should, and the Old Ladies got so many laughs that they improvised 
extra lines. Their folksy language carried the aura of its patriarchal origins. 
The broad subaltern world that the play cast as a harem contained fault lines 
that came up in tensions between feminist and conservative characters. Its 
affirmative staging of folk culture revealed the limits of traditional storytell-
ing as a means of feminist critique. However, scripted monologues about the 
wounds of patriarchy used the storytelling genre critically to voice domestic 
secrets.
Confessional Storytelling as a Weapon of the Weak
The harem of the play was home to plain talk among intimates, as well as 
public verbal art. Once audiences had grown familiar with the characters, 
they voiced a darker repertoire of “stories from Egyptian homes.” Their con-
fessional performances brought folksy humor to a domestic register of social 
critique that was not often acknowledged in popular culture. Mu’izz put on 
sunglasses to play a man confiding to friends about his unsatisfying marital 
life and troubles with impotence. He claimed to lack sexual desire because of 
“the stress of political circumstances” in Egypt, but his neighbors saw through 
his shifty performance. Their skeptical expressions forced out the truth: he 
Making Women Matter in Avant- Garde Theater 89
had been unhappy in his marriage and had an affair with a colleague’s wife. 
The audience laughed, and the story became part of a joking repertoire. It 
drew a livelier response than the frame tale about the star- crossed lover Ali 
that it echoed. The story of an evil caliph who thwarted young love had been 
intended as an allegory of contemporary Egypt. In the storytelling circle, it 
resonated with a more comic everyday story. The impotent man was forced 
to confront his ethical shortcomings in the harem, where all secrets came out. 
The samir was a metaphor for popular culture itself.
Mu’izz and Yahya demonstrated this critical form of humor in their next 
tale, narrated as gossip between two men at a café. They took turns sharing 
the story of a married woman, Safiya, who manipulated her husband. Safiya 
had gone missing from bed one night and returned three days later with a 
story to excuse her absence. Mu’izz and Yahya acted out the scene with heavy 
irony, making it clear that Safiya’s dream lover was a wealthy Saudi who paid 
for sex.
Safiya: Someone came to me dressed all in white . . . 
Sayyid: Where did he come to you?
Safiya: In a dream [fi- l- manam], where else? He was dressed all in 
white, and rode a horse that was all white. And said to me, wake 
up, Safiya, wake up and take your due from Abdallah! So I went 
with him Sayyid, and when I mounted the horse I felt as if I were a 
feather floating in the breeze. Then he brought me back and gave 
me these fifty dollars. (Loud laughs and applause from audience.) 
But he said something, Sayyid, which I could not understand! He 
said, this money is for you, and the other half is for your house-
hold expenses.
Sayyid (line spoken by both actors): It’s a blessing, Safiya! It shows 
that evil does not visit in vain.
Making up a fairy tale saved face for a wife who supplemented the family 
income through such escapades, and the husband accepted them with a sanc-
timonious proverb. The storytellers appreciated such verbal art as a survival 
skill in which women specialized. When the harem was framed as a dysfunc-
tional space of secrets, popular wit and humor lent painfully ironic situations 
some dignity. This version of popular culture, less noble than recognized folk 
genres, showed “the people” to be ordinary, marginal members of Egyptian 
society. Their intimate exchanges within the storytelling circle revealed a 
repertoire of language about sexuality that offered an alternative to more 
recognized popular culture. If the Old Ladies’ advice on marriage showed 
the public face of popular culture, confessional stories represented its secret 
truths.
The darker section of Harem Tales incorporated familiar songs and un usual 
stories gathered during oral history research, just like the sunnier side of 
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popular culture. Notably, this secret repertoire made the final statement in 
the play, as characters offered their reflections on how to change the dys-
functional harem from within. The character of middle- aged Sitt al- Kull 
(Ms. Competent) was one such everyday philosopher. As a contemporary 
storyteller, actor Minha wore eyeglasses on a chain and spoke in the tone of 
a woman who had seen it all. Earlier in the play, she had contributed a fairy 
tale about a man who married a female jinn and grew afraid of her magical 
powers. Ending with a wry allusion to men’s fear of competent women, she 
told a similar tale toward the play’s end, about how she dealt with a domi-
neering new male manager in her office. Lighting a cigarette, she described 
handling his youthful ego with patient humor and eventually winning his 
respect. Ms. Competent made a place for her storytelling wisdom through 
a strategic hybrid of verbal techniques. Like the Old Ladies, she knew how 
to manage men; unlike them, she relied on her own experience rather than 
folksy tricks. The actor’s use of scripted stories and everyday embodiment to 
perform an urban style of popular wisdom carried the “stories from Egyp-
tian homes” into contemporary office scenes by ridding the female body of 
traditional mannerisms.
By the play’s end, many characters had shed their colorful bits of cos-
tume and performed as urban Egyptians. Likewise, the narrative shifted from 
mythical to contemporary time. The chief Storyteller wrapped up the fairy-
tale of Ali and Nur with a hasty happy ending, which her companions in the 
circle rejected. Each offered his or her own interpretation of the tale. “I am 
Nur!” the Masculine Girl asserted, recounting her own disappointment with 
men. Ms. Competent saw the couple’s disillusionment as a realistic result of 
what happened when lovers began to see each other clearly: Nur was not as 
beautiful as in the dream, and Ali struggled with poverty. The epic narrative 
of disappointment resonated in contemporary Egypt, where dystopian fail-
ures were a widely recognized fact of life. As Yahya pointed out, “We are all 
living in the Caliph’s harem, or under the magician Qarun’s spell.” Each sce-
nario in the performance showed how subaltern cultural repertoires allowed 
the weak to push back occasionally against epic oppression. Rich repertoires 
of plain talk, humor, and domestic irony grew out of the shared popular 
experience of injustice. When performed onstage, these stories lacked the 
visual dazzle of folksy genres. But they did stage subaltern voices that offered 
alternatives to both canonized folklore and representations of the folk in lit-
erary drama. Harem Tales eventually showed the modernity of folk culture 
as a subaltern repertoire.
Critical and Popular Responses to Folk Feminism
Harem Tales was widely applauded by audiences and critics at the Inde-
pendent Theater Festival for its virtuosic singing and storytelling. A glowing 
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review in the weekly magazine Sabah al- Khayr, by veteran critic Luis Gris, 
called the troupe “a treasure of folk arts” and recommended that the play 
be invited to “enliven Ramadan nights at the Ramadan tent set up by the 
Ministry of Culture on the grounds of the Opera House.”32 Gris made no 
mention, however, of the play’s gender critique. Feminist English- language 
critic Nehad Selaiha wrote a more ambivalent review that addressed the rep-
resentational politics of its folksy staging of womanhood. “Intended as a 
corrective satire on the negative aspects of female consciousness and behav-
ior, Tales of the Harem seemed nevertheless, in both form and content, to 
be looking backwards with nostalgia to earlier, happier and more peaceful 
times,” she wrote.33 The folksy aesthetic that appealed to Gris (who was 
among the regulars at Atelier) appeared to Selaiha as affirmative of folk tra-
ditions rather than truly critical. In her reading, feminist critique in a folksy 
voice inevitably echoed nostalgic celebrations of popular culture. Several 
younger members of the avant- garde theater world were similarly reluctant 
to hear the play’s folksy voices as critical. Two women friends with whom 
I attended the play were rattled by its misogynistic jokes, which overshad-
owed the feminist statements in their view. Their spectatorial experience of 
the adapted samir was different from my intellectual one, raising the question 
of the degree to which avant- garde versions of popular performance inevita-
bly reproduced the hegemonic cultural politics of their source genres.
The intertextual techniques used in Harem Tales were more traditional-
izing than those of Details, with small gaps in language and style between 
texts woven into a neofolk repertoire. As Briggs and Bauman point out, inter-
textuality is bound by ideology, so that feminist adapters of folk genres were 
ideologically constrained in the degree to which they could hybridize these 
repertoires. The sha’bi genres deployed in Harem Tales infused the perfor-
mance with the flavor of their gender roles for my urban intellectual friends, 
as for Selaiha. Moreover, the play went on to the national women’s theater 
festival in 2006, where the actors playing the Old Ladies won prizes, signal-
ing that it was received there as the kind of nostalgic celebration Selaiha had 
feared.
Harem Tales also played at Cairo University, the Rotary Club, and other 
venues around town for a remarkable run of over two years. Ali mentioned 
that the questionnaires she distributed after these shows came back with some 
satisfying responses from audience members. “They were surprised that they 
enjoyed it, even though all the actors were sitting down,” she shared when 
we met up in 2007. “Many people said, you say everything that’s inside us! 
Everything that happens in our homes! Many people said, this is my mother- 
in- law, this is me, this is our neighbor. You say everything very honestly.”34 
Such moments of recognition were particularly gratifying to a director who 
worked hard to address more popular audiences than usual for avant- garde 
theater. “The cultured people saw the work as drama, and ordinary people 
saw it as their story,” she explained. Harem Tales apparently worked better 
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as a feminist performance with the latter audiences. They heard the critical 
register in the storytellers’ voices, whereas Cairo intellectuals had been trou-
bled by the folksy overtones. Popular avant- gardism was a utopian idea that 
proved difficult to define in practice.
Misahharati’s experimental use of song and storytelling for feminist critique 
secured the troupe’s position as a leading innovator of folksy performance 
in the independent theater movement. Its partial success in voicing social 
critique through popular characters furthered the movement’s mission to 
move beyond intellectual audiences as well. Yet the genre that Harem Tales 
developed appeared to evade definition as feminist theater, as the cultural 
establishment assigned it to the sha’bi camp. Its mixed reception highlighted 
an enduring dilemma of directors looking to win recognition for subaltern 
characters in modern theater: How could they define these characters as pop-
ular without falling into traditionalist modes of representation? The arc of 
Harem Tales, from fairy- tale storyteller to modern Ms. Competent, gestured 
at reconciling iconographies of Egyptian womanhood divided into the tra-
ditional and modern, to create a repertoire of popular storytelling. Since the 
troupe emphasized vocal over visual performance, actors were able to recon-
cile cultural registers with relative ease. Yet their verbal repertoires sometimes 
bore the stamp of traditional gender performance. It was when they spoke 
everyday urban stories, based on field research in Cairo, that they most suc-
cessfully embodied the modernity of folk struggles. Subaltern voices now 
appeared as those of neighbors rather than distant foremothers. Their mod-
est inclusion at the Independent Theater Festival was a gesture of recognition 
for folk struggles within avant- garde cultural politics.
Feminists between Cosmopolitanism and Indigeneity
A handful of troupes led by women were among the most successful of 
the free theater movement, even as they faced the conundrum of staging 
Egyptian women’s experience with few scripts or dramatic genres to use as 
resources. These two plays show some of the ways in which feminist per-
formers developed Egyptian voices for the stage by borrowing from foreign 
and local repertoires. Directors Mirette Mikhail and Abeer Ali used inter-
textual strategies both to produce original genre frames for women’s stories 
and to authorize these genres with reference to established dramatic tra-
ditions. Each of their performance hybrids carried traces of the respective 
genres within which they framed the emergence of women’s voices from the 
margins. Women who played storytellers onstage were not simply mediat-
ing cultural or personal memory but rather adapting repertoires that others 
had authored. They used the traditional dichotomy between archives and 
repertoires in literary drama to authorize their performances through either 
literary or folk standards. The storyteller’s voice turned the text into living, 
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local culture and invited recognition for it within a contemporary perfor-
mance repertoire. The story was a relational medium, in Samuel Weber’s 
terms, gaining its theatrical power by staging connections between here and 
elsewhere.35
When feminist performers mediated between sites of cosmopolitanism, 
gender conservatism, and avant- garde thought, they raised many questions 
about how independent theater related to other cultural spaces. How close 
was it to European forms of sexual liberalism, or to gender norms in popu-
lar urban quarters in Egypt? Women onstage carried the burden of mediating 
these questions of cultural proximity, and they were challenged more often 
than men for their affiliations. At the same time, they had the opportunity 
to build their own space in the landscape of avant- garde performance. With 
no inherited norms to challenge inside the theater world, pioneering fem-
inist dramatists freely adapted outside texts and brought new stories into 
independent theater. Their gestures of opening up the terrain of theatrical 
representation stimulated ways of imagining avant- gardists as an expansive 
and mobile community. Even if it remained somewhat marginal, women’s 
theater engendered a mix of repertoires that democratized the representa-
tional practice of independent theater. The folksy voices of Harem Tales and 
outspoken autobiography of Details were performances of subaltern voices 
that assumed their place in the movement’s repertoire. These performances 
opened the genres into which they entered, taking outsider positions that 
questioned the boundaries of folk storytelling and translated theater.
Together with their spatial centering of women’s voices, these perfor-
mances foreshadowed the recognition of other experiences minoritized in 
independent theater. Their gestures of celebrating subaltern identities staged 
disidentification with their roles as recognized intellectuals, imagining an 
avant- garde in which less privileged minorities were at the center of the cul-
tural landscape.36 Folk- style theater and feminist storytelling both grew more 
popular in independent theater in the following years. After the Hanager 
theater closed for repairs in 2007, these genres found a warmer welcome in 
subcultural venues. Folk- style troupes Hala and Red Tomato (formerly Al- 
Khayal al- Sha’bi) turned to street theater (see chapter 6), while the Bussy 
troupe, formed at the American University in Cairo, continues to stage fem-
inist storytelling at nongovernmental organizations and universities. Indeed, 
the hybrid genres developed by marginal players in independent theater 
proved better equipped to survive a post- Hanager era, in which dramatists 
had to collaborate with small institutions that served subaltern groups.
Their flexible performance repertoires enabled some independent troupes 
to cross over to different institutional contexts, and to work outside theater 
spaces as well. Nongovernmental organizations using theater for social 
change became key patrons of folk- style independent troupes, for instance. 
Storytellers’ framings of small- scale social questions were often better suited 
to such work than were the national narratives of political theater troupes. 
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Subaltern citizenship was performed in various such minor repertoires as 
independent theater extended its networks in the years after 2004. Private 
cultural institutions of the late Mubarak era recognized the skills of theater 
makers who imagined citizenship from below as the state cultural infrastruc-
ture crumbled around them. In some cases, they invited dramatists to teach 
in their neoliberal projects of cultural education. The avant- garde gesture of 
claiming recognition for marginal citizens then transformed into the very dif-
ferent practice of using theater techniques to train such citizens in the culture 
of the globalized workplace.
Feminist performers who devised original means to represent themselves 
onstage were among the avant- gardists who capitalized on cultural democ-
racy to win recognition for subaltern identities. Staging the self as the means 
of its own representation was certainly a feminist gesture for the drama-
tists examined in this chapter. It also aligned unexpectedly with neoliberal 
cultural politics of self- making. The boundaries between individualized per-
formance on the left and the center of the cultural landscape grew permeable 
as independents began moving decisively away from socialist- era theater 
institutions. In educational workshops for self- cultivation, avant- garde prac-
tices of rehabilitating marginalized identities came to serve cultural programs 
with a more entrepreneurial bent. Utopian visions of democracy through cul-
ture did not die out, then, when venues for avant- garde theater vanished. 





In the summer of 2007, the catastrophe at Beni Suef left a lingering cloud 
over Egypt’s theaters. State- owned theaters throughout the country remained 
closed for fireproofing repairs, from the stately halls of cultural palaces to the 
Hanager Arts Center. What was usually the busiest performance season of the 
year now saw a lull, particularly for the independent theater movement, which 
was hit by the loss of its key festival venue. Its leading dramatists returned 
resignedly to their day jobs. When I called old friends in Cairo to reconnect 
after two years away, several asked to meet at workshops they were teaching 
in venues unfamiliar to me. Twenty- eight- year- old actor Sameh had turned his 
interest in drama therapy into a training program at Mohandiseen’s Actors’ 
Studio (Studyu al- Mumaththil). The private studio in a middle- class building 
was a far cry from Sameh’s usual downtown café haunts. Riding the elevator 
to the address provided, I found a spacious apartment with a waiting room 
where young professionals smoked quietly, chatted, or checked their phones. 
One journalist waiting for the workshop told me she came here after work and 
found it to be “like a yoga class.” Indeed, Sameh began class with relaxing exer-
cises in a darkened room, followed by narrative prompts that delved gradually 
into participants’ memories to generate dramatic narratives. In this setting of 
self- care, theater became a way of staging and examining personal biographies.
On radio shows playing in Cairo taxis that summer, my ear repeatedly 
caught the neologisms al- tanmiya al- bashariyya (human development) and 
al- tanmiya al- dhatiyya (personal development), referring to a new cultural 
movement that conceived of the individual and his or her body as objects of 
development. American self- help books translated into Arabic, which dotted 
the stands of street- side booksellers, influenced the vocabulary of personal 
development coaches. Following the success of Egypt’s most famous tele-
vangelist, Amr Khaled, new self- help gurus like Ibrahim al- Fiki, host of the 
television show Success without Borders (Al- najah bila hudud), taught youth 
to educate themselves rather than relying on schools. It was a message that 
resonated in a theater world deprived of its key institutions. At workshops 
in Cairo over the next two years (2007– 9), I met young participants from 
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middle- class backgrounds who believed acting techniques would build the 
self- presentation skills they needed to get jobs. This was especially true if 
they sought service jobs, at a time when employment in other professions 
dwindled. Echoing the ascetics who turned to self- care when social morality 
weakened, these self- help aficionados took the body as material over which 
to exercise mastery.1 Their youthful ethics of personal enterprise mirrored the 
neoliberal ideology of officials in the Mubarak regime, in the embodied form 
of educational practice.
Across the river from Mohandiseen, in the posh Zamalek neighborhood, a 
businessman had turned an even more unlikely space into a center where self- 
help workshops were offered. Sakiat al- Sawi (Al- Sawi’s Culture Wheel) had 
been a trash space before advertising entrepreneur Muhammad al- Sawi used 
his connections to gain a permit to build two large halls and a Nile- side gar-
den. The Sakia, as it was popularly known, soon assumed the Hanager’s place 
as the liveliest venue in town for young artists, dramatists, and culture aficio-
nados to gather. The main hall hosted amateur theater and a range of musical 
performances, while lectures and skill- building workshops at the smaller River 
Hall also drew loyal audiences. The youth cultures of independent theater and 
personal development coexisted, intertwined, and occasionally clashed at this 
private cultural center. As fires at the cultural palaces and then Cairo’s National 
Theater made visible the shocking erosion of the public cultural infrastructure, 
such private centers grew in number and reputation. They stood apart from 
the Ministry of Culture’s artistic program by teaching person- centered tech-
niques more than national cultural ideology. Acting programs for self- help 
were part of this privatized new network of pedagogy, in which professionals 
shared their embodied knowledge with students and unemployed graduates 
seeking to build new cultural repertoires. Hegemonic concepts of youth cul-
ture and institutional infrastructure were both transformed in the process.
The three cultural programs I describe in this chapter deployed theater 
techniques to teach personal skills, adapting self- help scripts for an Egyptian 
context of accelerated economic reform and high unemployment. Act-
ing workshops at the private Sakia center, the independent theater Studio 
Emadeddin, and the arts program funded by the Aga Khan Foundation exem-
plified the instrumentalization of culture as supplementary education to keep 
up with the demands of the changing Egyptian economy. To perform in this 
job market often entailed adapting existing skills and improvising new ones. 
Multinational corporations had specific cultural standards for their employ-
ees, and upper- class graduates with a bilingual education had an advantage 
in performing accordingly. Others hoped to make up the deficit by attending 
a series of short workshops to build their embodied repertoires of cultural 
knowledge and skills. While performance took class- specific forms at each of 
the three workshops, I approach them as part of a shared middle- class youth 
culture emerging in counterpoint to the widening gap between the elites of 
new globalization and the majority of Egyptians whom it left behind.
Instrumentalizing Performance in Self- Help Citizenship 97
The personal development cultural programs were founded on a shared 
belief in individual enterprise as a means to social change. Their culture con-
cepts shared the hopeful modernism of state institutions, but diverged in 
eschewing institutional frameworks for cultural development. Instead their 
self- help rhetorics aligned with neoliberal culture, modeled on the principles 
of a market economy, and aimed at “constructing a social fabric in which 
precisely the basic units would have the form of the enterprise.”2 Some Egyp-
tian personal development programs borrowed concepts of enterprise from 
the Islamic trend of ethical self- improvement, pioneered by “new preachers” 
(al- du’a al- judud) such as Amr Khaled and Mostafa Hosni.3 Others used a 
corporate vocabulary of skill building to describe flexible roles for globalized 
workplaces.4 Teachers who came to personal development from the inde-
pendent theater movement thus adapted their concepts in an ideologically 
diverse landscape of neoliberal performance. Long- standing divides between 
religious and secular culture, and between public and private institutions, 
were attenuated in new programs that focused on personal ethics. A utopian 
language of culture represented the new Egyptian citizen without aesthetic 
markers of class or ideology, in magazine and website texts as well as prac-
tices. Acting teachers adapted their skills of embodiment and role- play to suit 
the new framing of performance as the ability to carry out a job. They taught 
workshop participants techniques of physical discipline and flexibility, while 
encouraging them to have faith that their efforts would be rewarded.
It was a time when many such grassroots projects emerged alongside mass 
campaigns for ethical culture in Egypt. Religious self- help programs at mosques 
were particularly popular among women who sought to build their ethical 
capacities through rigorous debate and embodied ritual.5 Cairo was also one 
of the venues of the pan- Arab Culture of Optimism program for disillusioned 
youth, launched by the Saudi Arab Thought Foundation.6 The volunteer pro-
gram Resala, established in 1999, was a prominent Islamic example of social 
work initiatives that gained prominence as state structures failed.7 Art- based 
self- help programs, like the acting workshops I present here, formed a tiny part 
of this thriving ethical culture landscape. They were unique, however, because 
they tested the concept of personal development in embodied, material terms. 
Participants who underwent skills training at acting workshops often failed 
to find work afterward. A discourse of rehearsal borrowed from the world 
of theater nevertheless sustained the idea that they would find the right roles 
when they were ready. Their patient and hopeful striving united them with 
many other Egyptians working to rebuild middle- class dreams for the future 
in dystopian times. As workshop participants exercised control over their lives 
and futures through perpetual training, they found their bodies to be par-
ticular media of cultural knowledge. They were shaped by class and gender 
training, even if flexible enough to acquire superficial bodily skills for a new 
habitus. The limited possibilities of actors’ training designed to engrain such 
skills tested the faith of neoliberal citizens in the late Mubarak era.
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Social Flexibility at an Improvisation Workshop
The grand buildings of Emadeddin Street recalled its history as the Broadway 
of Cairo’s prewar era, and a cultural manager decided it was the right venue 
for his studio for teaching theater techniques. Studio Emadeddin, launched in 
2005, was the culmination of Ahmed el- Attar’s longtime ambition of improv-
ing production values in independent theater. While he directed the Ma’bad 
troupe, El- Attar had organized workshops in lighting and scene design. 
He used the new studio to disseminate the benefits of his arts management 
training further, while retaining the format of skill building in short- term 
workshops. El- Attar’s use of his grant- writing skills to build opportunities 
for younger dramatists made him a respected figure in independent theater 
circles, despite the fact that he now made plays only for European festivals. 
In his late thirties, he was no longer a politicized member of the movement 
but rather an elder statesman. He left the management of the studio to his 
partner Nevine el- Ibiary. It was a spacious, wood- floored apartment with 
four large, soundproofed rooms that were rented out for rehearsals or used 
for free acting workshops arranged by the studio itself. Two computers in 
the small lounge area were available for browsing or research, and a simple 
office at the end of the hall accommodated desks for El- Ibiary and El- Attar. 
Two years after its launch, it was packed with young people looking to learn 
new skills during university summer vacation or in evening classes after their 
office jobs. Many were not theater makers at all.
“Lots of people who come here are addicts of workshops— they’ll apply 
to anything,” El- Ibiary remarked drily, pointing to piles of applications on 
her desk when I visited in the summer of 2007. “But we offer specialized 
workshops, with a simple selection process to ensure participants can meet 
the basic criteria.” The studio distinguished itself from the new crop of self- 
help workshops by emphasizing its reputation for teaching technical skills. 
Professional dramatists living in Cairo contributed workshops in acting tech-
niques like playback theater and improvisation, and El- Ibiary was currently 
scouting out European and Arab specialists in the region to teach more. This 
summer, the studio was offering a two- week workshop in improvisation 
taught by Ramsi Lehner, who had worked with Ma’bad since the 2004 show 
Mother I Want to Be a Millionaire. The lanky American University in Cairo 
graduate, about thirty years old, took improvisation courses as a student 
in Boston. He now worked as an acting teacher in a private high school in 
Cairo, where improvisation was among the techniques he taught as a means 
of building confidence and social skills in students. Lehner saw improvisa-
tion technique in particular as “a stepping stone toward conflict resolution, 
onstage and off.”8 His workshop at Studio Emadeddin was oriented toward 
both specialized actors and those attending for personal development, since 
he believed the technique could enrich social and performance repertoires 
alike.
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Twenty- six participants came to the improvisation workshop, including 
students from several universities and young professionals who had worked 
as amateur actors. Lehner gathered them in a circle to explain that improv 
was not like the acting techniques they may have studied before. “I’m not 
interested in your acting abilities,” was the provocative statement with which 
he began the first class. “What I’m interested in is getting your thoughts 
organized.” Lehner set out the program of warm- up, focus, and coordination 
exercises through which he aimed to break boundaries and facilitate ensem-
ble work. Getting organized meant working with others and reconfiguring 
one’s own embodiment. He explained to me later that he was also coun-
tering what he saw as problematic aspects of theater training in Cairo: the 
inculcated rigidity of social performance that limited actors’ potential, and 
the tendency of individual actors to show off, rather than work as a group. 
Improvisation techniques cultivated more fluid bodily boundaries as well as 
a sense of collective action. The workshop participants played along enthusi-
astically, enjoying the exercises, which allowed them to experiment without 
a script.
One technique that Lehner used to push against bodily boundaries was 
a “status game,” where actors worked to play with class- and gender- based 
embodiments. He demonstrated by getting down on all fours to mime scrub-
bing the floor, froze in his posture, and made way for a second actor, who 
reinterpreted the movement as a swimming lesson. The third actor in the chain 
developed the gesture into the walk of an animal. These imaginative interpre-
tations of the moving body opened up ways of thinking about embodiment 
beyond high and low social status. Staging social relations as improvisation, 
the actors explored multiple possibilities in their connections with others. At 
first, some of them voiced skepticism about how a character could emerge 
without knowing “where its story was heading.” But eventually they came to 
enjoy using improvised bodily configurations to allow unexpected narratives 
to emerge. When Lehner asked them to turn their free- association exercises 
into scenes, they came up with the characters of a seller of grilled corn, a 
spy, a Mamluk king, and a television presenter. Their playful movements 
generated more imaginative embodiments of character than usual for status- 
conscious young Cairenes. Most crucially from the instructor’s perspective, 
they grew adept at coordinating their movements and making transitions 
within a scene. “We have begun to think as one mind,” Lehner congratulated 
the actors after a particularly smooth exercise.
The participants’ adept improvisation of roles and postures encouraged 
Lehner to plan a showcase performance at the end of the two- week work-
shop. He asked the actors to demonstrate exercises they had learned for an 
audience of family and friends, with impressively polished results. The first 
group staged a “sitting– standing– lying down” exercise in which each of three 
actors had to assume one of the postures. They used the exercise to improvise 
a story of an unsympathetic son who told his blind father to go to work as 
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a beggar. The exercises in unusual bodily postures generated several socially 
marginal characters, such as members of a criminal gang and disabled peo-
ple, giving the middle- class actors a wide range of roles to embody. Focusing 
on the space between actors as a physical rather than a social space allowed 
them to calibrate interpersonal relations in more playful ways than usual. As 
Lehner instructed the actors before they went on to perform, they could go 
into a scene with an empty mind and take their cues from the situation. Their 
free associations drew on narratives from Egyptian media across a popular 
spectrum, as well as urban repertoires of youth culture.
One jarring moment in the otherwise triumphant evening happened in 
the skit of cops and robbers, a movie trope that somehow developed into an 
interrogation scene. A male actor interpreted his role as that of an Egyptian 
being interrogated by a police detective. “I’m here because I said no. Even 
animals can say no! Why have they sold us out and destroyed us?” he asked 
angrily. The others hastened to defuse the tension by framing the outburst 
as a scene of television melodrama: they called “Cut!” to bring it to a close. 
Later, Lehner said the other actors thought the political statement did not fit 
the logic of their scene. Since they were learning to embody social roles, they 
tended to act in conformity. After all, the aim was to produce a smooth flow 
of communication, not dramatic tension. It was a revealing moment that 
showed how self- modulation in improvisation produced social conformity. 
As the actors improvised, they governed themselves within the social norms 
embodied and enforced by their peer groups.
Lehner’s workshop was a “democratic” space, several participants said, in 
which they felt free to fashion scenes cooperatively without instruction from 
above. It also leveled differences between lead and secondary roles. “The 
workshop taught me that it isn’t necessary for me to be a star,” mused ama-
teur actor Bara. “I can step down sometimes to let my colleague shine, and 
both of us can improve the scene.” This flexibility of status came at the cost 
of addressing real frictions and social inequality, but the participants I spoke 
to did not see this as a problem. Swalim, who worked as a secretary, said she 
could imagine using improvisation techniques to smooth her dealings with 
corporate clients. And economics student Walid told me the workshop taught 
him a lot about self- presentation. The actors developed a keener awareness of 
their bodily habits, and how those facilitated communication. They believed 
a new repertoire of improvisation skills would help them move more easily 
through the workplace. Whether it would help their upward mobility in the 
new economy was a speculative question that most were unable to answer.
When I put this question to actor Islam, he said that he saw the benefit of 
the workshop as teaching adaptability rather than boosting cultural capital. 
He was a full- time student at the prestigious Theater Institute of the Academy 
of Arts but said he found more room for his own ideas at the studio workshop. 
“The improviser has more flexibility [luyuna] than any other actor,” Islam 
argued. He also appreciated the wider range of skills taught at Emadeddin. 
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“The studio works with foreign expertise, which has more flexibility than the 
Academy.” Islam’s personification of acting workshops as flexible, mirroring 
the improvisational actor’s agility, produced an appealing metaphor of neo-
liberal skill building. The adaptability of the trained improviser did indeed 
appeal to office workers who wanted to improve their interactional skills. 
Each participant I spoke to echoed the discourse of corporate “soft skills” 
programs where “social acts are recast in a transactional or entrepreneurial 
frame and actors’ segmented selves are recast as assemblages of produc-
tive elements.”9 Islam could recast his old- fashioned academy training as an 
updated assemblage of globalized skills and canonical knowledge. Whether 
workshop participants had come to learn acting techniques or social skills, 
however, the cultural trend of personal development framed their learning as 
self- help. It was an entrepreneurial style of education that promised to pre-
pare them for new workplaces as elite schools did for a fortunate few. Across 
the spheres of theater production and personal development, “foreign exper-
tise” was a valuable form of capital.
Studio Emadeddin was a key example of how independent dramatists adapted 
to the shrinking space of cultural production in the last years of the Mubarak 
regime, when the closure of state theaters left fewer potential patrons for their 
work. Now their appeals for funding were directed at corporate institutions 
or internationally connected nongovernmental organizations. The studio had 
grants from the Dutch embassy and American Ford Foundation,10 and its 
programming adhered conscientiously to its stated mission of capacity build-
ing and transnational exchange. It interpreted these terms to build actors’ 
capacities through performance skills valued at European theater festivals, as 
well as new Egyptian corporate workplaces. The ad hoc program of work-
shops, based on foreign talent available locally, ended up generating an 
actors’ repertoire that expanded definitions of performance technique well 
beyond stylized embodiment and character building. Participants in the stu-
dio’s workshops were open to learning many skills taught under the umbrella 
of acting. Many were taking lessons at other venues as well, and these “work-
shop addicts” incorporated acting techniques into their broader self- help 
repertoires. In the process, they showed that acting skills like improvisation 
could help corporate workers, and would- be television presenters, as well as 
dramatic actors.
While it lacked the defined program of a theater troupe, Studio Emadeddin 
also supported existing youth theater practice with rehearsal space that could 
be rented at low rates. It enabled self- management for troupes and modeled 
for young actors an entrepreneurial style of skill building. As they absorbed 
a range of techniques, their “theater culture” (al- thaqafa al- masrahiya) was 
enhanced with flexible skills of value in both the cultural and the corpo-
rate economy. A particular attraction of Studio Emadeddin workshops was 
that their instructors had studied abroad or at foreign universities in Cairo. 
Thus, the abstract language of capacity building used on the studio’s website 
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had the implicit referent of westernized, upper- class cultural knowledge. Yet 
the participants with whom I spoke had few illusions that such workshops 
qualified them for elite corporate jobs. They were simply acquiring modes of 
polished embodiment that were slightly different from those they were used 
to. Several participants in the improv workshop thus spoke of learning skills 
(maharat) rather than acquiring cultural knowledge (al- thaqafa). Neverthe-
less, the idea that these skills would add up to cultural capital informed their 
youthful enthusiasm for workshops. Their combination of faith in education 
and cynicism about upward social mobility was in keeping with the ethic of 
a generation that, though trained in neoliberal modes of self- help, saw little 
evidence that these changed educational or social hierarchies in Cairo. At a 
time when public institutions offered little hope, however, workshops were a 
means of keeping aspirations for a better future alive.
Improvising the role of entrepreneurs was also the compromise that inde-
pendent dramatists made when they began teaching in personal development 
programs. They applied their skills wherever these were welcome, often with 
little sense of launching a career in self- help training. Lehner worked as a 
DJ in a nightclub, an occasional film actor, and an acting teacher in schools, 
as well as teaching at Studio Emadeddin. He parlayed his English- language 
education and upper- class background into performance skills with currency 
across cultural venues. Sameh’s workshops creatively deployed acting skills 
honed through years of working in independent theater, as well as his later 
study of drama therapy with psychiatrist Muhammad al- Rakhawy. His gift 
for teaching brought him frequent, though unstable, jobs at private cultural 
centers around Cairo. Both men improvised to build careers as opportunities 
for theater work dwindled, and as they moved into their thirties, when they 
were expected to have a stable income. Adult masculinity was now defined in 
functional terms as the ability to perform as a responsible earner and provider. 
And for actors who no longer counted as “youth of the theater,” this meant 
recasting their performance skills as professional skills. They emphasized that 
theater taught means of personal growth, echoing an older Egyptian notion 
of theater as a school of modern identity.
As hegemonic concepts of performance and entrepreneurship shifted during 
the personal development trend, institutions like Studio Emadeddin modeled 
the application of neoliberal economic principles to the world of cultural pro-
duction. They transferred skills from upper- class instructors to middle- class 
workshop participants through performance repertoires that emphasized 
flexibility and improvisation. Middle- class youth thus built on their exist-
ing cultural capital in an open- ended process of self- improvement. Acting 
workshops marked a subtle but striking shift within the theater world, from 
thinking of culture as a collective enterprise to framing it as a personalized 
mode of ethical training. Continuing education to improve one’s prospects 
after college was an increasingly widespread phenomenon, and the language 
of personal development framed it as a social project of collective uplift, even 
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as the individual bore responsibility for his or her own progress. Cultural 
institutions of the new era mediated this contradiction through a language 
of social ethics.
Bridging the Religious and the Secular in Self- Help Culture
Under an overpass in Cairo’s Zamalek district, a new cultural center launched 
in 2004 made space for a hybrid concept of ethical culture. Sakiat Abdel 
Moneim al- Sawi was named after an Egyptian minister of culture in the 1970s. 
His son Muhammad al- Sawi, who owned an advertising agency, founded the 
center as a symbolic gesture of completing his late father’s unfinished trilogy 
of novels. The Sakia was a rare example of corporate sponsorship of the arts, 
which built on the ideals of state cultural institutions. Businessman Al- Sawi 
used his personal connections to gain funding from Juhayna and Mobinil, 
two of Egypt’s largest corporations. And he deployed his own advertising 
skills to publicize the Sakia through banners, billboards, and a glossy maga-
zine. Al- Sawi’s turn from business to the arts emerged from a cultural trend 
my theater friends termed islahi (reformist), referring to the modernist Islam 
newly fashionable in Egypt’s upper classes.11 As new preachers attempted to 
bridge cultural divides in urban Egypt by showing that elite lifestyles were 
compatible with religious devotion, reformists like Al- Sawi worked to show 
that the westernized upper classes remained committed to the nation’s pro-
gress. Al- Sawi was educated at a German school, wore a short beard, and 
lived in Zamalek. His ethical ideas about culture marked him as a reform-
ist despite a lifestyle that was not visibly religious. The family- friendly Sakia 
cultural center had a prominent No Smoking sign, a bold gesture in a city 
where cigarettes were widely associated with artists and intellectuals. And it 
featured a mix of performance arts and educational programming.
In the summer of 2008, the Nile- side campus was lively with visitors from 
across the middle- class spectrum. Young families exiting an early- evening 
puppet show found the café tables in the garden taken up by young peo-
ple studying for a class, as well as others drinking tea and practicing songs 
on guitars. Another hint that this was not a conventional arts venue came 
when I found neatly printed programs for the entire month at the ticket win-
dow. The well- organized cultural center sent ripples of commentary through 
Cairo’s theater world. “The Sakia is simply a business enterprise with no 
ideology,” scoffed my director friend Ahmed. “It might feature a rock band 
which says there is no God on one day, and a religious lecture on the other.” 
Indeed, while I waited in a hall for a lecture on the benefits of fasting during 
Ramadan, I saw band members enter from the next hall, singing, and pause 
with embarrassment at the very different audience here. “The center has a 
religion filter but not an artistic filter,” a playwright friend complained, tell-
ing me how a friend of ours had her play on women’s sexuality canceled by 
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Al- Sawi himself. Meanwhile, concert tickets brought high revenues for the 
Sakia, and so musicians were allowed more lenient censorship on its stage. 
The center’s guiding rule seemed to be that all audiences were welcome, but 
no performers could offend and potentially drive people away. This was cul-
tural production with a consumer- friendly face.
Despite the warnings, I found the Sakia refreshingly open and welcom-
ing to visitors. It had an informative, bilingual website, which described the 
center as “an ethical Egyptian environment that motivates people to develop 
and strengthen their culture through arts, enlightenment, and creativity.”12 
The administrative offices were open- plan, and young people shuttled 
through with none of the hierarchical formality I had observed at govern-
ment institutions. The Sakia had only three full- time managers, and it hired 
young college graduates to edit the magazine and staff the research center. 
When I put my head around a door to ask about scheduling an appointment 
with the theater programmer, a smiling young man made a quick call. I was 
pleasantly shocked when he told me that the programmer, Ahmed Ramzi, 
could meet with me in fifteen minutes.
Street entrance of Sakia cultural center. Photograph  
by Sonali Pahwa.
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Ramzi sat down with me at a hallway table to explain his role in curating 
the theater program. “We can’t rule on the artistic value of a theater troupe— 
your standard may be high, low, or medium,” he said. “The artistic work is 
seen and justifies itself on stage.”13 The Sakia simply asked troupes to pay a 
minimum of 500 Egyptian pounds for rent and granted them the remainder 
of their ticket proceeds. What my dramatist friends decried as a commercial 
policy was likewise an open selection process that did not require access to 
state officials or influential critics. Amateur troupes took advantage of it and 
rented the stage for short runs of inventive productions, of uneven quality, for 
small audiences dominated by friends and family. Theater critics were rarely 
seen at Sakia plays, except during the center’s annual summer theater festival. 
Its amateur reputation and family- friendly policies made many avant- gardists 
skeptical. After all, Ramzi said he had to “make sure there are no insults of 
people, transgressions of decency in clothing, or anything that might blemish 
the Sakia’s reputation.” Amateur productions here were accordingly respect-
ful of aesthetic decorum, even if some plays were pointedly critical.
When I saw the center’s quarterly magazine Paper Sakia (Al- saqia al- 
waraqiya), it became clear to me that the Sakia had a different definition 
of culture from that of my avant- garde friends. The colorful, glossy “cul-
tural magazine” was filled with articles on civil society initiatives and Arab 
Riverside garden of Sakia cultural center. Photograph by Sonali Pahwa.
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historical figures, and it included just a handful of reviews of contemporary 
theater, art, and literature. “What is culture? Does it have to do only with 
the arts?” retorted Injy el- Batrawy, the young editor of the magazine, when I 
asked her about the focus on social issues. “There is a strong relationship to 
society. We present information and knowledge.”14 Considerable research had 
gone into writing informational articles that aimed to inspire contemporary 
Egyptian youth. The summer 2008 Paper Sakia featured an article on a 1933 
Anglo- Egyptian research mission in maritime sciences, an advice column by 
a psychologist, a story on a cyclists’ club in Cairo, and an article calling for 
the preservation of Alexandria’s architectural heritage. Al- Sawi wrote opening 
columns for each issue, and this one delivered a stinging critique of young Egyp-
tian men who harassed women on the street, stole, or cursed. His title played 
on the colloquial expression “A child is lost!” (‘ayl ta’ih), used at crowded 
fairs, to argue that “reason is lost” (‘aql ta’ih). He faulted Egyptian parents and 
authority figures for failing to guide young people. Images of cosmopolitan, 
socially engaged youth in the magazine, some in Islamic clothing, put a face on 
the kind of ethical youth culture his center was seeking to promote.
The Sakia translated the concept of clean entertainment from the Islamist 
cultural movement for “purposeful art” (al- fann al- hadif) into a studiously 
Art class at Sakia cultural center. Photograph  
by Sonali Pahwa.
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neutral program that sidestepped debates about the relationship between 
piety and ethical culture in contemporary Egypt.15 It aligned with a rising 
Islamist cultural wave that promoted moderate beliefs and democratized ide-
ology around the 2005 presidential election, where the Muslim Brotherhood 
ended up with strong gains. One summer evening in 2008, I stopped by the 
Sakia to find a group of excited young women awaiting a lecture by heart-
throb televangelist Mostafa Hosni. The center’s eclectic repertoire of youth 
culture visibly attracted a more conservative middle- class demographic than 
the usual secular- oriented Cairo arts venue, which was marked by clouds of 
cigarette smoke, bohemian outfits, and casual cross- gender interactions. In 
addition to fostering different styles of embodying modern personhood, it 
offered training workshops that echoed Islamic youth culture programs in 
claiming to build ethical discipline.
The Sakia’s monthly schedule of events that summer featured a weekly 
meeting of a vaguely titled “youth workshop” that kindled my curiosity 
about how educational programs aligned with theater and music at this 
venue. I found the workshop to be a large affair, for which the spacious River 
Hall was set up with about two hundred folding chairs. A steady trickle of 
young men and women came through the hall to occupy these, and they 
sat in gender- segregated sections by unspoken agreement. There was little 
of the flirting and chatting I associated with student gatherings. Instead, two 
young women seated next to me studied lists of English vocabulary as they 
waited for the lecturer to set up his slideshow presentation on stage. His first 
slide showed the website of Ma’an, the organization offering today’s free 
workshop, which it also held at Cairo University and the agricultural col-
lege. The lecturer, Gawad, wore a suit and tie, like a corporate executive, but 
spoke with the rapid- fire enthusiasm of a youth group leader. Smiling and 
personable, he offered his phone number to anyone who wished to speak 
further with him. He also introduced a representative from the Islamic edu-
cational nonprofit Resala who was seeking volunteers for that organization. 
But today’s workshop had nothing to do with religion: it was about taking 
standardized American tests like the GMAT and SAT. I was puzzled to find 
these woven into a personal development workshop, until the lecturer began 
his inspirational ethical discourse.
“You know that all companies make you take these tests when you apply 
for a job nowadays,” Gawad noted, explaining to college students that their 
summer vacation was a time to work on their professional skills. He pro-
ceeded to drill them on GMAT test questions for two hours. My neighbors 
bent their heads industriously over workbooks, heedless of the August heat, 
which was thickened by the crowd in the lecture hall. They were learning 
the discipline of a new youth culture of constant education. “There is no 
stupid or intelligent person,” Gawad said to motivate them. “There is only 
training and practice.” Every now and then, when test questions grew dif-
ficult and the frustration palpable, Gawad told anecdotes about graduates 
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of Ma’an workshops who had done so well on aptitude tests administered 
by multinational corporations that they got jobs above their qualifications. 
These stories were supported by testimonials on the Ma’an website. Under 
the declaration that it was possible to “remake yourself” (yatakawwan ‘alayk 
marattan ukhra), the website featured success stories of young graduates of 
the workshop who had changed career paths. A law student called Iman 
had taken classes in finance and was hired at an international oil company. 
Rihab worked as a volunteer with Ma’an, then organized a lecture series that 
encouraged others to assume social responsibility. An entrepreneurial spirit 
had enabled these exemplary young people to adapt to a new Egyptian econ-
omy through an educational detour that built up their work ethic.
Like the volunteer organization Resala, Ma’an cultivated a youth culture 
of socially responsible citizenship.16 Gawad argued that taking classes over 
the summer holidays was a social contribution, as he exhorted: “I should ask 
myself, how can I help my nation and my religion?” Concepts of culture and 
education intertwined at Sakia workshops, highlighting the double valence 
of the Arabic term al- thaqafa, which could refer to a level of education or 
knowledge of arts. What was strikingly new in its version of the culture con-
cept was the emphasis on self- guided learning. Gawad talked about education 
as a personal discipline and an ongoing process that would make young peo-
ple better members of their society. The material and ethical dimensions of 
self- improvement were linked somewhat abstractly in Ma’an’s discourse, 
however. The organization’s website featured quotes from the Qur’an and a 
page of ethical dialogues that would have been at home in evangelical liter-
ature. “I don’t seem to have a goal in life, or be able to define what I want,” 
stated the “questioner.” The “guide” responded, “Seek your goal diligently 
and persistently, like our master Abraham. Ma’an guides you one day a week. 
For the rest, you must go elsewhere to learn and gain experience . . . You are 
the only person who can define your own goals.” Middle- class youth partici-
pating in programs that bolstered their own career prospects were taught to 
see themselves as part of a corporate- style ethical economy in which produc-
tivity was a spiritual duty.17
Personal development workshops with a religious bent built on the Islamic 
prayer movement of a previous decade, with its discourse of self- guided scrip-
tural education and ritual practice.18 However, the newer workshops decentered 
the body in their practices of ethical discipline. Instead, concepts of motivation 
from translated self- help books found their way into the vocabulary of lectur-
ers, who asked only that their audiences listen for inspiration. The Paper Sakia 
similarly featured stories of Egyptian youth, past and present, as encouraging 
parables. The magazine never, in my reading, featured discussion of the class 
and educational privileges that underpinned the achievements of such inspir-
ing youth. Its carefully chosen narratives of success fashioned a more utopian 
vision of youth to counter the dispiriting news of unemployment in contem-
porary Egypt. However, these scripts of ethical youth culture were tested 
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when personal development workshops promised a path to upward economic 
mobility. Bringing specifically trained bodies into stories of self- improvement 
showed that they had different mobilities, in a society rife with gender and class 
prejudice.
At the opening night of Sakia’s theater festival in July 2009, audiences sat 
down to a play on a familiar theme: the difficulty of finding jobs as young col-
lege graduates. It opened with a stylized tug- of- war between “the youth” and a 
lone adult, “the functionary” (al- mas’ul). Comic sketches followed the solemn 
scene, all set in classrooms where teachers miseducated and harangued their 
students. The longest skit was about a bright young woman who graduated 
college with top grades and looked forward to being appointed a teaching 
assistant (mu’ida). However, the plum job went unfairly to a privileged child 
of professors. Lacking work experience or connections, the young woman 
contemplated a job as a shop clerk with measly pay. The rest of the student 
characters ended up as street vendors or beggars who pretended to be blind.
The struggle against an impenetrable job market received a more hope-
ful staging in a career training workshop at the Sakia that summer called 
Al- ‘amal ibada (Work Is Worship). Workshop organizer Reem was a corpo-
rate executive who wanted to share her experience with young jobseekers, 
whom she advised on self- presentation and workplace norms. She was a styl-
ish woman with a westernized appearance, and evidently a tough- minded 
mentor. Reem wrote on the blackboard, “Do the dreams of youth correspond 
with their skills, education, and abilities?” This was meant to be a rhetorical 
question: she was here to teach realistic dreaming, in contrast to motiva-
tional speakers who urged youth to aim high. In order to do so, she organized 
lectures by corporate professionals, as well as occasional public meetings 
between these professionals and young jobseekers. Today, she recounted one 
such meeting at which potential employers complained about young people’s 
lack of experience, and jobseekers felt sidelined because they did not have the 
right look for corporate workplaces. Women who wore Islamic headscarves 
had particular complaints about discrimination. Reem wanted to bridge the 
gap of expectations by bringing in a series of guest speakers as “models from 
society who made an effort and succeeded.”
Today’s guest, Lamia, was a striking counterpoint to the disillusioned pro-
tagonist of the play. Introduced as an English literature graduate, she wore 
a modest headscarf and professional but not fashionable clothing. She had 
always been interested in office work, and she sought out summer jobs, since 
a college degree did not teach all that was needed for a job. “No, I must 
still develop myself,” Lamia affirmed. One summer internship found her 
at Reem’s office, where her work ethic made such a good impression that 
Lamia secured a permanent job here. She did not disclose whether the job 
was administrative (as I guessed) or managerial. Lamia’s story resonated with 
Reem’s suggestion that youth should moderate their dreams to fit their skills, 
and, implicitly, their class backgrounds. Like devout Muslims for whom 
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self- realization and personal modesty went hand in hand, the office worker 
took pride in accomplishing modest goals. She modulated her expectations 
to the kind of job in which her educational and class background slotted her. 
Since jobs at multinational corporations called for expensive bilingual edu-
cation, a middle- class college graduate often had better chances of moving 
across professions than up the corporate ladder. Lamia’s shift from studying 
literature to working in an office demonstrated that flexibility was a valued 
means of mobility in this neoliberal economy.
It was telling that the workshop title, Work Is Worship, framed work as a 
virtue for its own sake. Personal development programs that borrowed such 
vocabulary from Islamic self- help found it to fit well with neoliberal concepts 
of self- management. Young people’s enterprise should not be too ambitious 
or speculative; it should fit within a structured social order. Middle- class 
young Egyptians who flocked to personal development workshops, volun-
teer organizations, and motivational lectures were joining networks that 
facilitated the smoother working of that social order. Here they acquired tex-
tual and embodied knowledge that helped them play the role of responsible 
middle- class citizens. Free workshops were more democratic means of dis-
tributing such knowledge than elite private schools, and yet they could only 
boost cultural capital to a limited extent. They cultivated a shared ethic of 
middle- class aspiration, and complemented neoliberal ideologies of personal 
enterprise with informal networks of sharing and solidarity.
Compared with other cultural spaces in Cairo, the Sakia was remarkably 
inclusive of class and educational backgrounds, religious and secular orien-
tations, and diverse cultural repertoires. Its eclectic program also made it a 
space where contradictions of middle- class youth culture in the late Mubarak 
era were visibly on display. A culture of idealistic self- help coexisted with 
structural obstacles to upward mobility, such as an inadequate number of 
middle- class jobs for youth. And avant- garde theater was censored to suit 
the supposedly conservative tastes of the center’s middle- class audience. Yet 
the Sakia remained a rare space for fostering a shared youth culture in such 
a divided urban society. Its location in upscale Zamalek, and accessible Nile- 
side gardens, allowed it to stage a utopian version of a new style of cultural 
institution. The free workshops and inexpensive magazine furthered that 
impression. It repurposed an unused piece of urban space to fashion a vision 
of new civil society where secularist and Islamist cultural repertoires coex-
isted. In the utopian absence of cultural hierarchies, youth were encouraged 
to imagine self- improvement as a means of national development. The lack of 
ideology for which my theater friends faulted the Sakia thus enabled a broad- 
based (if rather puritan) redefinition of culture outside norms inherited from 
the state cultural establishment.
Received definitions of culture encompassed an expanding repertoire at 
this historical moment in Egypt, and within the Sakia’s eclectic program in 
particular. In large part, this was a result of the shifting definition of the 
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cultural worker. In the economy of what Maurizio Lazzarato calls imma-
terial labor, the autonomous worker blurs boundaries between laborer and 
entrepreneur; his or her work gains value depending on the economic or social 
networks that tap it.19 Cairo’s personal development workshops tapped the 
labor of various cultural workers, from traditional artists to corporate and 
Islamist trainers, in their emerging redefinition of cultural education. They gen-
erated a cultural infrastructure that became particularly active in projects of 
social uplift after the 2011 revolution.20 It was broadly defined by a hopeful, 
even utopian, culture of spiritual development and self- fashioning. Meanwhile, 
the fact that these workshops remained identified as cultural and not educa-
tional institutions highlighted the inability of autonomous cultural workers 
to bridge material gaps of opportunity between Egyptian youth of different 
social classes. In particular, personal development workshops that did not 
account for economic and educational hierarchies were limited in their imag-
ination of art as a means of social change. To expand on this last point, I 
offer as my final example an acting workshop that staged cross- class cultural 
exchange explicitly as an ethical practice.
Embodying Ethical Class Relations in Volunteer Culture
Personal development workshops largely remained enclosed within the middle- 
class neighborhoods where private acting studios and cultural centers were 
located. These were spaces for self- care and skill building, for members of a 
social class embattled in times of rising inequality. As personal development 
culture grew, it intersected with the work of nongovernmental organizations 
that used the tools of microenterprise and microcredit to cast working- class 
Cairenes as “agents of their own empowerment.”21 In fact, self- help ideolo-
gies came to these working- class groups years before the current trend of 
personal development. A handful of cultural workers lent their labor to such 
projects across metropolitan and marginal venues. Among them was my 
friend Sameh, the independent theater actor turned acting coach, whose reli-
gious beliefs fostered a strong commitment to social work. In 2009, he was 
teaching classes for middle- class children at the private Markaz al- Ajyal 
(Generations Center) in Al- Doqqi and at a mosque in distant Tenth of Rama-
dan City. He also volunteered at the Shughlan school in Old Cairo’s Al- Darb 
Al- Ahmar neighborhood. Sameh and his wife, Hind Samir Mohamed, had 
both benefited from arts workshops and wanted to pass on such opportunities 
to less privileged, working children who attended the school. Their inclusive 
concept of culture, and experience at a range of venues, made them optimis-
tic about teaching outside a middle- class milieu.
Hind was a particularly energetic recruiter for the Shughlan school’s arts 
program in Al- Darb Al- Ahmar. She was a fine arts graduate who had worked as 
a saleswoman during college, and prided herself on getting along with people 
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across social backgrounds. As we walked through the neighborhood after the 
workshop, Hind greeted several shop owners who knew her from prior vol-
unteer work. She pointed out the mother- and- child association where she had 
served, and navigated muddy paths with ease despite being several months 
pregnant. It was a neighborhood of craftsmen’s and mechanics’ workshops, 
and Sameh mentioned that the arts program animators (munashshatin) 
found it difficult to persuade parents to send their children to the educational 
workshops. “Some of the parents of working children approve, but others 
only want their sons to bring home money,” he explained. Those who did 
come to the workshop on their days off from work did so “out of a love of 
discovery and knowledge.” Sameh regretted that working- class families did 
not see the benefit of giving their children better opportunities, but he had 
faith that the children themselves recognized the value of knowledge. In the 
Shughlan’s arts program, Sameh and his fellow volunteers worked to bridge 
the class gap between visions of children’s potential by showing participants 
the educational value of art.
The four- week Shughlan arts workshop during Ramadan in 2009 included 
acting, music, and drawing workshops taught by arts graduates and assisted 
by student volunteers. Hind taught some of the drawing lessons, and Sameh 
supervised Shadi, who led the acting workshop for adolescent boys. Approx-
imately ten to sixteen years old, the boys trooped into the Shughlan building 
with manly wisecracks and swearing. Two young women standing on the side-
lines were scandalized and reprimanded them gently. I learned that they were 
volunteers at the art therapy program but business students themselves. Shadi 
began the acting workshop by explaining that today’s class would rehearse 
and reflect on everyday physical practices. His first drill for the boys asked 
them to choose three distinct expressions to perform. They enacted angry, sad, 
and, to their instructor’s chagrin, intoxicated (mastul). He tried to evoke more 
appropriate emotions by offering a scenario in which a boy went out to buy 
food for his family and accidentally dropped the money on his way. Few such 
childlike scripts appealed to the working boys, who earned their own income. 
Sameh explained, however, that the exercises were designed to get them into 
an imaginative space he called “the magic box” (al- sanduq al- sihri). “The idea 
is to express themselves so they can learn how to change.”
Shadi focused on embodied habits, working to channel the boys’ swag-
gering movements in artful ways. He asked them to imagine, for instance, 
walking on burning sand. The scenes composed from these movements were 
more controlled than the boys’ everyday body language, which remained 
boisterous. Shadi regularly disciplined them for talking or laughing loudly. 
“Those who don’t know how to be men are not my problem!” he scolded. His 
middle- class standards of masculinity were clearly different from those that 
prevailed in the craftsmen’s milieu, where these boys’ economic contributions 
made them men. Yet Sameh thought they were learning the value of modulat-
ing their behaviors to middle- class norms. He listed their achievements a few 
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weeks in: “They now knock on doors, swear less, and let us know if they’re 
going to be absent.” The boys’ growing (and perhaps grudging) respect for 
their trainers showed that acting techniques had indeed brought flexibility to 
their embodied repertoires.
Transposing acting techniques from middle- class contexts into the acting 
workshop for working adolescent boys highlighted the ways in which these 
cultivated obedient physicality. Shadi used acting techniques to train well- 
mannered bodies that would be an asset for young men who went to work in 
a middle- class milieu. Learning to act appropriately in an educational setting 
appeared as flexibility in the Studio Emadeddin improvisation workshop but 
as an affirmation of social inequities at Shughlan. The class bias of identity 
performance at different personal development workshops was clearly visible 
here. They taught educated youth to adapt flexibly to people of different back-
grounds, but consistently assigned working- class youth to deferential roles. 
While Shadi scolded the boys and Sameh preferred to counsel them individ-
ually, both instructors agreed that training this set of workshop participants 
required more discipline than they were used to imposing. Drawing working- 
class youth into the acting workshop introduced them to an aesthetic order 
that reproduced a class- based vision of social hierarchy. It enacted the imma-
terial labor of transferring cultural capital through paradoxically belittling 
gestures and physical forms of discipline.
The motivated middle- class youth represented in personal development 
literature, such as the Paper Sakia magazine, required training of their own 
to enable them to instruct others in social work programs. Upstairs from the 
courtyard where Shadi taught the acting workshop, Sameh led a Training of 
Trainers workshop (Tadrib al- Mudarribin) attended by five student volun-
teers. They sat around a desk as soothing Turkish music played and Sameh 
urged them to work through their own problems so they could deal better 
with the children. He launched the session by telling inspirational fables and 
asking participants to contemplate ethical questions. I was surprised to hear 
no practical advice on teaching skills. Instead, Sameh urged the volunteers to 
develop self- knowledge before helping others, emphasizing that the two were 
related. “If you help people, you will feel your life has meaning,” he advised.
The self- help exercises here were framed in a language of spirituality. 
Sameh drew the outline of a body on the board and traced a spirit (al- ruh) 
within, saying, “You have spirit, and can give it to others in your work and 
dealings with them. Spirit is not just religion! It also means harmony with 
the self.” Participants listened to Sameh’s parables, closed their eyes to think 
positive thoughts, and absorbed his ideas about how they must better them-
selves if they wanted their society to change. He mobilized spiritual concepts 
to frame the labor of volunteers as ethical practice, aimed as much at giving 
them a sense of purpose as at helping less advantaged youth. While Sameh’s 
own strong sense of social justice drove his service at the school, alongside 
his paid work, the younger volunteers treated their attendance as a summer 
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internship. The language of personal development at this workshop gestured 
at an emerging ethical culture in which middle- class youth helped working- 
class peers while also engaging in self- help. Instead of furthering their own 
careers, the volunteers were told they were here to improve their society. The 
infrastructure for that improvement was still abstract, however, making for 
an educational experiment limited to teaching middle- class manners.
The workshops at Shughlan, a hybrid of personal development and volun-
teer culture, staged some paradoxes of cultural outreach in the late Mubarak 
era. Volunteers brought to their social work ethical concepts that clearly orig-
inated in middle- class artistic and religious discourses. Cairo college students, 
in particular, performed a certain moral and aesthetic authority as adults 
from an educated middle class. The personal development culture within 
which they played these roles was a space of utopian class relations. As their 
lessons at the Training of Trainers sessions reflected, the idealized citizen of 
this space was culturally invested in building a new society that centered his 
or her vision of the nation. Ethical culture remained a middle- class institution 
in this repertoire of citizenship, which gestured at a new society where all citi-
zens shared the same notion of ethics.
In Gilles Deleuze’s formulation of social control in contemporary soci-
eties, individual modulation of power replaces external discipline: “Just as 
the corporation replaces the factory, perpetual training tends to replace the 
school.”22 At the different personal development workshops, modulation 
took distinct forms for middle- class youth and others, showing that the figure 
of the ethical citizen was not as flexible as self- help discourse would suggest. 
Belief in the ability to modulate one’s performance through workshops was 
founded on middle- class norms of stylized embodiment, including those of 
gender performance. Working- class youth who were deemed resistant to the 
discipline of that norm received stern scoldings, while their instructors were 
asked simply to self- regulate and harmonize their personas with role models 
from parables. The bodies of social subalterns offered more resistant material 
for personal development techniques. Acting workshops made the cultural 
limits of this self- help movement particularly visible and tangible. Neverthe-
less, the new social bonds rehearsed in gestures of outreach traced a potential 
network of more ethical social relations across class divides. They showed 
that turning personal development into a force for social change required 
cross- class networks to channel the labor of volunteers into a transformative 
culture of ethical citizenship.
Ethics and Aesthetics of Citizenship in Neoliberal Cultural Institutions
In apartment studios and repurposed urban spaces, a new cultural infrastruc-
ture emerged in Cairo in the last years of the Mubarak era. I often heard 
avant- garde artists dismiss the new institutions as business enterprises, even 
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as their founders spoke in familiar terms of art as a means of social uplift. 
Theirs was a language that hybridized the terminology of the Muslim “new 
preachers,” who urged ethical social practice, with that of state cultural insti-
tutions that claimed the mission of cultivating modern identity through arts. 
Religious lectures thus coexisted with music concerts in new cultural insti-
tutions, while corporate trainers repurposed spiritual self- help discourse in 
personal development workshops. As cultural producers with different mis-
sions drew from the same repertoires, they bridged older divides between 
theater and social work and between religious and secular culture, whether 
or not they intended to do so. New cultural institutions thus gestured beyond 
the aesthetic practices of state institutions, with their focus on European- style 
modernism, to imagine what a more plural form of national culture might 
look like. The performance repertoires they produced were high- mindedly 
abstract and intentionally ethical.
In emerging genres of personal development, Cairo actors found new 
avenues for their skills in teaching arts of self- presentation and ensemble 
performance. The demands of self- modulation in the neoliberal economy 
were well served by theatrical techniques such as improvisation. Even self- 
help coaches without any acting training used a language of working on 
the self that echoed (or even cited) concepts of rehearsal and performance. 
However, the limits of imaginative embodiment as a means of professional 
mobility became clear when workplace scenarios were enacted as theater, 
such as in the Work Is Worship workshop. The globalized corporate econ-
omy was deeply exclusionary, and jobseekers ran up against class barriers 
regularly. University graduates who raised questions of exclusion on aes-
thetic grounds, such as that experienced by women wearing hijabs, found no 
satisfying answers at the personal development workshops I attended. They 
were instructed simply to work on improving themselves and to modulate 
their expectations, in an echo of narratives of self- control in the contem-
porary Islamic revival. The workshops that hybridized translated self- help 
literature and Muslim evangelists’ practices with secular culture concepts 
thus left unanswered the question of how to turn such inclusive culture into 
material opportunity.
Questions of class and gender performance raised in personal development 
workshops added useful nuances to theories of self- making in neoliberal eco-
nomic discourses. At a time when self- help manuals and books translated from 
English promised to teach “soft skills” by molding the self to fit a professional 
persona, acting workshops made clear the limits of such self- modulation in a 
polarized society. They also demonstrated experimental solutions to bridging 
cultural divides to some extent. Arts- based workshops that built aesthetic ver-
sions of more inclusive and ethical communities could be seen as anticipating 
a new society. Achieving this in practice would, of course, require significant 
structural reforms. A preliminary gesture in this respect was the rebuilding 
of cultural infrastructure by independent dramatists such as Ahmed el- Attar 
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and entrepreneurs like Muhammad al- Sawi. They took advantage of what 
many saw as an alarming absence of state support for culture in order to 
rethink cultural production as a more grassroots enterprise. The workshops 
and performances that their initiatives produced raised the question of how 
to reconceptualize national culture when state secularism and socialism were 
no longer hegemonic.
When Egypt’s Ministry of Culture was established in 1956, it funded theater 
that echoed aesthetics of secularist modern citizenship. As the decades 
went on, the ministry and General Organization of Cultural Palaces con-
tinued to reproduce cultural ideologies that were no longer supported by 
material benefits, such as jobs in the state sector. New arts workshops at 
various personal development programs in the late Mubarak era attempted 
to reconcile cultural and economic norms of citizenship once again, promot-
ing more remunerative repertoires of contemporary culture. Despite being 
rooted in enduring class divides, the collaborative new cultural workshops 
staged a hopeful path to economic opportunity and offered young middle- 
class Cairenes faith in the future. In its utopian form, personal development 
culture revived the idea of youth as a time of hope. As Cairo college gradu-
ates struggled to find jobs, they gravitated toward educational programs that 
fostered hope through what Lauren Berlant terms an “optimism of manners, 
composure, a formalism of being.”23 Often, encouraging such investments in 
the future was cruel, in Berlant’s term, as job opportunities remained scarce. 
Yet they generated cultural dynamism amid a widespread feeling of political 
and economic stasis in the middle classes.
Another way to see sites for personal development training is as networks 
of cultural activity that rehabilitated historical ideals of culture as a means 
of self- improvement and upward mobility. They gave youth the means and 
opportunity to rehearse the role of the responsible citizen. Acting as if they 
had a place in the new economy, middle- class dramatists and cultural activ-
ists demonstrated their capacities for leadership and organization. As private 
versions of the state- sponsored public relations campaigns that Mayssoun 
Sukarieh calls “hope crusades,” personal development programs built more 
citizen- centered narratives of national hope.24 Youth in these workshops 
resembled dramatists in independent theater in devising speculative narra-
tives of imagined citizenship. Several participants considered the workshops 
sites of ethical reflection and self- knowledge, no less than their peers who 
followed the lectures of new televangelists and undertook volunteer work 
for religious organizations. Their practices were performative, in the sense of 
generating potential social identities, and figured a social future in concretely 
embodied terms. It is in this sense that I analyze personal development work-
shops as performances of a new cultural citizenship, which spanned a wide 
Egyptian middle class in the late Mubarak era. Adding an ethical twist to 
neoliberal notions of enterprise, these workshops taught repertoires of social 




Social Theater and Arts Festivals after 2011
On January 25, 2011, the streets and squares of downtown Cairo became a 
giant stage for political theater. Television footage showed scenes of soccer 
ultras chanting antipolice fight songs and families with small children wav-
ing flags in the carnivalesque spirit of a long- awaited revolution. A stunning 
range of popular discontentment with the Mubarak regime became visible 
in the performances that appeared onscreen as a coordinated spectacle of 
dissent. The Tahrir Square occupation had clearly interrupted the optics of 
dictatorial power by “occupying the medium and creating the message.”1 For 
my leftist Egyptian friends who participated in the eighteen- day uprising, it 
was etched in memory less as a visual spectacle than as a utopian commu-
nity where they met people from different class and ideological backgrounds. 
Upper- class activists and trade union members, Islamists and secularists stood 
shoulder to shoulder for the first time in the memory of many citizens. Friends 
mourned this remembered revolutionary commons after Hosni Mubarak 
stepped down and Tahrir was cleared of protest tents. They cherished the 
occupied square as a “symbolic resistance text.”2 Meanwhile, citizens from 
the political center celebrated it as the site of a “civilized revolution” in which 
Egyptians were seen at their most ethical.3 When security forces scrubbed the 
graffiti and banned demonstrators from Tahrir, political radicals and law- 
abiding patriots alike wondered how to reembody the ethics of revolution 
outside that exceptional space and time.
As I watched the events on Al- Jazeera television with Egyptian friends 
in Doha, Qatar, we hardly recognized fractious Cairo in this spectacle of 
unity. Our social media were similarly alight with hope. “That’s what you 
call a revolution, sons of bitches!” a usually cynical friend enthused on Face-
book on January 28, when protesters pushed the police off the streets. After 
eighteen days of protest forced President Mubarak to step down, however, 
Egyptians hotly debated the question of what constituted a revolution. “The 
people want the downfall of the regime” had been a unifying slogan of the 
January and February 2011 protests. While ideological divisions between 
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the people hardened, artists and intellectuals contemplated how to distill 
memories of the revolution into embodied scenarios that could revive its 
utopian solidarity.
How indeed had a divided citizenry found public cultural repertoires with 
which to stage a collective revolution? After decades of dictatorship and 
police monitoring their movements, Egyptians now felt freer to act in ways 
ungoverned by state dramaturgy. Egyptian academics Sahar Keraitim and 
Samia Mehrez argue that the very act of protesting gave citizens a newfound 
sense of ownership over public space, pointing out that popular performance 
genres such as the zaffa (musical procession) from saints’ fairs were repur-
posed in Tahrir Square as repertoires of revolutionary community.4 After 
the carnival of revolution, when police cleared protesters mercilessly from 
squares, these politicized popular repertoires endured mainly in memory. 
An online media archive preserved that collective memory in the months of 
military crackdown that followed the events of early 2011. Iconic scenes of 
protest were memorialized in YouTube videos, such as that of marchers halt-
ing on Qasr al- Nil Bridge to pray in rows under the spray from police water 
cannons, or that of the bold young man who stood in front of a military tank 
rolling through a Cairo street. Meanwhile, both state and private television 
networks packaged the images from the anti- Mubarak protests into patriotic 
scenes, framed with flag symbols and nationalist music.
When I visited Cairo in May 2011, friends in the independent theater 
world insisted that the revolution was not over. There was still political and 
cultural work to be done to sustain calls for social change in a city where 
less radical residents were eager to get back to work and restart “the wheel 
of production.” As the new military rulers declared the revolution a mission 
accomplished, dramatists joined activists in efforts to resurrect the cultural 
repertoires of its utopian community. This chapter analyzes a new avant- garde 
genre of 2012– 14, the popular public performance, as one such cultural rep-
ertoire of revolutionary life. Staged in urban streets or squares, these shows 
activated everyday forms of community to evoke the solidarity of the Tahrir 
protests. In counterrevolutionary times, activists were only legally permitted 
to stage small, apolitical gatherings in public. Street performers managed to 
fashion scenes of heterogeneous and hospitable community within these limits. 
I describe two examples: a 2012 public arts festival and a 2014 clown show 
for Syrian refugees. Each evoked “the people” (al- sha’b) of utopian revolution-
ary memory through the use of folksy rituals and performance styles, as well 
as street- side locations. The self- styled revolutionary festival Al- Fann Midan 
(Art Is an Open Square) evoked the remembered space of Tahrir with its mix 
of people and arts. Meanwhile, the clown show 1, 2 .  .  . 5! staged a more 
open- ended utopian community, moving from an event for Syrian refugees to 
a performance in an Alexandria neighborhood. By reembodying festive forms 
of community in public, they pushed against the official closure of the revo-
lutionary narrative.
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After the end of regular protests, the emerging genre of popular urban 
performance interrupted the flow of quotidian life with glimpses of utopian 
time. Instead of re- creating scenes of revolution, these performances simply 
aimed to attract audiences across social and cultural divides. The avant- 
gardists who had developed performance gestures to challenge conventions 
of communication onstage now interjected unexpected gestures of utopian 
community in city streets that had returned to conventional sociality. And as 
counterrevolutionary regimes cracked down on protests, these transposable 
performances had the advantage of evading security. They recast theatri-
cal repertoires as popular street actions, fashioning a style of revolutionary 
populism that offered an alternative to media nationalism. I analyze utopian 
stagings of “the people” in these shows through José Esteban Muñoz’s version 
of the distinction between abstract and concrete utopias, the former complete 
and ahistorical, the latter indeterminate and potential.5 Art Is an Open Square 
ritually transposed the utopia of Tahrir into a festive time and space, while 
the clown show that traveled across venues left its scenarios of revolutionary 
community more open.6 I hope to show that gestures of mutual recognition 
between participants in such gatherings revealed as much about revolutionary 
community as did the occasional mass protests after the 2011 uprising.7 By 
staging inclusion through gestures of hospitality, these modest performances 
kept the utopian category of “the people” open and allowed it to evolve.
In the aftermath of the uprising, my dramatist friends were unusually opti-
mistic about the future of the independent theater they had sustained through 
oppressive and corrupt state bureaucracies. Now they saw an opportunity 
to turn their vision for democratic cultural production into official practice. 
They formed the Independent Culture Coalition in alliance with cultural 
managers and held several planning meetings, one of which I attended in 
May 2011. Dancers, musicians, and dramatists gathered in eclectic discus-
sion groups, and staunchly Marxist nationalists chatted with their political 
opposites, artists funded by the U.S.- based Ford Foundation. “We are mov-
ing toward a democratic civil society,” argued eminent artist Mohamed Abla 
before the assembly of the coalition. “How can we respond culturally to the 
spirit of the revolution?” The solution, organizers agreed after lengthy discus-
sion, was to use popular arts to replicate the alliance that had been formed 
between cultural elites and other citizens during the Tahrir occupation. New 
concepts of “the people” voiced in these discussions appeared more advanced 
than in official political debates at the time, which were deadlocked between 
Islamist and secularist ideologues.
Independent artists sought to uncover the revolutionary social potential 
that endured outside the strictly policed sites of the political uprising. They 
planned to activate this potential through performance in popular venues, 
which could stand for their vision of utopian community. Their vision of uto-
pia in the present resonated with Stefano Harney and Fred Moten’s concept 
of the “utopic commonunderground [sic] of dystopia,” an imaginative space 
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created by fugitive intellectuals escaping official cultural ideology.8 Independ-
ent Egyptian artists were fugitives from the counterrevolutionary regime in 
the sense of evading police crackdowns, as well as in their idealistic quest to 
sustain revolutionary communities. Making their idealistic vision concrete 
in occasional performances, they created spaces in which utopian ideas per-
meated everyday repertoires of practice. I analyze the stylized movements 
and gestures by which these performances staged social interaction. Unlike 
dramatic scenarios, which required a specialized theater space, these every-
day enactments staged community in ways that adapted to spatial context, 
turning the necessity of fugitive performance into a virtue. The two case stud-
ies that I compare used public performance to stage community in different 
ways, with the enclosed square and open street as their respective sites. Their 
strategies for interrupting normal social relations built on popular perfor-
mance repertoires and fashioned them into utopian scenarios.
As independent theater reached out to wider and more popular audiences, 
its performances appeared in streets and squares as tentative gestures to cau-
tious onlookers. These transplanted critical theater from authorized venues 
to new contexts, inviting a focus on their reception, or what James M. Hard-
ing and John Rouse term “the performative gesture” of avant- gardism rather 
than its formal style.9 Such gestures also tested the extent to which social sol-
idarity endured after the revolution, despite its political disappointments. It 
was new territory for independent dramatists accustomed to protecting their 
performances from publics they deemed culturally conservative. Generating 
performance space from urban public space entailed a more flexible nego-
tiation of boundaries between actors and spectators. The dramatists made 
particularly adept use of bodily gesture to create these charged spaces out of 
brief interactions in public. The theoretical and physical notions of gesture 
complemented each other aptly as independent dramatists moved to new 
terrain.
Anthropologists Julia Elyachar and Michael Herzfeld each describe 
how public gestures elicit reciprocal responses without a necessary verbal 
exchange, opening secondary channels of either normative or intimate com-
munication.10 The Egyptian performers in my case studies made extensive 
use of such gestures to engage with audiences in public and elicit reciprocal 
acts for signaling alliance.11 Their street shows used a broad repertoire of 
gestures to rehearse alternative modes of communication in public, taking 
utopian ideas about community into concrete scenarios of stranger sociality 
at a fair or on the street. Since these everyday performances had open- ended 
scenarios and depended on audience engagement, their stagings of utopian 
community were liable to fail. They also changed in dialogue with different 
audiences. Thus, they offer instructive examples of the ways in which uto-
pian communities could be instantiated in postuprising Egyptian contexts. 
In a pragmatic version of Harney and Moten’s romance of fugitivity, then, 
I examine the performative workings of secondary communication through 
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gestures reciprocated and refused. Where was the utopian community wel-
comed into the urban fabric, and where could it not travel?
In the performances I analyze, conventional social scenarios of insider- 
outsider relations significantly shaped the audience’s reception of the performers’ 
utopian gestures of community. Theatrical performers might be figured in a 
pedagogical scenario as high- status teachers but in a street show as wan-
dering outsiders of unknown value. The scenarios into which their gestures 
were folded brought audiences to recognize them in accordance with their 
conventions of response. Such recognition was, in Juana Maria Rodriguez’s 
terms, “an intimate, social, and political gesture, a practice of engagement, 
never complete, always in the moment.”12 Reading gesture in this double 
sense illuminates the cultural politics enacted in concrete exchanges that 
might otherwise appear as mere street entertainment. Public performances 
that disrupted neighborhood life, inviting audiences to recognize outsiders 
and situate them with respect to the community, enacted new understandings 
of “the people.” The gestures of recognition or refusal that the independent 
dramatists encountered showed the extent to which their utopian scenar-
ios resonated with their audience. If no physical response was forthcoming, 
the performance utopia remained a relatively abstract spectacle. The most 
successful performances aligned with repertoires of everyday hospitality, elic-
iting quotidian gestures that fit into their scenarios. They showed that street 
theater was a means of blurring boundaries between the theatrical and the 
everyday and staging revolutionary scenarios outside the limited sphere of 
politics.13
Reviving Scenarios of the Revolutionary Square
Cairo’s Tahrir Square, like Martyrs’ Square in Port Said and the Corniche in 
Alexandria, was an iconic site for revolutionaries who cherished the mem-
ory of gathering with fellow citizens there. There were several attempts to 
resurrect scenes from Tahrir in documentary dramas throughout 2011.14 
Independent director Dalia Basiouny wrote that her performance Stories from 
Tahrir aimed at conveying a feeling of the square to those who did not join 
protests, and reviving the memories of those who did.15 Sondos Shabayek, 
of the feminist storytelling project Bussy, based her hugely successful Tahrir 
Monologues on first- person accounts from participants in the February occu-
pation of Tahrir. These performances served as a “reservoir against cynicism,” 
writes Margaret Litvin, for members of the intellectual community who 
attended in a celebratory spirit.16 However, she notes that re- creating Tahrir 
scenarios onstage was not necessarily a means of taking revolutionary senti-
ment forward; documentary dramas praising the revolution tended to bury it 
by consigning political anger to the past. Where participating in the revolu-
tion during its active stage had entailed “embodied act(s) of doing something 
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that could make a difference,” in Samuli Schielke’s words, commemorative 
performances tended to cast viewers as passive spectators.17 There was little 
hope of re- creating those scenarios in public spaces, which were now heavily 
policed and guarded against protest. My revolutionary friends thus spoke 
dismissively of the trend for celebratory Tahrir dramas, although state theaters 
welcomed them.
One documentary drama did win acclaim in the independent theater world. 
Laila Soliman’s No Time for Art bucked the celebratory trend by inviting rec-
ognition of police brutality after Mubarak’s resignation. The performance, 
which I saw in June 2011, recounted the violence inflicted on revolutionaries 
who tried to hold down the square and use it as a stage for political action 
after the eighteen days of sanctioned uprising. Audiences entering the small 
Rawabet Theater in downtown Cairo were handed yellow stickers for the 
campaign against military trials for civilians, which could also be seen on 
lampposts across downtown. The show opened with the Egyptian national 
anthem. Three actors sat before a video screen on which scenes of television 
footage from the revolution played, and they narrated stories of violence 
after the euphoria. Among the testimonies acted onstage was that of Red 
Tomato actor Aly Sobhy, whom I saw sitting quietly in the back. He had 
been tortured, his hair shaved off, and his front tooth knocked out by mili-
tary police clearing Tahrir Square in March. The actor who voiced Sobhy’s 
bitterly humorous account of the experience created a revolutionary voice 
in counterpoint to the nostalgic recitation of testimonies in Tahrir dramas. 
Nesreen Hussein describes No Time for Art as a dialogic performance, which 
audiences were invited to complete, gesturing at a community that might 
emerge in performance rather than one memorialized by it.18 The use of the 
present tense in the play re- created the intimacy, intensity, and uncertainty of 
revolutionary practice. Its dark tone aligned with director Soliman’s anger at 
the military council’s brutal violence. In her scenario, revolutionary feelings 
could not be limited to joy or nostalgia.
Reviving the spirit of the revolutionary square, as many dramatists attempted 
in the days of counterrevolution, required imaginative thinking about what 
that spirit meant in the present time. Documentary dramas about Tahrir were 
caught between modes of celebratory and accusatory testimony. A second 
wave of postrevolution performance unlinked social imagination from the pol-
itics of the present, and I analyze them through Muñoz’s framing of concrete 
utopias. Tahrir Square remained a key reference point in these performances, 
but it was evoked more allusively than spatially. While documentary dra-
mas evoked historical time, the newer wave of performances used spatial 
means to re- create the temporality of newfound hope. According to geogra-
pher Doreen Massey’s concept of open space as heterogeneous, a plurality 
of social repertoires in space gestured at an open future in the newer perfor-
mances.19 Such concretely utopian concepts of space were visible in the two 
shows I discuss here. Their respective versions of acting to make a difference 
Remembering Utopia 123
framed everyday urban practices within spaces of symbolic heterogeneity, 
showing how actors and spectators could embody a community open to a 
new future. In performance titles like Art Is an Open Square, Tahrir endured 
as a metonym for inclusive spaces of citizenship.
Pluralism and Popular Festivity after Revolution:  
Art Is an Open Square in 2012
The signature project of the Independent Culture Coalition was a monthly 
arts festival launched in 2011. Art Is an Open Square aimed to re- create 
the lively heterogeneity of the Tahrir Square protests in another space, and 
extend their communal spirit in time. In the aftermath of the uprising, artists 
at the coalition meeting had spoken of taking art to every part of the nation 
and offering it as a free, public right. My notes from the May 2011 meeting 
were filled with participants’ ideas about performing in various town squares, 
combining jazz and folk styles, and so on. The festival that resulted from 
these ambitious plans was far more circumscribed. It had a standing date of 
the first Saturday of every month, and the fixed venue of ‘Abdin Square in 
downtown Cairo, a ten- minute walk from Tahrir. The monthly ritual built 
on the weekend practice of promenading in the square before a former royal 
palace, a rare open public space in the lower- middle- class neighborhood. To 
emphasize the popular and inclusive nature of the arts festival, organizers 
hung decorative cloth panels, like those at an Egyptian mulid (saint’s fair), 
at the entrance of ‘Abdin Square. Such fairs took place in the countryside, 
bringing pilgrims from all over Egypt to pay respects to the saint, shop, and 
have fun.20 Art Is an Open Square evoked the combination of commerce and 
entertainment at the mulid, with vendors of popular snacks as well as elegant 
crafts, a tent for puppet shows, and a stage for performances at the end of 
the long square. The coalition’s debates about using art to carry the spirit of 
the revolution had moved from the pedagogical notion of taking art to the 
people to the goal of assembling a range of popular arts within a city square.
Yet the organizers did assign political significance to the cultural plural-
ity on display at the festival. As audiences entered, they saw a cloth wall 
pinned with pro- revolution posters and manifestos. This remained present 
until the last festival edition I attended, in July 2012. That edition coincided 
with International Nubian Day, and showcased the arts and performances 
of Egypt’s displaced Nubian population, many of whose members lived in 
the ‘Abdin neighborhood. The social plurality on display at Art Is an Open 
Square matched its range of cultural offerings. The novelty of finding a festi-
val that resembled a popular carnival in the heart of Cairo brought curious 
passersby, middle- class artists, families with children, and bands of young 
men. Whether or not they read the revolutionary posters, the diverse attend-
ees in the square were placed within a commemorative frame that attributed 
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their presence to the national solidarity that had catalyzed the revolution. 
As they roamed the square, however, they found different entertainments to 
cater to various age, gender, and class groups.
As afternoon shaded into twilight, performances onstage and in the square 
gathered the flow of festivalgoers into circles of spectatorship. Nubian musi-
cians were given the official stage at this edition. A child singer took the 
microphone first, singing in a powerful voice in Nubian, to the applause of 
a small audience made up mainly of Nubian families. Younger people joined 
the well- dressed families by the stage when a boy band came up, singing 
in Arabic about girls who wore hijabs but showed off their curves in tight 
pants. There was much applause and laughter for the cheeky lyrics, though 
two teenage girls near me shook their heads, dressed as they were in that 
fashion themselves. A similar mix of ages and genders was visible around 
the more informal, spontaneous performances in the square. The soccer 
fans known as ultras formed a dance circle, drumming wildly and singing 
their famous chants from the revolution as decorous middle- class audiences 
looked on silently. I saw many instances of such silent spectatorship across 
the square, such as when a circus performer showed off his fire- eating skills 
for the crowd. The juxtaposition of different performance styles for a mix of 
Boy band performing at Art Is an Open Square, July 2012. Photograph by Sonali 
Pahwa.
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audiences produced some awkward encounters across class lines in an other-
wise warm festival atmosphere.
Middle- class dramatists from the Independent Culture Coalition who 
attended Art Is an Open Square spoke enthusiastically of the mixed urban 
demographic that the festival attracted, a marked shift from the usual audi-
ences for art, music, and theater in Cairo’s formal cultural institutions. It 
seemed to them that every age group and social class was represented at 
the festival. Moreover, it was unique in including subaltern and unofficial 
cultural practices, such as soccer chanting. The scenario of the mulid- style 
fair allowed for these popular arts to be folded in and recognized by audi-
ences. This festive microcosm of popular culture attracted large numbers of 
middle- class artists in 2011, but fewer in 2012. Its diversity, popular tone, 
and ritualized commemoration of Tahrir served as a re- creation of revolu-
tionary utopia for organizers so long as it mirrored their contemporary vision 
of national solidarity. My artist friends who attended the festival in 2011 
gradually stopped going, as the model of national unity in Tahrir Square 
gave way to divisive politics and the violent suppression of protests. Some 
Soccer ultras chanting at Art Is an Open Square, joined by a man with an “I Am 
Nubian” T- shirt, July 2012. Photograph by Sonali Pahwa.
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claimed that “the artistic level was basic,” or that the festival was too hot 
and crowded. These gestures of refusal told me that the festival’s celebration 
of popular art and national solidarity no longer felt revolutionary to them 
amid contentious new politics. Now that elections had brought the Muslim 
Brotherhood to power, to the disappointment of secularist intellectuals, the 
celebration of popular culture felt outmoded. The fugitive intellectuals went 
back to their work in underground music, theater, or art, and the Independ-
ent Culture Coalition stopped meeting.
Using popular festivity to re- create a utopian community proved to have 
particular limitations after the violent suppression of popular nationwide 
protests. In this historical context, artists grew less optimistic about using 
the urban square as a microcosm of national revolutionary community. They 
could claim little room for political critique here, aside from a table for hand-
ing out pamphlets and stickers from the No Military Trials for Civilians 
movement. The nostalgic scenarios of popular festivity in the square were 
decreasingly able to speak back to the politics of the present, in Muñoz’s 
understanding of utopian critique. Neither was there space at the festival 
for the kinds of debate that would have attracted a fugitive community of 
intellectuals who refused the military discourse on postrevolution citizenship. 
The fate of Art Is an Open Square symbolized the impasse of revolutionary 
intellectuals who used art to preserve the memory of a cherished utopian 
community, even as they recognized the need to move their utopian imagi-
nation forward. It was a dilemma that they began to address through new 
experiments with space.
The festive square was a container of valued diversity, a plural and pop-
ular public along the lines of the mulid where everyone was welcome. 
However, its spatial scenario offered a limited narrative of progress: that of 
entering the festive square, enjoying its mixed offerings, and leaving uplifted. 
It was a one- directional movement into a fixed utopia. Artists and intellectuals 
who grew disappointed with the co- optation of popular festivity by Egyp-
tian regimes that organized their own “demonstrations” imagined moving out 
of the square to seek new utopian scenarios. These scenarios of community 
entailed reimagining avant- gardists’ organizational and performance prac-
tices. Instead of curating popular arts for the festival, the artists now worked 
to incorporate popular styles into their own repertoires. They recognized the 
need to open the space of popular performance by taking their own bodies 
and practices before new audiences. In theoretical terms, the fugitive per-
formers began to open up their concrete scenarios of utopian community 
both spatially and temporally.
Pop- up street shows became the signature of the next wave of this revolution-
ary performance project. Taking chamber music and ballet to neighborhoods, 
and feminist skits to Metro trains, the artist collectives Mini Mobile Concerts 
in Alexandria and Mahatat for Contemporary Art in Cairo adapted elite per-
formance genres for imagined popular publics. When the performers entered 
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public spaces, they carried the cultural authority of a middle- (or upper- ) 
class background. Yet they relied on audiences to reciprocate their gestures of 
outreach. The collaborative scenarios that resulted were less curated than the 
representation of national diversity at the arts festival. They were risky exper-
iments, and they sometimes failed, as I noticed in videos of several pop- up 
shows on the Facebook pages of the arts collectives I followed. My extended 
case study of a single troupe, and its evolving clown show, investigates the 
dynamic unfolding of the scenario of performer- audience interaction. It 
also shows how moving the performance from a theatrical to a quotid-
ian context opened new means of staging community through gestures of 
recognition.
Reimagining Community Theater in the Work of Red Tomato
In the summer of 2014, General Abdel Fattah al- Sisi was inaugurated as 
Egypt’s new president, and Tahrir Square’s grassy island was roped off and 
adorned with a military- style “commemorative monument.” Political murals 
had been painted over in the vicinity. Even stalwart activists were persuaded 
by the military’s claim that it had corrected the path of revolution by depos-
ing the Islamist government. However, there were rumblings of discontent in 
the theater community. Several editions of Art Is an Open Square had been 
canceled by security forces, and state theaters had gone without a budget for 
three years. As formal cultural and political activity ground to a near halt, 
performers were left with the option of guerrilla strategies for finding perfor-
mance space. Pop- up shows offered pragmatic means of evading the security 
permit system and the new law against public gathering, as well as allowing 
adventurous performers to reach out to popular audiences. Their gestures 
of outreach created spaces in which encounter across class lines was possi-
ble. With the decline of revolutionary institutions, such as the Independent 
Culture Coalition, these fugitive intellectuals found themselves staging revo-
lutionary ideals through simpler performance practices.
The Cairo- based troupe Outa Hamra (Red Tomato) had long espoused 
eclectic notions of a performance community, working with refugees, juvenile 
prisoners, and sex workers. The troupe members were themselves a mixed 
group, including four Egyptians and two European residents of Cairo. Their 
commissioned work with marginalized populations came under the rubric of 
what an English- speaking member described as “community theater.” How-
ever, troupe members generally called their style al- masrah al- igtima’i (social 
theater), since they made a point of taking shows outside designated com-
munity centers and offering them as free public entertainment. Red Tomato 
had started out as a street troupe that performed for children, and it had a 
lively, festive style. The troupe’s embrace of clowning since 2010 was part of 
its long history of experimenting with performance styles, from puppetry to 
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playback theater. Its strategy of performing both in community centers and 
on Egyptian streets turned the work into social theater, using scenarios of 
inclusion in the former to stage visions of open community at large. Politi-
cal theorists have cited refugee rights as a model for human rights, describing 
these as “the paradoxical rights of the private, poor, unpoliticized individ-
ual.”21 Red Tomato staged a concrete link between these two sets of rights by 
taking its clown shows to both refugee and urban venues, folding both sets 
of audiences into the scenario of utopian community.
Syrians were coming to Egypt in large numbers in 2014 as the civil war at 
home entered a particularly violent phase. The Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) resettled many Syrian families 
in Alexandria, where it found them housing with relative ease. Yet the Syr-
ians struggled with local hostility and xenophobia. As part of an initiative 
to make them feel more at home, the UNHCR commissioned Red Tomato 
to produce a show in collaboration with French members of the European 
organization Payasos Sin Fronteras (PSF; Clowns without Borders). PSF had 
been founded by Spanish performer Tortell Poltrona, who argued that clown-
ing “offer[ed] humor as a means of psychological support to communities 
that have suffered trauma.”22 Red Tomato’s members had studied clowning 
with French trainers from PSF in 2010 and found that it fit well with other 
theater methods for staging the integration of newcomers into communities. 
The troupe’s best- known play, Going to the Neighbors’ House, was a comic 
scenario developed out of workshops for Sudanese and Eritrean residents of 
Cairo and their Egyptian neighbors, on commission from the Psycho- social 
Institute. The clown show extended the comic genre of neighborly misun-
derstanding into a broader, less verbal scenario of outsider status. Since Red 
Tomato wove Egyptian folk comedy styles into the show, it fashioned locally 
recognizable versions of the clown in a genre that could stage an Egyptian 
welcome to Syrians.
When I interviewed Red Tomato members after a rehearsal, they had dif-
ferent takes on how clowning worked in Egypt. “It’s a powerful way of talking 
about things, because it makes people lower their defenses,” argued Jakob, 
a founding troupe member and longtime European resident of Cairo. Noha 
Khattab, an Egyptian anthropologist who joined the troupe after writing a mas-
ter’s thesis about it, liked clowning because it recognized common humanity 
across social backgrounds. “If you are a refugee or living in a slum, it collapses 
the idea that you can’t laugh or have fun.” Troupe members saw clowning as 
an extension of their community theater work, as it offered another framework 
for reaching across social divides. Aly, who had come to Red Tomato from 
his political street theater troupe Hala, found that street theater often drew 
suspicion from authorities. “Before January 25, we got some pushback from 
security forces,” he said. “They saw us working with foreigners and street chil-
dren, so they sometimes summoned us to the police station after a show. But 
when they saw our work, they didn’t have any problems with it.” I found this 
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remarkable after seeing a video of an early show on the troupe’s Facebook page 
in which Aly put on a police officer’s hat and caricatured his arrogance. Jakob 
then described a performance in a poor Cairo suburb where the troupe had 
encountered hostile neighborhood men, one of whom threatened to break the 
tiles of their temporary stage. But when the same man and his friends saw the 
show, they did indeed lower their defenses, laugh, and congratulate the troupe 
at the end. Red Tomato’s movements in urban space were clearly eased by a 
performance genre seen as folksy and fun rather than political or educational.
Their 2014 clown show 1, 2 . . . 5! consequently took up the assignment 
for Syrian refugees as both a light- hearted entertainment and a meditation 
on the role of outsiders in a community. The PSF’s abstractly utopian idea of 
clowning as a means of welcoming displaced people became more concrete in 
Red Tomato’s interpretation, which grew out of its history of working with 
marginalized groups and absorbing details of their lives. The troupe often 
wove social narratives (such as a theme of child abuse) into clown shows, 
unlike their French collaborators in the 2014 project. They resolved their 
artistic differences by making a show that relied more heavily on nonver-
bal gesture than usual, yet included locally specific details. The figure of the 
clown in this show acted as an outsider in various scenarios, eliciting differ-
ent kinds of recognition from Syrian audiences in a community center and 
Egyptians in a neighborhood street.
Scenes and Gestures of Hospitality
On a Saturday in June 2014, Red Tomato members and their four French 
collaborators traveled to Alexandria for the first of two scheduled shows in 
town. UNHCR had booked the garden of the Arab Medical Union villa for 
what the printed banner called a “Day of Entertainment for Syrian Children 
with the Cooperation of Clowns Without Borders.” This consisted of a lunch 
followed by a clown show for about forty children and an equal number of 
adults. Young Egyptian men in UNHCR jackets chaperoned the Syrian chil-
dren on old swings and play equipment while well- dressed parents chatted or 
checked their phones to one side. Holding an event to welcome refugees was 
not enough, however, to evoke gestures of goodwill from individual Egyp-
tians. As I wove through the crowd, I saw UNHCR employees chiding young 
children, one asking a child to repeat, “Long live Egypt.” The entertainment 
section of the day generated a warmer atmosphere, with more formal scenar-
ios for welcoming the outsiders. Actor Shakir from Red Tomato, who emceed 
the event, greeted the mostly Syrian audience with a funny, high- pitched spiel. 
He told some jokes and invited children to come forward and tell their own. 
Both Egyptian and Syrian children in the audience responded, standing on 
plastic chairs to address the crowd. The scenario of hospitality in this folksy 
introduction succeeded in eliciting a response from the audience of outsiders.
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Then the clowns filed in, dancing to their own music. Dressed in color-
ful variations on street clothes, with outlandish headgear and small horns to 
pipe out tunes, they lined up before the audience to stage a scene of arrival 
in a new place. They placed colorful plastic buckets over their faces, removed 
these slowly, and stared in comical amazement at their surroundings. The 
ritual of entry was more formal than usual for Red Tomato, since the clowns 
came down from the upper balcony of the villa. Yet they worked to invert 
the authority this implied through rambunctious scenes of conflict. Egyptian 
and French clowns tussled and held each other in neck grips, and an Egyptian 
clown sang a phrase by Umm Kulthum to a French clown who ventriloquized 
a puppet with a line from Edith Piaf. The comic conflict scenarios then gave 
way to a celebration of outsider status across national lines. Four clowns did 
headstands while cycling their legs in the air, and one took a watering can to 
their rears. A female clown hung upside- down from a pole carried horizon-
tally by two men, her silver leotard covering what would have otherwise been 
an improper exposure of skin. The show- stopping scene was one in which all 
the clowns took each other’s red fezzes— symbols of stately decorum from 
an earlier Arab era— and placed them on each other’s heads down a line, in 
a lively image of irreverence for social status. The scenes of slapstick invited 
the audience to laugh together at the absurdity of one- upmanship and status.
While the children clapped enthusiastically, I noticed that the Syrian 
adults were restrained in response to this utopian scenario of a society with-
out rules. Several of the mothers were dressed in modest, all- black clothing, 
and all sat silently, occasionally filming the show on their smartphones. Well- 
dressed fathers were similarly composed and proper. One man asked his child 
to give up his seat for me, a hospitable gesture that I refused with thanks. 
The parents’ gentle directions to children to sit down or be polite affirmed 
their adherence to middle- class norms of respectability despite their cur-
rent displacement. They resisted playing the part of dispossessed refugees. 
In this respect, it was telling that the adults seated near me declined to sing 
along to a popular Lebanese song about exile, “Nassam ‘Alayna al- Hawa’” 
(“Breathe on Us, O Breeze”) when the clowns asked them to. Its romantic 
voicing of exile status, like the clowns’ performance of an exuberant wel-
come, contrasted with the desultory hospitality of UNHCR workers (and 
reportedly of Alexandrians more generally). Red Tomato’s honoring of out-
sider status worked less well within a social scenario of grudging acceptance 
of refugees. The day of entertainment was an exceptional event in this con-
text, an abstractly utopian scene of welcome. Syrian children reciprocated 
the clowns’ gestures of outreach, but their parents reciprocated the UNHCR 
workers’ silence. The clowns’ performance of a scenario of what Noha called 
“melting status” as a means to stage an honest welcome was more fully real-
ized outside the refugee office’s formal event.
The frenetic half- hour clown show ended with polite applause, and the 
Syrians did not linger. The performers took off their noses, put their props 
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in a bag, and returned to the van. A scheduled second show, at a UNHCR 
facility in an Alexandria suburb, had been canceled by Egyptian security, but 
they wanted to perform again. Red Tomato’s clowns had done a version of 
1, 2 . . . 5! at a Youth and Sports (Al- Shabab w al- Riyada) community center 
in Cairo, and they knew the show worked well for an Egyptian audience. So 
they conferred with a local friend and decided to try performing in a down-
town Alexandria neighborhood. The street show was their favorite genre, 
since it was free of physical boundaries between performers and members 
of the community. In this Alexandria show, the narrative of outsiders arriv-
ing in a new place took on a new meaning in the context of a neighborhood 
where the clowns depended on hospitality to find their performance space. 
They lowered their status spatially and bodily when they ventured into the 
city street.
The clowns sat at a sidewalk café in the downtown Alexandria neighbor-
hood Kum al- Dikka, situated where a busy street branched into a quieter 
residential one. They put on their headgear and colorful accessories when 
they finished their tea, and gradually began performing. Two French clowns 
started juggling pins, getting the attention of neighborhood boys who asked 
for a lesson. The café owner’s young son (who studied at a French school) 
came up to ask where the foreigners were from, and when he realized they 
Red Tomato and PSF perform at a day of entertainment for Syrian refugees,  
Alexandria, June 2014. Photograph by Sonali Pahwa.
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shared a language, he took one of the clowns for a hospitable walk around 
the block. Another clown played a tune on his flute and drew the attention of 
men sitting before an outdoor television, set up for the World Cup match that 
was about to start. Women walking home stopped to scrutinize the mixed- 
gender group at the café, where women did not usually sit. In their different 
ways, the children and adults in the neighborhood recognized the presence 
of strangers in their midst and engaged with them tentatively. The interaction 
was unmediated by a formal welcome, such as that of the banner at the Arab 
Medical Union. Its opening up of the performance space was a more impro-
vised and dialogical process.
When all the performers had warmed up, the ritual of entering the neigh-
borhood began. This time, the musicians had a longer path through the 
narrow street, echoing the musical procession (zaffa) with which a marriage 
was announced in urban areas. Stavros, a local actor and friend of the troupe, 
brought along his drum to increase the volume so it could reach apartments 
in the taller buildings. By the time the party of oddly dressed performers had 
danced through the neighborhood’s main artery, several heads had popped 
out of windows and determined that this was not a bridal welcome. Some 
adults and several children followed the clowns to the empty parking lot, 
tucked between buildings, where they would do their show. As I watched 
Shakir set up the tarpaulin seating and stage tiles, I noticed some women 
looking out of apartment windows above. They stayed there through the 
show, angling their phones to capture images. Audiences watched the show 
unfold from different vantage points, depending on whether they were chil-
dren, adult men, or women. Likewise, my sense of their responses was guided 
by my position at the front of the lot. I heard claps and laughs from the win-
dows and saw more detailed responses from children (and some adults) at 
closer range.
As the clowns launched into the same sequence of upside- down antics as 
before, I heard laughter from all corners. One scene that had fallen relatively 
flat in the previous show was loudly applauded here: that of a Punch and Judy– 
style fight between Noha, playing the hunchbacked “great- grandmother,” and 
Hani, as her son “the grandfather.” They battled with sticks in an indecorous 
inversion of patriarchal authority. When things got particularly boisterous, 
one of the French clowns hid in a barrel to escape, and Noha beat him out 
of it with a stick. The reversal of gender and age hierarchies received wild 
applause. Such cartoonish violence between the visibly Egyptian characters 
in the show, dressed in folksy outfits, resonated most audibly with this neigh-
borhood audience. The clowns were a welcome style of outsider for them, 
colorful as a puppet show but engaging as humans. The neighborhood chil-
dren went up to the performers at the end and shook their hands, asking 
to take photographs with Hani and Noha. I interpreted the applause and 
the conversation between performers and children as gestures affirming 
their shared laughter at authoritative elders. As parents stood to one side 
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or watched from windows, these gestures created “intimate communication 
while under public gaze.”23 The clowns had staged a scene of upending social 
hierarchy in a comical style directed at children, but that the adults were also 
glad to welcome. In their inverted role as rambunctious clowns, the high- 
status European and Cairo outsiders performed an alliance with low- status 
children and staged a utopian version of subaltern community.
The show ended on a triumphant note, but the clowns had to move on 
quickly. I accompanied them back down the lane to the main street, where 
a man asked if they were “the Syrian troupe.” He had identified the foreign- 
looking performers with the show for or by Syrians, of which word had 
spread. It was only a moment, but it showed that the line between stigmatized 
refugees and high- status outsiders was temporarily blurred. It was difficult to 
tell what kind of outsider the performer represented in a street encounter. Yet 
the clowns interpreted the success of their pop- up show as a sign that out-
sider performers were welcome in Alexandria neighborhoods, contrary to the 
security forces’ contention that their presence would cause conflict. As the 
Red Tomato clowns chatted over the fish dinner to which they treated their 
French guests, they spoke about the second show as the main success. “I felt 
excited to be in the street as myself, not just as a performer,” Noha said. “We 
did not have to trick the audience that we’re people from outer space who 
drop in, do the show, and leave.” Her social position as an upper- class Cairo 
woman did not make her an alien here, nor did her clown outfit. She thought 
Fight between Grandfather and Great- Grandmother, Red Tomato performance 
in a Kum al- Dikka parking lot. Photograph by Sonali Pahwa.
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the neighbors’ hospitable welcome of the performers staged a kind of recog-
nition across class (and cultural) lines.
The exaggerated physicality of clowning made visible the potential of non-
verbal and gestural communication in staging alternative scenarios of social 
relation. After the ritual of welcome, mediated through the zaffa procession, 
the neighborhood residents engaged warmly if minimally with the clowns. 
The children were the most communicative, their gestures of recognition not 
yet disciplined by gender and age roles. Their interactions with the outsiders 
staged an open- ended scenario of community, unusual in times of internal 
social division and xenophobia. This pointed to the value of street perfor-
mance in activating neighborly hospitality. Its layering of playful interactions 
onto urban space extended the clownish utopia into more quotidian social sce-
narios. It thus translated UNHCR’s mission of providing support to refugees 
in multiple ways, addressing both Syrians in Egypt and Egyptians deprived 
of community- building rituals by the police state. The concrete utopia that 
the performance conjured up was able to cross assigned social divides and 
hierarchies in part because its vision of community was founded on welcom-
ing outsiders. Its broad gestures and elision of language aligned with an idea 
on which Red Tomato’s members all agreed: that clowning should not have 
a message because “nobody wants advice from a clown.” The social message 
was thus inherent in the physical presence of the performance.
In a clown show built on physical humor, rules of public behavior were 
up for change. The inversion potential of clowning scenarios, which Jakob 
called “breaking defenses” and Noha “melting status,” was particularly effec-
tive at the level of the neighborhood. Here, audiences activated repertoires 
of hospitality with which to welcome outsiders, as well as a tradition of per-
mitting street performers (such as puppeteers) who enacted status inversion. 
The politically radical clown troupe could thus fashion scenarios of uto-
pian welcome into a community more concretely here than at the UNHCR 
event, with its mission of integrating refugees in the abstract and minimizing 
cultural differences through humor. The gestures of hospitality with which 
residents of Kum al- Dikka welcomed the clowns exemplified a grassroots 
process of building temporary alliances across differences. They showed the 
utopian possibilities inherent in quotidian cultural repertoires. Children’s 
taste for status inversions made them particular allies of the clowns, and 
their gestures of recognition briefly conveyed the hope of making communi-
ties more expansive and inclusive.
Popular Performance, Utopian Community,  
and the Future of Revolutionary Hope
From 2012 to 2014, when Egyptian police enforced antiprotest laws and cur-
fews, public performances interrupted the attempts of successive regimes to 
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securitize the streets and stabilize politics. Both Art Is an Open Square and the 
clown show 1, 2 . . . 5! resisted being categorized as commemorations of the 
revolution. Instead, they drew street audiences into heightened affective rep-
ertoires, echoing the performance techniques by which revolutionary protests 
had offered alternative ways of interacting in public space. The architecture of 
interaction in such shows was formed by embodied practices more than rules 
of policed public space. Decontextualizing gestures from everyday scenarios (of 
hospitality, for instance) turned the cultural values embedded in the gestures into 
open- ended interactive practices. The performers’ reworking of popular public 
repertoires through decontextualization and transposition produced stagings of 
community that extracted the utopian from the everyday. These unspectacular 
interventions escaped the kinds of media attention that large protests attracted. 
Instead, they circulated through videos on social media, and in the memories of 
those who viewed and participated in performances.
As revolutionaries undertook the labor of structural change, social theater 
experiments illuminated the movement of revolutionary practice from its 
spectacular to its quotidian phase. Political scenarios on a national scale were 
replaced by smaller gestures of community building that folded into everyday 
life and social repertoires. Returning to Muñoz’s concepts of everyday utopia, 
we can see street performances of inclusive community as representative sites 
of utopian imagination. When read through the lens of gestural exchange, 
they offer analytical purchase for understanding how revolutionary thought 
translated into embodied social dialogues. In particular, Rodriguez’s use of 
gesture to conceptualize recognition as a performative rather than juridical 
concept informs my reading of how post- 2011 performances communicated 
revolutionary desires for relationality and mutual recognition. Their every-
day scale echoed Harney and Moten’s idealized concept of revolution as 
being without politics, or specific political goals.24 It is worth considering 
such initiatives as subaltern modes of revolutionary practice that built chan-
nels of communication between intellectuals and a broader public.
Cultural and political avant- gardes intersected spectacularly during Egypt’s 
2011 uprising and occasionally sustained each other in the years that fol-
lowed. As the independent theater movement detached concepts of modern 
culture from progressive visions of the future, it opened the way for expand-
ing concepts of avant- garde performance “from temporal to more spatial 
notions of cutting edge as border.”25 The spaces of interaction between these 
artists and their publics grew broader after the intellectual undercommons 
joined in revolutionary protests. The utopian connections that occasionally 
formed in street performance now made visible the intellectual idealism that 
persisted in the fugitive underground of the nation through its years of polit-
ical struggle. The venues into which theater makers inserted their visions of 
idealized community— the urban festival, refugee event, and neighborhood 
street show— offered their own cultural repertoires to the utopian project. 
Unexpectedly, the urban neighborhood of Kum al- Dikka proved particularly 
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able to open its concept of community in plural, inclusive ways. It showed 
that repertoires of pluralism in a space did not necessarily match its norma-
tive cultural boundaries. The hospitable residents of Kum al- Dikka might be 
less cosmopolitan than the Cairenes who came to Art Is an Open Square, but 
their neighborliness offered paths of entry for outsiders. Gestures of recogni-
tion for the work of avant- garde performers here offered glimpses of hope for 
the continuing exchange of critical thought through theater.
In the repressive period of Egyptian politics cemented by the 2013 coup, it 
became apparent that the political revolution was not moving forward. There 
was no time beyond military rule on the horizon. Yet there were ways in which 
revolutionary ideas spread geographically. Theater makers and musicians were 
among the vectors of this revolutionary movement, as subaltern intellectuals 
accustomed to making space for their ideas outside formal institutions. Their 
fugitive techniques allowed them to sidestep police crackdowns and reach out 
to audiences with improvised scenarios of inclusive community. Using quotidian 
cultural repertoires in their shows, the performers demonstrated that everyday 
practices could sustain the ideals of the revolution. And as they engaged with 
a broader array of citizens, their performance repertoires grew more popular, 
their definitions of theater diverse, and their utopian imagination more open.
The relative absence of minority identity politics in their postuprising 
theater signaled a provisional embrace of nationalist repertoires of citizen-
ship. Performers of all stripes were inspired by revolutionary sentiment to 
reconcile avant- garde and popular art forms, and theater makers likewise 
experimented with reaching across cultural registers. They were on unfamil-
iar ground here, and their attempts to expand repertoires with clowning, 
dance, and popular performance genres often failed to win support across 
their traditional and intended new audiences. As a relatively successful effort, 
the clown show 1, 2 . . . 5! provided a model for using performance scenarios 
flexibly to address different audiences. A heightened use of gesture that invited 
dialogic response, completing the scenario of community, allowed a broader 
range of people to inhabit the role of theater audience. Moreover, the hierar-
chy between pedagogue- performer and student- audience typically inscribed 
into theater for social change was flattened in this scenario. When the clown 
show moved from a context of pedagogical theater to one of street theater, it 
gestured at inverting the performer- audience relationship altogether. The per-
formers were cultural outsiders, asking neighborhood audiences to welcome 
those unlike themselves. The radicalism of this gesture lay in aligning more 
and less privileged outsiders and staging the possibility of their alliance in a 
“fellowship of the flawed.”26
Avant- garde street performances rehearsed a community to come, in both 
futurist and contemporary terms, negating the official position that the revo-
lution was past. Its concrete reimagination of public space to enact alternative 
social relations resembled techniques of protest performance,27 as well as the 
festivity of apolitical street entertainment.28 The symbolic repertoires of the 
Remembering Utopia 137
performances were key to staging their visions of community. When they incor-
porated subaltern gestures, such as that of the weak beating the strong in the 
clown show, or the chants of soccer ultras at the arts festival, they revived mem-
ories of revolutionary inversion. The mix of performance repertoires at street 
shows in Cairo and Alexandria opened up different lines of social engagement 
and scenarios of what a future community should look like. The utopian mem-
ory of citizens acting in common during the 2011 uprising thus extended into 
more modest gestures of reimagining “the people” as an avant- garde assemblage.
As the political revolution slowed with the tapering of mass protests after 
2011, media commentators followed military leaders in calling for a return 
to normalcy.29 The artists and activists who wanted to keep alive revolu-
tionary hopes thus returned to fugitive practices to enact what Asef Bayat 
called nonmovements for social change. In this context, some everyday uses 
of public space grew charged with potential political significance. Performers 
turned their interventions here into memorable and repeatable gestures, and 
their repertoires modeled the double- edged possibilities of physical move-
ment. Even in entertaining repertoires, such as clowning, they extended their 
scope of rights to the city and public sociality. The new society, in their uto-
pian vision, expanded repertoires of revolutionary citizenship beyond the 
world of intellectuals and political elites.
To what extent could such playful interventions challenge the rollback 
of rights under a new dictatorship? I contemplate this question via Marga-
ret Litvin’s suggestion that art is revolutionary when “most agile and most 
frequently revised, best able to respond to the protean and unpredictable 
machinations of counterrevolutionary actors.”30 Street performance was a 
means of reaffirming the political agency of the performing body as some-
thing more than a sign to be inscribed and co- opted within media narratives. 
It adapted with agility to shifts in political scenarios and enabled activists to 
modulate their response to counterrevolutionary pressures. Most crucially, 
revolutionary art held a space for utopian thought outside the apparent clo-
sure of revolutionary politics. Theatrical experiments with new communal 
relations echoed Muñoz’s philosophical concept of the utopian gesture as 
“not a full- fledged resistance, but  .  .  . a moment when that overwhelming 
frame of a here and now, a spatial and temporal order that is calibrated 
against one, is resisted.”31 In scaling revolutionary hope down to the per-
forming body that invited others into its story, dramatists affirmed their faith 
in art as a reservoir of dissident feeling. It could push against the grain of 
populist utopianism or political despair. And it preserved the idea of the citi-





One summer afternoon in 2014, I took a Cairo Metro train to the very end 
of the line to meet a theater troupe led by Nada Sabet, a thirty- year- old direc-
tor with degrees from the American University in Cairo and Goldsmiths, 
University of London. She had returned to Egypt after the revolution, like 
many expatriate elites, to participate in the nation’s cultural reconstruction. 
Nada’s small silver car, into which I squeezed with three actors and another 
researcher, was heading even farther out of the familiar city center. It rattled 
over the bumpy, unmarked roads to a women’s cooperative in one of Cairo’s 
“informal neighborhoods” (‘ashwa’iyyat), where her independent troupe was 
to perform a skit show about female circumcision. Actors Ahmed, Sami, and 
Shirin, middle- class twentysomethings from Cairo and Alexandria, would not 
have been found performing in such a neighborhood before the revolution. A 
troupe like Nada’s could not, indeed, have traveled to make theater for social 
change before state security rules eased with the fall of Hosni Mubarak. Nada 
applied to produce a show for one of the new internationally funded projects 
that emerged with the renewed global attention on Egypt, and took on an anti-
circumcision assignment from the United Nations– funded nongovernmental 
organization Y- Peer.1 She would use her characteristically comic style to invite 
discussion about the social and sexual ethics of modern womanhood here.
The building where the women’s cooperative met was a state- owned com-
munity center, incongruously immaculate amid the street’s piles of uncollected 
garbage. The actors unloaded lengths of colorful fabric from the van to wrap 
into impromptu costumes, together with wigs, accessories, and a banner 
printed with the troupe’s name, Noon Creative Enterprise (Noon li- l- Ibda’). 
Upstairs, an audience of about twenty women welcomed them with smiles 
despite their delay, pleased to have a show rather than the usual dull lecture at 
their monthly meeting. Nada introduced her sketch comedy, Hara TV: Keep It 
Real, as a set of rehearsals for a fictional television show about women’s issues. 
There would be a discussion afterward where the audience could share their 
views about what they had seen. Nada’s animated hand gestures, T- shirt, and 
natural hair contrasted with the decorous demeanor of women with stylishly 
modest clothes in the audience, promising a lively debate about gender roles. 
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The performance was designed to bridge their visible cultural divide through 
its innovative genre, which hybridized Egyptian neofolk styles with techniques 
of legislative and forum theater taken from the transnational Theater of the 
Oppressed.2 Its wide- ranging satire of calls for female circumcision in Egypt 
aimed to show that women’s oppression crossed class and regional lines.
The performance was fast- paced and folksy. Actor Ahmed dressed in drag 
as a conservative mother- in- law who prayed her new grandchild would be a 
boy. And a modern city doctor, performed by Shirin in a lab coat, also endorsed 
the idea that circumcision was necessary to moderate women’s sexuality. With 
their slapstick style, the Noon actors generated a surprisingly funny perfor-
mance about a banned surgical procedure that remained common throughout 
Egypt and resulted in deaths at unregulated clinics. The audience laughed and 
nodded, apparently relating to the troupe’s framing of circumcision as a symp-
tom of patriarchal hypocrisy about gender equality in Egypt. Though two 
unsmiling older women left midway, visibly displeased, the audience otherwise 
warmly received the satirical critique. After the show, however, the discussion 
revealed a gap between the affective alignment of performers and audience 
and their different views on the pragmatics of social change. One woman in 
the audience sighed, “I wish I could be like those women [in the skits].” She felt 
bound by gender norms herself, even if she laughed at how they were repre-
sented in the show. “I have a boy and girl, and treat them the same at home,” 
another woman declared proudly. “Treating them the same will not change 
society,” her skeptical friend responded.
The Noon troupe’s project of taking socially critical performance to audi-
ences in urban slums, and then small towns, produced an ambivalent space 
of encounter between idealistic young avant- gardists and audiences more 
resigned to the lack of change in their social world. In the utopian moment 
of performance, they found common ground in thinking about the future 
of their society. Yet the theatrical space could only serve for so long as the 
metonym for a revolutionary nation in which all citizens identified with the 
spectacle of political democracy and committed to fulfilling its promise. While 
the educational television genre on which Hara TV was modeled addressed 
women in need of enlightenment, urging them to catch up with progressive 
gender norms, the discussion showed that democracy was a more laborious 
process. Audiences pushed back against the avant- gardist performers’ vision 
of changing gender roles, reminding them that the world outside the theater 
moved more slowly. Their bodies were not flexible entities but rather bound 
to families and judged by the norms of communities. It took a brave woman 
to fight against the idea of girls’ sexual purity by refusing circumcision when 
real husbands and mothers- in- law were so more powerful than comic char-
acters. Still, Noon’s theater makers continued to travel with their show and 
urge critical debate through performance. Spreading their hopeful vision of 
the future through cultural outreach was among the last avenues open to 
activist youth in an era of counterrevolution.
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The utopian spirit that galvanized many artists and dramatists in 2011 
had fizzled rapidly at state cultural institutions. Battles between Islamist and 
liberal leaders waged on media channels made it clear that the debates over 
the dominant culture of the nation would not be resolved easily. The liber-
als used arts institutions as a platform for their ideology. At a meeting on 
cultural policy at the Cairo Opera House in June 2012, on the eve of the pres-
idential election, the moderator invited attending artists and intellectuals to 
discuss how, in the new Islamist regime, “extremist voices attacked creative 
freedom and the right to knowledge.” Independent dramatists at the meet-
ing voiced agreement with state cultural officials in a closing of the ranks 
of political liberals against the perceived threat. Theater professor Nehad 
Selaiha joked with colleagues that the Muslim Brotherhood would form a 
caliphate and relocate Egypt’s capital to Jerusalem. Liberal jurist Hossam 
Eissa, the keynote speaker, reminded the audience of the notable contribu-
tions of Christians and Jews to Egyptian music and cinema. Art had become 
a battleground rather than a meeting point for conceptions of citizenship in 
these halls of power. Secularist bureaucrats and artists, in particular, feared 
losing the privilege they had enjoyed in state institutions. Their fears became 
concrete when the Muslim Brotherhood’s minister of culture, Alaa Abdel 
Aziz, fired the head of the Cairo Opera House in June 2013, reportedly saying 
that the state should not support Western arts for a small elite.3
The decision catalyzed protests in Cairo and Alexandria, which joined 
the national activist wave culminating in the army coup of July. Even perfor-
mance became a political tool, as Islamists, liberals, and military supporters 
each used the familiar repertoires of urban protest, including chanting, sing-
ing, and dancing, to create camera- ready scenes of occupied squares for 
television and social media. The political spectacles by which leaders claimed 
stewardship over the popular revolution were so pervasive as to marginalize 
the demands of performers themselves. At the weeks- long protest in front of 
Cairo’s Ministry of Culture headquarters, members of the opera ballet danced 
in street clothes, performing the role of outcast artists. Meanwhile, independ-
ent dramatists felt ignored when they asked about democratizing the ministry’s 
structure and budget.4 In the parallel protest at Alexandria’s Bayram El Tunsi 
Theater, led by independent musicians and dramatists, participants stated 
more boldly that their demand was cultural freedom. Avant- garde perform-
ers, including the Noon troupe, continued working all this time to organize 
public arts festivals and cultural outreach initiatives. Their performances 
offered small- scale models for how artists and intellectuals might bridge 
growing ideological divides in the nation.
Postrevolution arts initiatives expanded their work well beyond cultural 
institutions, focusing on public performances and workshops rather than 
traditional avant- garde audiences. The Mahatat collective for art and perfor-
mance, for instance, announced on its Facebook page that it was working “to 
transform public spaces, create opportunities for exposure to the arts, and offer 
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needs- based learning experiences to artists, practitioners, and entrepreneurs.”5 
Such collectives continued to voice faith in public arts as a means of fostering 
community. Theater director Ahmed el- Attar launched the full- scale Down-
town Contemporary Arts Festival in 2012 in an effort to bring free access to 
performance in urban streets and alleys. He wrote of his hopes for the festival 
in its 2013 program: “On 25 January 2011 we began the first day of our lives 
both as individuals and as a nation. On that day a glimpse of hope was born, a 
new future was perceived, and a different reality materialized.”6 Expanding the 
spatial scope of their avant- garde vision was key to dramatists’ efforts to sus-
tain the revolutionary spirit. They recognized that cultural outreach was slow 
work and would take far longer than the eighteen- day uprising that unseated 
Mubarak. But they were not content to hand responsibility for cultural democ-
racy back to a Ministry of Culture that had put its support behind the Sisi 
regime. So they continued to attempt to perform in modest, popular neighbor-
hoods and grapple with the resistances they encountered here. The hard work 
of outreach brought their utopian ideals down to earth.
Avant- garde performance initiatives staged hopeful cross- class relations 
after the revolution, circumventing hardening divides in national politics. 
Their ideals echoed Jacques Rancière’s utopian notion of how theater gen-
erates “community as a way of occupying a place and a time, as the body 
in action as opposed to a mere apparatus of laws; a set of perceptions, ges-
tures and attitudes that precede and pre- form laws and political institutions.”7 
While dreams of building embodied connections across class difference drove 
new projects for street and social theater, dramatists recognized that perfor-
mance often just oriented groups toward each another and staged mutual 
recognition in a temporary form. Yet they considered the gesture of inviting 
cultural outsiders into the sphere of avant- garde performance revolutionary in 
its modest way. It established a new conceptual framework of recognition, in 
Frank Wilderson’s terms, “predicated not on the subject- effect of cultural per-
formance but on the structure of political ontology, a framework that allows 
us to substitute a culture of politics for a politics of culture.”8 In other words, 
it democratized art as a site of discussions of citizenship only among a privi-
leged class of aesthetes. Social theater that mapped onto new spaces extended 
the link between cultural and political citizenship to a more plural community.
Independent cultural producers who successfully launched such popular 
avant- garde projects offered an implicit solution to the cultural polarization 
that paralyzed state institutions. The looser aesthetic hierarchy of their own 
performance tradition enabled them to think of cultural citizenship in more 
inclusive terms. Between the cultural democracy reforms of the 1990s and 
the political revolution of 2011, the demos in democracy was variously rep-
resented by the activists and the performance genres of independent theater. 
Where an older generation of state- affiliated dramatists thus spoke of “the 
people” as a mass to be enlightened, the independents working at the end 
of the wave made theater for a people to come. Across generations, these 
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dramatists were highly educated, culturally respected, and economically mar-
ginal, occupying a position of privileged subalternity that made them effective 
mediators between neoliberal narratives of high- speed globalization and the 
slower realities of national historical change. Their own struggles with rigid 
institutions and hierarchical bureaucracies produced a critical approach to 
state authority. Within the space of performance, then, subaltern intellectu-
als and working- class audiences found affective similarities in their critiques 
of globalization from above and desires for more representative cultural pro-
duction. Performances for social change embodied these speculatively as 
cross- class alliances to be activated in times of political need.
The outreach work of Egyptian artists is currently in suspended anima-
tion, as the Sisi regime continues to steamroll free expression and critical 
art with increasing ferocity. Several independent dramatists have stopped 
making theater. Others are forced to restrict their work to nongovernmen-
tal organizations and foreign cultural centers, ending their troupes’ history 
of working across cultural, educational, and corporate institutions. As police 
crackdowns extend to digital venues, as in the closure of satirist Shadi Abu 
Zeid’s YouTube channel Al- muhtawa al- ghani (Rich Content) and his arrest, 
there remain few underground spaces to which independents can escape and 
sustain their virtual community. The current regime certainly tests the belief 
Hip- hop performance at the Downtown Contemporary Arts Festival, 2012.  
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that art can serve as a forum for expressions of hope for the future. Some 
independent dramatists with whom I reunited in the counterrevolutionary 
period looked back cynically at their younger selves, so optimistic about 
using theater to build a new community. Without cultural spaces in which to 
enact their visions of engaged citizenship, they went back to office jobs and 
family lives. Several grew clinically depressed.
None of these friends regretted the 2011 revolution, however. They posted 
social media memories on each January anniversary and remembered the 
thrill and hope they had felt during protests. Perhaps it was their expansive 
knowledge of tragedy that kept them from seeing revolutionaries as tragic 
figures, like Samuli Schielke’s interlocutors of the same Egyptian generation.9 
In contrast to the grand narratives of social change against which those 
young Egyptians measured the revolution’s failure, the memories my friends 
drew on were of minor projects and successes. Fashioning visions of commu-
nity outside a single national narrative was part of their ethic as “soldiers of 
the cultural battlefield” in the neoliberal age. In this context, the failure of 
the national uprising was not the end of their story. Their repertoires of hope 
were enriched by memories of revolutionary protest, as were their embodied 
practices of citizenship. The dramatists of the independent theater movement 
were well versed in living across oppressive urban and democratic cultural 
spaces. When the latter diminished under political pressure, they remembered 
how such spaces had been rebuilt in the past.
Independent campaigns for cultural outreach had all the uncertainty of 
street theater, in which the audience welcomed into a democratic scenario 
might refuse its gestures of inclusion. The conditional optimism of these initi-
atives differed from the grand narratives of official avant- gardes that claimed 
to bring a new world into being. The free theater manifesto of 1990, for 
instance, was far more pragmatic than the celebratory manifesto of the Cairo 
International Festival for Experimental Theatre. Independent troupes were 
known for staging their own modest scenarios of self- representation rather 
than awaiting the arrival of cultural democracy. My analysis of performances 
through which they did so demonstrates the possibilities of avant- gardist 
culture in autocratic contexts. It points also to the excess of hope that con-
tinues to fuel such work against the political odds. Tracing utopian thinking 
through cultural activism offers a narrative of revolution that is more his-
torically complex than one centered on the events of 2011. Theater was no 
longer a magisterial school for modern citizenship in the late Mubarak era. 
It had become an alternative to the censored, policed publics otherwise avail-
able to urban Egyptians. Young avant- gardists embraced it as a lifeworld in 
which to counter the alienating individualism of a neoliberal economy, as 
well as the erasure of citizen participation in a dictatorship. As the endur-
ance of Egyptian theater in unlikely circumstances has shown, it was a space 
worth fighting for. Where such modest spaces of utopian thinking remained, 
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